Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA3133
2007-05-04 22:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

MAGDALENA IMPROVING, BUT THREATS FROM EMERGING

Tags:  KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4897
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7520
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8958
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY LIMA 5021
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0274
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5649
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3951
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003133 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: MAGDALENA IMPROVING, BUT THREATS FROM EMERGING
CRIMINAL GROUPS REMAIN

REF: 06 BOGOTA 9310

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: MAGDALENA IMPROVING, BUT THREATS FROM EMERGING
CRIMINAL GROUPS REMAIN

REF: 06 BOGOTA 9310

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Community leaders in Magdalena told poloff the
paramilitary demobilization and President Uribe's democratic
security strategy have led to improvements in security and
the local economy. Still, instances of rearmament of
ex-paras are worse in Magdalena than in other north Atlantic
coast departments, and local residents are wary of the 2,500
demobilized paramilitaries in their midst. Still, they
warned that a small number of former paras now involved in
drug trafficking continue to intimidate the population,
especially in the middle and southern parts of the
department. End summary.


2. (U) Poloff visited Santa Marta, capital of Magdalena
department, on March 21. Magdalena was under heavy influence
of three paramilitary blocs--all deeply involved in the drug
trade--from 1999 to March 2006. The paramilitaries' control
over politics in Magdalena was extensive: in 2003, mayoral
candidates ran unopposed in 14 of the 30 municipalities. The
para-politics scandal has left few high-profile political
figures untouched: Magdalena's Governor Trino Luna, one
senator, and one representative are in jail; one senator, one
representative and three former representatives are under
investigation; and one representative is on the run.

--------------
The Numbers Speak for Themselves
--------------


3. (C) During a March 21 visit to Magdalena, Acting Governor
of Magdalena Sandra Rubiano explained that prior to the
paramilitary peace process, the department was caught in a
bloody fight for control over strategic narcotrafficking
corridors between the FARC and the AUC. Rubiano attributed
significant improvements in the department's security and
local economy to the paramilitary demobilization--Sur de
Magdalena Bloc (December 2004),Resistencia Tayrona Bloc
(February 2006),and North Bloc (March 2006). She also

credited Uribe's democratic security strategy. Secretary of
Interior Claudio Giovanni told us homicides decreased from
736 in 2001 to 392 in 2006; kidnappings fell from 170 in 2002
to 25 in 2006; and the number of displaced dropped from
14,000 in 2001, to 1,800 in 2006. Magdalena's agricultural
production rose 81 percent from 2004 to 2006.

--------------
Reintegration Efforts Improving...
--------------


4. (C) Since the last Embassy visit in September 2006,
Coordinator of the Tracking, Monitoring, and Evaluation
System (SAME) Indira Berrocal said the local Center of
Reference and Opportunity (CRO) had increased its coverage
from 1,547 to 2,078 demobilized paramilitaries, 80 percent
of Magdalena's demobilized population (ref. A). A week prior
to our visit, the Presidency's Reintegration Office held its
first information and documentation session in Magdalena to
boost awareness, explain changes to the program, and
encourage greater participation. 140 demobilized paras
previously not registered with the CRO were identified after
the session, including some from neighboring departments.
Department mayors were increasingly supportive of
reintegration, a positive sign according to SAME and CRO
officials.

--------------
...But Rearmament becoming a Greater Option
--------------



5. (C) Ombudswoman Lizette Penaranda and Police Commander
Col. Freddy de Jesus Pacheco said the reintegration process
of 2,500 demobilized paramilitaries had been difficult in
Magdalena because the population was wary of the former
paras. CRO Director Colonel Gabriel Carrero said a majority
of demobilized ex-paras had problems finding jobs or
reconnecting to their families. Pacheco said the State's
failure to "keep them occupied" was increasing the risk they
would return to crime.


6. (C) Penaranda said new illegal activities in Magdalena
were sponsored by ex-para leaders Vicente Castano and Miguel
and Victor Mejia (AKA "Los Mellizos"),with former mid-level
paramilitary commanders playing a key role on the ground. In
northern Magdalena, mid-level commanders previously tied to
Hernan Giraldo and Jorge 40 continued to fight the FARC's 37
Front and the ELN for control of drug routes. Former Jorge
40 commanders "55" and "57"--who led rearmed criminal
groups--were recently captured by the Police in Medellin. In
the area around Chivolo, Plato, and Tenerife, former
paramilitary leader Jose "Chepe" Barrera, who demobilized
with the Sur de Magdalena Bloc but was released from La Ceja
retention center in October 2006 because of lack of charges
against him, was leading a new criminal group. Another
former Jorge 40 commander, "AKA Codassi," was operating in
Ariguani and San Angel. In southern Magdalena, a
coca-producing area and main trafficking corridor, a small
number of "Aguilas Negras" operate--mostly ex-paras
previously led by former mid-level commanders of "Jorge 40"
who never demobilized. The police attributed a rise in
homicides to disputes among the various actors for control of
this strategic corridor.


7. (C) Pacheco said police recently captured 10 members of a
criminal group in the south of the department that operated
in Guamal, El Banco, and San Sebastian. In Chivolo and
Plato, the security situation had improved slightly with the
capture of Dario Aladino Escopetta and Saul Sarabia. Based
on information from demobilized, the Police had recently
captured 19 new criminal group members and found a coca
laboratory in northern Magdalena. Pacheco said another good
source of information on illegal actors and activities was
their network of 300 voluntary collaborators or "red de
cooperantes."

--------------
Displacement Situation Remains the Same
--------------


8. (C) Penaranda said the situation in Chivolo remains the

same for 100 displaced families displaced by former paras
that wanted to return to their land (ref. A). The ex-paras
have refused to return the lands, which are now being used
for productive projects. Governor Trino Luna, arrested in
March for alleged links to paramilitary groups and illegal
contracting, has avoided getting involved in the situation.
Penaranda said the conflict could lead to violence.

--------------
Para-Politics and Elections
--------------


9. (C) Community and Church leaders agreed local elections
in October will be better than 2003 elections. In 2003, 25
of 30 Magdalena mayors had links to the paramilitaries.
Penaranda noted people were speaking out on political and
victims' issues, despite some lingering hesitation. Col.
Pacheco and Penaranda said they expected the October regional
elections to be relatively free from major irregularities or
armed group pressure, but conceded some ex-paras continued to
intimidate residents in the middle and southern parts of the
department.
Drucker