SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004742

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR MARR PTER ECON ETRD KCRM
CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)


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Introduction
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1. (C) Your visit follows President Uribe's May and June
visits to Washington. Uribe fears unsubstantiated claims
that he and his family were tied to the paramilitaries are
undermining prospects in the U.S. Congress for continued high
aid levels and ratification of the bilateral Free Trade
Agreement (CTPA). He needs substantial U.S aid and the CTPA
to help him finish the fight against narcoterrorism and to
manage a complex domestic and regional climate. Uribe
supports our efforts to locate and rescue the three U.S.
hostages held by the FARC, and recently released a FARC
leader to try to spur talks on a humanitarian exchange. He
remains popular with the Colombian public, but faces
challenges in blocking the rise of new criminal groups,
addressing human rights concerns, and maintaining
governability while supporting the investigation of links
between former paramilitaries and members of Colombia's
political, military, and economic elites. He maintains an
uneasy, yet cordial, relationship with Venezuelan President
Chavez, and is trying to maintain a dialogue with Ecuadorian
President Rafael Correa. Key issues:

-- U.S. Support for Plan Colombia

-- U.S. Hostages

-- Free Trade

-- Paramilitary Investigations

-- Drug Eradication and Narcotrafficking

-- Colombia's Regional Influence

-- Extradition

-- Human Rights

-- New Criminal Groups and Reintegration

-- FARC and ELN

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U.S. Support for Plan Colombia
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2. (C) U.S. assistance is key to help Colombia defeat
narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Without security,
economic and social goals cannot be achieved. The GOC's
proposal for Plan Colombia's next phase continues efforts to
establish control throughout the national territory, but it
also substantially boosts resources for education, health,
Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, and development.
The U.S. Congress is considering cuts in U.S. aid as well as
shifting resources from security assistance to social and
justice programs. Secuity cuts would mainly affect
counterdrug spray programs and Colombian Army mobility and
logistics. Some military and counternarcotics programs may
be assumed by the GOC, but this would likely require
offsetting cuts in social programs. Uribe fears Colombian
Congressional debates on paramilitary ties to politicians
have harmed prospects for U.S. ratification of Plan Colombia
and CTPA. Opposition Senator Petro has also made
unsubstantiated claims linking President Uribe to
paramilitaries. We have no evidence tying Uribe to
paramilitaries.

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U.S. Hostages
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3. (C) The FARC has held three Americans for more than four
years, with the April 28 escape of a Colombian policeman
providing our first credible proof of life since 2003. The
GOC supports our efforts to locate and rescue the Americans.
Uribe has committed, publicly and privately, to ensuring the
three Americans are included in any humanitarian exchange.
In June, Uribe unilaterally released about 200 FARC members,
as well as a senior FARC official, to press the FARC to
release its hostages. Still, the FARC continues to insist
the GOC demilitarize a large area before starting talks and
to link the freeing of the three Americans to the U.S.
release of extradited FARC leaders "Sonia" and "Simon
Trinidad." With GOC support, France, Spain and Switzerland
are active in efforts to initiate talks on an exchange, but
have made little progress due to FARC intransigence. On June
28 the FARC announced the deaths of 11 Colombian state
legislators held for over five years. The FARC alleged the
deaths occurred in a crossfire during clashes with an
"unidentified military group." The GOC denies any military
operations occurred on that date.

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Free Trade
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4. (C) The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in June, but
it still needs to be reviewed by Colombia's Constitutional
Court before becoming law. Uribe considers ratification
essential for Colombia to attract long-term investment,
increase economic growth, create jobs, and boost government
revenues needed to fund social spending. Uribe is concerned
about possible U.S. Congressional rejection of the Colombia
accord, and also fears Colombia being left behind if
agreements with Peru and Panama are approved. Failure to
approve the CTPA would be a major political blow to Uribe
domestically and internationally. It would boost Venezuelan
President Chavez' alternative ALBA and convince many that the
USG does not deliver for its closest allies. The U.S.
Congress extended trade preferences for Colombian exporters
under the Andean Product Tariffs and Drug Eradication Act
(APTDEA) through February 2008.

