Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA3448
2007-05-16 13:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

CARAMAGNA SAYS "DE-PARAMILITARIZATION" OF REGIONS

Tags:  KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHBO #3448/01 1361302
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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5239
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7548
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8997
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY LIMA 5062
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0315
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5683
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3965
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003448 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: CARAMAGNA SAYS "DE-PARAMILITARIZATION" OF REGIONS
POSSIBLE

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003448

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: CARAMAGNA SAYS "DE-PARAMILITARIZATION" OF REGIONS
POSSIBLE

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia
(MAPP/OAS) Director Sergio Caramagna told PolCouns the
mission's ninth quarterly report would characterize the
demobilization process as positive, with the potential to
lead to the "de-paramilitarization" of former paramilitary
strongholds. A successful paramilitary process would not
solve Colombia's structural social and economic problems, but
would remove a major obstacle to addressing them. Still,
Caramagna said the report would caution that the GOC's
efforts to combat new criminal groups and reintegrate the
demobilized would be critical to achieve a positive outcome.
International support for the process would also be key. End
summary.

--------------
Peace Process Results Still Positive...
--------------


2. (C) On May 7, Caramagna shared with PolCouns an early
draft of the ninth quarterly report, which judges the
disarmament and demobilization process with the
paramilitaries to be generally positive. The removal of over
30,000 illegal armed actors and 18,000 weapons from the
conflict has allowed the GOC to reestablish itself in the
regions, regain communities' confidence, and strengthen its
legitimacy. Caramagna cited several advances, including a
reduction in violence, a growing GOC presence in abandoned
regions, the establishment of victims' groups, and the return
of displaced communities to their lands. Moreover, the
exposure of paramilitary abuses through the Justice and Peace
Law and the para-politics scandal was helping to remove the
legitimacy that the paramilitaries had enjoyed in many parts
of Colombia.

--------------
...But Consolidation of GOC Efforts Crucial
--------------


3. (C) Caramagna said the current juncture is critical
because it could lead to true "de-paramilitarization" through
a truth and justice process, or it could deepen

ex-paramilitary participation in narcotrafficking. The
paramilitary process cannot solve Colombia's structural
social, economic, and political problems, but a successful
process would remove a major obstacle to addressing these
issues. To achieve a positive outcome, he said the GOC would
need to further strengthen state institutions, mount
effective reintegration programs, and take decisive action
against the emergence and expansion of new criminal groups
were vital. Caramagna stressed international support GOC
would be key to ensuring the process' success.

-------------- --------------
IX Report Results: Rearmament and Security Tendencies
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The MAPP/OAS observed the following rearmament and
security tendencies in the zones formerly controlled by the
paramilitaries:

A) Emergence of new criminal alliances: New strategic
alliances are being formed by former paramilitaries and
narcotraffickers, such as ex-Central Bolivar Bloc members and
the Norte del Valle cartel. Some key ex-paramilitary leaders
who did not surrender to GOC authorities, such as Vicente
Castano and Pedro Olivero (Cuchillo),are behind the
formation of new criminal groups in some areas.

B) Leadership structures operating clandestinely: Some former

demobilized mid-level commanders are secretly leading new
criminal groups. It is hard to identify them since some
ex-paras do not appear to have demobilized or they
demobilized with a different rank. Some of the most
recognized former mid-level commanders are AKA "101" and
"Codazzi."

C) Recruitment or displacement of demobilized: Pressures on
demobilized paras to rearm increased during the time period.
The pressure comes mostly from former mid-level paramilitary
commanders who are urging ex-members to rearm. These
pressures include death threats and selective killings of
those unwilling to rearm. Many ex-paras have fled to escape
such threats. The departments most affected are Cordoba,
Cesar, Norte de Santander, and the Uraba region.

D) Adaptability of the modus operandi of emerging criminal
groups: The Public Forces' actions against these groups have
weakened them, but the GOC has been unable to dismantle them
completely. This was the case in southern Cordoba with the
"Vencedores de San Jorge," which was hit hard by the Public
Forces in early 2006 but regrouped and renamed itself
"Aguilas Negras" in early 2007.

E) Vulnerable populations affected: The regional dynamics
unleashed by the reemergence of armed structures are
affecting some vulnerable populations and communities, such
as children, women, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous. For
example, children and some indigenous and Afro-Colombian
communities have been caught in the crossfire between these
criminal groups and other illegal armed groups battling for
control of strategic corridors. Criminal groups are also
targeting victims' organizations in some areas, as in the
case with Yolanda Izquierdo who was killed in Monteria late
January.

