Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA32
2007-01-04 18:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL ECON CO 
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INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7334
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8552
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 4620
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9860
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000032 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ECON CO
SUBJECT: STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN
CONFLICT

REF: BOGOTA 8793

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000032

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ECON CO
SUBJECT: STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN
CONFLICT

REF: BOGOTA 8793

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (U) Rural land development is a source of conflict in
Colombia; repeated land reform efforts have been
unsuccessful. A proposed new law aimed at facilitating rural
development and promoting land distribution has led to
complaints by human rights groups that it could legalize
illegal land seizures by paramilitary and other illegal armed
groups. Some studies estimate that paramilitary and
narcotics traffickers may control at least 10 per cent of
Colombia's land. End Summary

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Centuries of Land Conflict
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2. (U) Armed conflict and land disputes are historically
intertwined in Colombia. Jesuit academic Father Fernan
Gonzalez explains that Colombia did not follow the common
latifundia pattern in which enormous colonial land grants
were later distributed to peasants through agrarian reforms.
Rather, Colombia's peasants colonized frontier areas and
developed unclaimed land. As their land acquired value,
rural elites would use political power and violence to seize
it. This forced campesinos to move to more remote areas
where the cycle would continue. Gonzalez said two factors
explain why this pattern has continued for decades: large
areas without strong state presence and the absence of
serious agrarian reform that provided campesinos with clear
land title. Despite the increasingly urbanized nature of
Colombia society, Gonzalez said the land issue remains key
since almost 15 million Colombians continue to live in rural
areas.

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Failed Policies
--------------


3. (U) Colombia's land reform efforts over the past forty
years have had little success. The Instituto Nacional
Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria (INCORA) isthemost
ambitious program to date. INCORA's goal is to promote
reform, largely through subsidizing the sale of land by
wealthy landowners to cooperatives. The cooperatives are

supposed to develop the land and increase productivity. The
World Bank and USAID criticize the program because: (1)
projects are generally chosen without legally required
technical and economic analyses, (2) the program has not
implemented an efficient process for developing resettlement
projects, (3) the program distorts land values because owners
factor the subsidy into their asking price, and (4) if
cooperatives cannot productively use land, legal restrictions
placed on program beneficiaries make it very difficult for
them to resell it.

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A New Proposal with Problems
--------------


4. (C) The GOC is considering a new, comprehensive, rural
development law. Luis Orozco, deputy director for social
issues of Colombia's land titling agency, the Instituto
Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural ("INCODER"),told us the bill
would harmonize a large number of existing laws, accelerate
distribution of land to disadvantaged groups, and encourage
productive land use. He said it would also help integrate
Colombia's rural economy into the global economy. The
proposal passed two Senate readings in 2006. Two House
readings, which are not expected until mid-2007, are required
before it would become law.


5. (C) The bill would also increase INCODER's power at
INCORA's expense by giving it a monopoly on developing,
approving, and implementing resettlement projects. INCODER
contends these enhanced powers would enable it to more
effectively promote rural development. Critics argue this is
politically problematic, because INCODER is widely accused of

corruption. Its officials are reportedly involved in
land-for-votes schemes, and the media recently linked Luis
Ortiz, INCODER's former director, to paramilitaries. Human
rights groups and many rural residents claim the organization
works with paramilitaries to facilitate land seizures, but we
cannot substantiate or disprove these charges. Ministry of
Agriculture counselor Lorena Garnica, who helped draft the
bill, told us it would reduce the possibility of corruption
by making INCODER more transparent and clarifying its
responsibilities.


6. (C) The bill's most controversial provision, which would
have made it easier to acquire legal ownership through
"adverse possession," was deleted in the Senate after heated
debate. Orozco, Garnica, and bill sponsor Senator Manuel
Guillermo Mora told us the provision's purpose was to help
disadvantaged groups obtain title to land they already
occupy. In contrast, the left wing Polo Democratico party
and human rights groups such as the Colombian Commission of
Jurists claimed the provision would help paramilitaries
legalize land seizures and forced "purchases" from indigenous
and Afro-Colombian groups. Garnica said opposition to the
provision was politically motivated. She explained that
existing law already permits adverse possession in the same
circumstances, and that land reserves for indigenous and
Afro-Colombian groups are constitutionally protected from
adverse possession. Moreover, indigenous and Afro-Colombian
lands cannot legally be sold. Still, the Polo party was
successful in having the provision dropped during the second
Senate reading.


7. (C) Other provisions of the bill were also removed. For
example, it was supposed to facilitate INCODER's capacity to
fast-track reallocation of confiscated narco-properties to
campesinos. While the government can already do this, the
authority is not extensively used because the current law is
complex, time consuming, and makes government officials
personally liable if courts later overturn confiscations.
The bill would have made confiscation and reallocation more
efficient. This provision was stricken by the Senate,
apparently at the request of INCODER, to minimize potential
liability for itself and employees.

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Illegal Armed Groups and Narcotics
--------------


8. (U) The World Bank reported that Colombia's land
inequality sharply increased in the past 20 years. This is
mainly due to large narco-purchases and forced "sales" to
illegal armed groups. A 2005 analysis by the UNDP reports
that there are 4 to 5 million hectares of "narco-landholding"
spread throughout Colombia that could be subject to
confiscation. This constitutes between 4 and 5 per cent of
Colombia's total land area. There has been widespread
criticism that the government has confiscated only a minute
fraction of the land it could: over the past fifteen years,
less than 150,000 hectares have been seized by the government
and virtually none sold.


9. (C) Paramilitary "purchases" are significant, especially
in the rural, north coast region. Paramilitary leader Jorge
40's recently confiscated computer reportedly contains
information on "purchases" of between 2.5 and 6 million
hectares in the region (reftel). Other paramilitary leaders
have acquired land on the Pacific Coast. There are claims
that paramilitaries are displacing Afro-Colombian communities
to develop lucrative palm oil plantations. The USG checks
all recipients of assistance carefully to ensure that no USG
funding directly or indirectly assists those who
illegitimately acquired land. Assistance has been refused to
some palm oil farmers on these grounds.


10. (U) In addition to "purchased" land, paramilitaries,
drug lords, and the FARC all repeat the centuries old pattern
of seizing land from campesinos or taking control of it and
forcingcampesinos to work for them. Between two and three
million peasants are estimated to have been violently
displaced by illicit armed groups seeking to control
territory and/or narco-cultivation in the past decade. This
"counter agrarian reform," as political scientist Francisco
Leal Buitrago describes it, has largely taken place in rural
areas where state presence is weak and land title ambiguous.
FARC seizures have generally been concentrated in the south

and east of the country.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (U) Any redistribution of land held by drug lords or
narco-terrorists is complicated by poorly defined land title
and fear of retribution. Colombia's rural areas lack good
cadastral surveys. Tradition establishes boundaries, and
rural residents "know" which family owns what land. Without
adequate plats defining land boundaries, title is ambiguous
and the perception of land inequality is reinforced.
Returning illicitly acquired land to original owners is
difficult, since they never had clear legal title.
Additionally, campesinos fear that if they accept land from
the government, then the previous "owners" will seek revenge
and try to retake the land. Lastly, failure to clearly
demarcate land held by indigenous and Afro-Colombian
communities undermines their ability to enforce the legal
protections afforded them by the Constitution. End Comment
WOOD

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