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Paramilitary Investigations
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5. (C) Uribe's democratic security policy and the
paramilitary demobilization have created the space needed for
Colombia's institutions -- the Courts, National Prosecutor,
and media -- to expose ties between the paramilitaries and
members of Colombia's political elite. Arrests to date
include 13 Congressmen and two governors, with 12 mayors
under investigation. The former head of the GOC intelligence
service, who was a close Uribe ally, was jailed for links to
paramilitary crimes, but released on a technicality. A
colonel has been removed from duty; the impact on the
military is expected to widen with more testimony from
ex-paras. Uribe strongly supports the investigations, though
most of those implicated to date are members of his
coalition. Despite the scandal, Colombia's Congress
continues to pass key legislation such as the CPTA.

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Drug Eradication and Narcotrafficking
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6. (C) Uribe is committed to fighting narcotrafficking, but
he is frustrated that record aerial and manual eradication
numbers do not appear to be reducing coca crops. The CIA
recently released its annual Colombia coca cultivation
estimate, showing an increase from 2005. Critics cited the
CNC statistic to claim aerial spraying of herbicide does not
work. Interagency post-spray verifications show glyphosate
kills sprayed coca at rates approaching 90 percent, but high
replant rates show the illicit industry's resilience. In
contrast, the U.N. cultivation estimate shows a decrease of
almost 10 percent compared to its previous estimate. Uribe
is concerned about the competing numbers since the GOC uses
the U.N. figure as its official estimate. Uribe will ask for
greater U.S. resources to end narcotrafficking. We are
planning to give him less.

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Colombia's Regional Influence
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7. (C) Uribe is working with Peru, Chile, Mexico, Canada,
and Caribbean and Central American countries to strengthen
regional economic and security cooperation. He envisions a
Pacific Coast bloc of like-minded democracies linked through
interlocking free trade agreements and committed to greater
integration and security cooperation that would be a de facto
alternative to Chavez's Bolivarian model. Colombia's close
commercial ties and shared border with Venezuela lead Uribe
to maintain cordial relations with President Chavez despite
sharp ideological differences, but he vigorously defends
Colombia's security and commercial interests. Uribe is
reaching out to Ecuador's Rafael Correa, but he fears
Correa's unpredictable nature and close ties to Chavez.
Uribe maintains good relations with other neighbors, but
Panama opposes a Colombian plan to extend the Pan-American
highway through the Darien Gap.

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Extradition
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8. (C) Colombia is the best U.S. partner in the world on
extraditions, with over 450 traffickers and terrorists sent
to the U.S. since Uribe took office in 2002. Uribe has
suspended the extradition of five narcotraffickers due to
their participation in the paramilitary demobilization
process. Human rights groups argue several paramilitaries
have violated the terms of the demobilization process and
should be extradited. The GOC has not made such a
determination, preferring to keep the paramilitaries in the
Justice and Peace Law Process for now.

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Human Rights
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9. (C) Colombia's human rights record is improving, but
progress in the prosecution of major human rights
violators remains slow. The recent UN High Commission on
Human Rights' annual report on Colombia recognized advances,
but flagged an increase in extrajudicial killings by the
military. We are helping Colombia transition from its
antiquated inquisitorial system to an accusatorial system --
a process that now covers 75 percent of the population -- and
this will help make progress in recent human rights cases. A
proposed reform of the military criminal justice system will
also help. We are working with the GOC to achieve justice
and reparations in the paramilitary process, as well as to
strengthen protection programs for victims and witnesses. We
also support a special prosecutorial team set up to
investigate crimes against union members.

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New Criminal Groups and Reintegration of the Demobilized
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10. (C) The rise of new criminal groups in areas previously
controlled by the paramilitaries is a problem. The new
groups lack the national structure and political ambitions of
the defunct United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),and
the GOC has set up police stations in rural areas -- as well
as joint police-military task forces -- to combat them. We
support GOC efforts to reintegrate 32,000 former
paramilitaries into civilian life, but these efforts are
hampered by the magnitude of the problem and insufficient
resources. The lag in effective reintegration programs and
the easy money of narcotrafficking and extortion have led a
small number of ex-paramilitaries to return to crime.

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FARC and ELN
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11. (C) Increased Colombian military presence and operations
have put pressure on the FARC, but they have not forced the
group to enter serious peace negotiations. On a defensive
footing, the FARC has largely withdrawn to more remote
regions and moves in small units -- avoiding direct
engagement and using explosives and land mines to ambush
security forces. Narcotics trafficking remains its chief
financing source. The GOC continues peace talks in Havana
with the ELN, a smaller left-wing terrorist group, and some
kind of cease-fire could come in July.
Drucker