F) Narcotrafficking structures taking over areas once
controlled by paramilitaries: Most post-demobilization
analysis expected the FARC to take over para-corridors, but
in reality, most of these structures are being controlled by
narcotraffickers. Very few confrontations have occurred
between the FARC and the emerging criminal groups, and in
some areas, such as Narino, Cauca, Caqueta and southern
Choco, the two are working together.

-------------- --------------
IX Report Results: GOC Reaction against Rearmament
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The MAPP/OAS Mission report notes its high-level
monthly meetings with the GOC on rearmament have encouraged
information sharing and sparked police or military action
against the groups; the most successful operations have
taken place in Caqueta, Norte de Santander, Magdalena, and
Antioquia. In Norte de Santander, the GOC created its first
special squadron--consisting of officials from the police,
armed forces, Fiscalia, Department of Administrative Security
(DAS),and Inspector General's Office--in late 2006. In its
first month, the special squadron captured AKA "Sinai," a
criminal group leader. The most recent high-level capture
was ex-paramilitary leader Ever Veloza (Hernan Hernandez or
HH),who was caught in April 2007.


6. (C) The MAPP/OAS Mission report recognized GOC efforts
to establish a police presence in 107 administrative units or
"corregimientos" in areas with large demobilized populations.
The National Police reports that since 2006, the GOC has
captured 1,095 criminal group members, with demobilized
accounting for less than 17 percent (193) of the total. The
report addressed the growing infiltration of these criminal
groups into GOC regional institutions. It also warned that
the Public Forces' practice in some areas of incorporating
demobilized into their "red de cooperantes," has been poorly
received by the public.

--------------

IX Report Results: Reintegration of Ex-Paras
--------------


7. (C) The MAPP/OAS report says delays in implementation of
the Reintegration Program--previously managed by the Justice
and Interior Ministry and now led by High Commissioner Frank
Pearl--have generated false expectations and resentment among
the demobilized. The Program's failure to extend
benefits--over 1,000 demobilized members from the Catatumbo,
Bananero, Calima, Mojana, and Cordoba blocs saw their aid cut
off several months ago--has further fueled discontent.
Moreover, the High Commissioner's Office's informational
sessions have been undermined by the movement of ex-paras to
other departments and criminal groups' pressure on the
demobilized not to attend. Caramagna warned further delays
would encourage demobilized paras to join new criminal
groups or resort to other criminal activities.
-------------- --------------
IX Report Results: Justice and Peace Law Application
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The report says important JPL advancements during the
reporting period include the start of the voluntary
confessions or "version libres," informational sessions held
by the National Reconciliation and Reparations Commission for
the public and efforts by the Inspector General's Office
(Procuraduria) and Ombudsman's Office (Defensoria) to
increase victims' access to information about the JPL
process. Some examples are:

A) Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia): In the last six
months, the JPL Unit started taking the version libres of
demobilized paramilitaries while encouraging victims'
participation in the process. The most notable ex-para
leaders that began their version libre process were Salvatore
Mancuso, Jose Baldomero (Guillermo Torres),and Juan
Francisco Prada (Juancho Prada). The JPL process has
generated information on 57 mass graves containing 468
cadavers. The Mission acknowledged the efforts of the JPL
Unit, but criticized the GOC's failure to provide it more
resources, personnel, and protection. The report notes
several JPL victims have refused to participate in the
process due to insufficient protection for them and their
families.

B) The National Reconciliation and Reparations Commission
(CNRR): The Commission organized activities with regional
victims' groups and other organizations to motivate victims
to better organize themselves and participate in the JPL
process. The CNRR also opened regional offices in Bogota,
Medellin, Sincelejo, and Bucaramanga.

C) Procuraduria and Defensoria: The Procuraduria trained 216
officials, magistrates, and tribunal auxiliaries on JPL.
Meanwhile, the Defensoria created a specialized unit to
coordinate related JPL issues and also trained 20 public
defenders. Thus far, only seven demobilized paramilitaries
have sought the assistance of the Defensoria's public
defenders. The Defensoria is also assisting in the
orientation of individual victims on the judicial and
reparations process.
Drucker