MEDELLIN SETS THE PACE ON SUCCESSFUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000581

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: MEDELLIN SETS THE PACE ON SUCCESSFUL
REINTEGRATION, BUT SECURITY CHALLENGES REMAIN

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Secretary of Government for Medellin Gustavo Villegas
said on January 16 security in the city had improved
dramatically over the last three years. Even regular
criminal group members want to "demobilize." Still, Medellin
faced security challenges associated with ex-paramilitary
power struggles. Medellin's Chief Prosecutor told us he was
concerned limited resources and leaks impeded his efforts to
prosecute cases. End summary.

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General Security Overview Positive...
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2. (SBU) Secretary of Government for Medellin Gustavo
Villegas, who is also the Director of Medellin's Peace and
Reconciliation Program, told us on January 16 the security
situation in the city had improved over the last three years,
due to strong leadership, increased police presence, and
programs that offered opportunities to demobilized
paramilitaries. Compared to 1992 when over 600 homicides
occurred in December alone, the number of murders for the
city in 2006 was 696. Villegas hoped to reduce that number
to 600 in 2007. The reduction has occurred primarily since
2003, when the total number of homicides in Medellin was
3,721.


3. (SBU) Villegas explained that Medellin owed its success
to its ability to address the potential security, social, and
economic risks of settling 4,130 demobilized paramilitaries
since 2003 -- 13 percent of the national total -- in the
city. The Mayor's Peace and Reconciliation Program led these
efforts by assisting the demobilized with education,
healthcare, psychological treatment, and employment. Over 80
percent of the demobilized paramilitaries have participated
in one or all of the programs the city offered. It has also
focused on community reconciliation activities for victims --
over 98,000 citizens have taken part. Moreover, the Mayor's
Office has boosted the legitimacy of local government,
especially the police, by increasing visibility and outreach.
The city's goal is to decrease former combatants reliance on
ex-paramilitary authority structures.


4. (SBU) Medellin's Peace and Reconciliation Program
Coordinator Jorge Gaviria told us on January 17 that even the
city's gangs of common criminals wanted to "demobilize."
Gaviria said more than 1,000 of the estimated 3,500 to 4,000
youth gang members in the city were prepared to leave the
gangs in exchange for benefits similar to those offered to
former paramilitaries. Villegas noted he is trying to lobby
for a legal framework that could allow these types of
criminals to benefit from the city's reintegration program.
Meanwhile, Villegas explained the city is trying to offer a
program to 10,000 impoverished youths (ages 16-29 years old)
who never participated in gangs or illegal armed groups. The
idea is to encourage their participation in education and
labor programs and give them the opportunity to excel.

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...But New Power Struggles Causing Unease
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5. (C) Still, violence remains in Medellin. In recent
months, several ex-combatants have been murdered, including
former high-level paramilitary leaders. The Police Commander
for Citizen Security in Medellin's Metropolitan Area, Colonel
Perdomo, said 89 ex-paramilitaries have been killed since
2004, of which 56, or sixty-three percent, were murdered in

2006. Villegas said the recent increase in demobilized
deaths could be revenge attacks related to their former
paramilitary activities. Candidate for Antioquia Governor

Jaime Fajardo and former Medellin Secretary General Alonso
Salazar largely attributed the murder of former
paramilitaries to internal rifts among ex-paramilitary
leaders held in Itagui Prison and to the influence of the
Cali Cartel in Medellin. OAS Mission to Support the Peace
Process in Colombia analysts said a "mafia mentality" still
permeated the former AUC members; the AUC never had
discipline within its ranks and always suffered from violent
internal disputes over strategic areas and routes.


6. (C) Power struggles are likely behind several late 2006
murders of former paramilitaries. Jairo Angarita, second in
command to ex-paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso in the
Sinu and San Jorge Blocs, had threatened to tell prosecutors
everything he knew before he was murdered several weeks
later. The other two prominent former paramilitaries killed
were Don Berna's right-hand Daniel Mejia, (AKA "Daniel") and
Jorge 40's lieutenant Jefferson Martinez, (AKA "Omega").
Villegas said Don Berna had informed him the Cali Cartel was
after Daniel. Medellin investigators told us Don Berna's
claim that the Cali Cartel was responsible could be an
attempt to divert attention from his own culpability, as
Daniel was starting to work with Don Berna's emerging rival,
Macaco.

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Limited Resources and Leaks Hamper Effectiveness
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7. (C) Medellin's Chief Prosecutor Guillermo Leon Valencia
told us he was concerned limited resources and leaks impeded
his efforts to properly follow key cases. Medellin,
Colombia's second-largest city, was seriously underfunded and
needed more prosecutors and judicial police. The situation
was worse elsewhere in the country, he said. By their
nature, leaks were difficult to prove and shut down,
especially in relation to Vicente Castano, who Leon Valencia
said had "thousands eyes and ears" in Medellin. Still, he is
preparing his staff for the new accusatory system and has
trained over 7,000 people, including police and other
forensic investigators. He said his prosecutors managed
30-50 cases each and they were much better off than the
judicial police, with 34 officers each handling 500 cases.

WOOD