Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA5002
2007-07-12 12:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q2'07

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6923
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7632
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9169
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL LIMA 5245
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0448
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5843
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS//
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005002 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q2'07

REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 9448


B. BOGOTA 297

C. BOGOTA 3096

D. BOGOTA 4746

E. BOGOTA 2839

Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005002

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q2'07

REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 9448


B. BOGOTA 297

C. BOGOTA 3096

D. BOGOTA 4746

E. BOGOTA 2839

Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) GOC efforts in the second quarter continued to erode
FARC and ELN fighting strength, while new strategies
effectively targeted other illegal armed groups. FARC
attacks centered on vital drug trafficking areas in Tolima
Department, Cali, and Buenaventura, where the group conducted
a series of bombings, and reflected the FARC's degraded
capacity to engage in conventional operations. In the
'Omega' zone, frequent clashes continued as the FARC
reinforced fronts to protect coca growing. Three new Army
brigades achieved good results in joint combat with Marines
in the north in preparation for deployment to Narino. The
FARC avoided engagement with the military near the Venezuelan
border, where ELN and new criminal groups bore the brunt of
military and law enforcement action. The GOC uncovered
several instances of FARC intimidation and infiltration aimed
to manipulate local elections scheduled for October. End
Summary.

--------------
Long-Term Progress Against Armed Groups
--------------


2. (U) GOC efforts to strengthen security forces and refine
strategies against illegal armed groups (IAGs) are slowly
achieving results. The FARC's ability to carry out offensive
operations, inflict casualties on the military, control
territory, and intimidate local populations is continuing to
deteriorate slowly. The ELN remains weak and is using an
on-again, off-again peace process with the GOC to relieve the
stress caused by GOC and FARC attacks. Other IAGs made up of
small numbers of ex-paramilitaries engaged almost exclusively
in drug trafficking have been damaged by new GOC interagency
task forces that target their criminal activity.

--------------
FARC Attacks in Southwest
--------------


3. (U) Terrorist attacks centered on Valle and Tolima,

driven by the FARC's focus on drug income, a need to control
mobility corridors, and an inability to engage in
conventional combat. In Valle, a security crackdown in
Buenaventura was followed by a series of FARC-sponsored
bombings, including one that destroyed police headquarters in
Cali (Ref C). From June 20-22, eleven bombs were planted in
and around Buenaventura, reportedly in retaliation for the
death of FARC militia leader 'JJ' at the hands of the
military (Ref D). In neighboring Tolima, the FARC twice
bombed the Ibague bus company owned by a mayoral candidate
and attacked a rural police post near Ibague with gas
cylinder bombs. The FARC attacked Rioblanco's public square
with rifles and mortars and was repelled from an assault on
Planadas.


4. (C) Tolima contains vital logistics routes, connecting
inland coca cultivation to Valle's Pacific coast shipment
points. Drug trafficking activity has grown in the southwest
following military pressure in other regions. Increased
military presence and intelligence successes against the
FARC's command structure prevented the group from mounting
large-scale conventional assaults. Instead, the FARC used
terrorist acts to avoid confrontation and draw public forces
into cities and away from drug routes.

--------------
FARC Defends Coca-Growing Territories
--------------


5. (C) Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O) concentrated its
efforts east and north of Macarena ridge in Meta Department,
where the FARC defended its coca fields in the national park.
JTF-O commanders said the FARC drew forces from other
regions to reinforce this critical zone, where an estimated
one-third of total guerrilla forces now operate. The FARC
continued to create 'inter-front' units to take combat
pressure off fronts involved in the drug trade, allowing them
more latitude in moving drugs and supplies. JTF-O's eight
offensive brigades frequently engaged FARC forces but did not
achieve the large scale takedowns of the first quarter. It
is too early to determine whether small unit tactics
introduced this year by JTF-O will bear fruit. Helicopter
crashes and mechanical problems cut into JTF-O's limited
mobility and put an end to fly over psyops messages. The
broadcasts had yielded key FARC desertions and actionable
intelligence. JTF-O mobile Army brigades integrated police
in their ranks, bringing needed investigative and arrest
authorities.

--------------
New Units Show Strength
--------------


6. (C) In the northern Montes de Maria region (Sucre /
Bolivar / Magdalena),law enforcement and the military
coordinated action against the two FARC fronts from which
Foreign Minister Fernando Araujo escaped in January 2007.
The units combined urban combat with legal prosecution,
yielding more than 50 arrests and 50 FARC killed in action.
Military pressure on the 53-member Revolutionary People's
Army (ERP) led to its complete demobilization. Marines and
three mobile brigades comprising the Joint Force of Decisive
Action ('FUCAD') operated in the area prior to deployment to
more intense conflict zones of Narino and Tolima/Huila in
late 2007. Officials are optimistic that FUCAD success can
be replicated against illegal armed groups in Narino, where
the Army has two territorial battalions lacking mobility (Ref
E).

--------------
Action vs. IAGs and ELN
--------------


7. (C) In the northeast Venezuela border region the FARC
avoided engagement while the ELN and new criminal groups bore
the brunt of GOC action. In Catatumbo (Norte de Santander),
the first of twelve inter-agency "Search Blocks" comprised of
military and law enforcement showed good results against
illegal armed groups. The Army reported seven engagements
with "Aguilas Negras" (12 members killed),three with ELN
(two killed),and one with FARC (none killed). The ELN twice
ambushed Army patrols in the area, killing four soldiers. A
cross-section of criminal groups including ELN and FARC
reportedly cooperated in Catatumbo in the cross-border drugs
trade. In the Sierra Nevada region (Cesar / La Guajira),
FARC activity was low, likely due to the deaths of two FARC
deputy commanders. The ELN remained weak in the region, with
16 members killed in ten clashes in which the COLAR suffered
no casualties. The Army also rescued two wounded minors who
had been forcibly recruited into the ELN.

--------------
Other Conflict Zones
--------------


8. (C) The fiercest fighting occurred in Antioquia and
Arauca. In Antioquia, frequent Army operations targeted a
range of FARC fronts who had attacked civilians to enforce
extortion demands. Sixteen ELN were also killed, including
nine at Anori. Police arrested two fugitive ex-AUC leaders
aka 'HH' and 'Rene.' The tridepartment zone of Arauca /
Boyaca / Casanare was a four-way contest for control by the
Colombian military, FARC, ELN, and new criminal groups,
causing 400 new displaced persons, increased mine field
casualties, and a FARC massacre of 13 civilians. In the
southern department of Putumayo an aggressive new brigade
commander stepped up offensives against two key FARC finance
and logistical fronts involved in drug trafficking along the
Ecuador border. In Caqueta the local FARC front attempted to
regain ground with an intimidation campaign against newly
resettled campesinos cooperating with the GOC.

--------------
FARC Pre-Election Activities
--------------


9. (U) A FARC political operative in Santander was captured
carrying a notebook with FARC plans to pressure candidates
into supporting the FARC ahead of October local elections,.
In Ovejas (Sucre) and Planadas (Tolima) two mayors and a
handful of local officials were arrested for collaboration
with the FARC, including routing government contracts to FARC
front businesses. The FARC targeted Neiva (Huila) Mayor
Cielo Gonzalez in multiple assassination attempts this year.
In May, a candidate for Huila mayor was arrested for
rebellion with ties to the FARC. In recent elections the
FARC has been more focused on development of illicit local
networks and intimidation of candidates, and less on election
day violence.


Drucker