COLOMBIAN HOSTAGE ESCAPES FARC CAPTORS DURING

S E C R E T BOGOTA 000311

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PTER CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN HOSTAGE ESCAPES FARC CAPTORS DURING
COLMIL ASSAULT

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


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Summary
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1. (S) Former GOC Minister and six-year hostage Fernando
Araujo escaped from his FARC guards during a COLMIL assault
to rescue him and take down a FARC leader. The December 31
operation coincided with partying among the guerrillas, who
failed to hear approaching helicopters. Araujo supplied
valuable intelligence on his captors' behavior patterns, but
several factors -- favorable terrain, the FARC New Year's
party and Araujo's remarkable physical and psychological
strength -- mean this successful outcome would not be easily
duplicated with other hostages. End Summary.

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Araujo's Ordeal
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2. (U) Former Development Minister Fernando Araujo, taken
hostage by FARC guerrillas in December 2000, was liberated
after six years of captivity thanks to a Colombian military
attack on the camp where he was held. A December 31 air and
ground assault on two FARC fronts in the Montes de Maria
region of the northern department of Bolivar created
sufficient confusion for Araujo to escape his guards. For
some hours he remained on the camp's periphery, hearing
shouting, but since the COLMIL failed to identify itself as
friendly he dared not turn back. After wandering five days
and over 20 miles with no food and only cactus for water, he
encountered a farmer who pointed him towards a military post.
He has since received medical care and reunited with his
family, while attracting front-page press attention.

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COLMIL's Operation - Pluses and Minuses
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3. (S) The press reported the assault was a joint operation
by Colombian Air Force, Army, and Marines. It was guided by
a FARC deserter turned informant and by intelligence gained
via GOC infiltration of local militias. The lead forces were
a U.S. trained unit of Colombian special forces (CCOPE)
created to hunt FARC leadership targets. With U.S.
intelligence support CCOPE sent two reconnaissance teams on a
five-day overland trek to find the camp of combined FARC 37th
and 35th fronts led by alias 'Martin Caballero.' Under
strong sun and in temperatures near 100 degrees, six special
forces came close to the objective but were unable to get
line-of-sight on the camp.


4. (S) Surveillance by CCOPE paved the way for the attack by
commandos inserted by rope from four helicopters into the
heart of the FARC camp. The operation was well executed in
terms of speed and surprise; Araujo estimated that only 2-4
seconds elapsed between the sound of helicopters overhead and
that of automatic weapons. Assaulters met ground fire that
was heavy but shortlived. Araujo's sense was that the FARC
ran from the camp. Four FARC KIAs were recovered, others
probably dragged away, and two additional FARC were killed in
post-combat pursuit. The operation's greatest flaw was in
failing to seal escape routes; Caballero's wife and two
family members were killed, but the target himself got away.

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Notes on the Camp and its Leader
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5. (S) An Embassy hostage recovery officer debriefed Araujo
on FARC front habits and procedures for holding captives.
Araujo was never tied, cuffed, or confined, but he was
restricted to a defined area of the camp. His guards covered
his eyes with his hat only during marches from one camp to
another, usually at points when signs or markers would reveal
his location. Araujo estimated distances between camps by
counting his steps during these movements, and kept
encyclopedic memories of dates, events, places, and guerrilla
names. He said he never felt his guards were his friends,
but they treated him well. In mid-2006 his captors spoke to
him often of prospects for humanitarian exchange, saying he

would be a key part of any such deal. When President Uribe
publicly endorsed military rescue operations last October,
the FARC assigned him a second guard.


6. (S) Araujo had a respectful relationship with the 37th
Front commander, alias Martin Caballero, whom he described as
an old-style revolutionary in the tradition of Che Guevara,
an ardent believer in the FARC's cause, and an avid reader of
works by Castro as well as military manuals. Araujo said
Caballero was inspired by the vision of Hugo Chavez but
dismayed by the current reality of the weakened state of the
FARC. Caballero was a strict disciplinarian who took no
personal perks as front commander. Although he allowed
Araujo the comfort of a hammock, Caballero himself slept on a
bed of leaves on the ground, in the same manner as his rank
and file.

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Tempting - But Tough - To Replicate
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7. (C) This is the first rescue attempt since President
Uribe suspended the GOC's efforts towards a humanitarian
exchange, and Araujo's successful escape may encourage
further such efforts. Some hostages' family members
protested the policy due to the risk such operations pose to
victims, especially given FARC avowals to murder hostages in
case of attempted rescue. In the Araujo case, the family had
explicitly authorized a rescue attempt, and President Uribe
spoke with the hostage's father just prior to launch. This
suggests a case-by-case approach, pursuing rescues only when
families consent.


8. (C) Araujo's liberation combined elements that would be
difficult to replicate. On the morning of New Year's Eve,
camp occupants were drinking and dancing, with some already
drunk. Araujo heard helicopters approach for two minutes
before they flew overhead, but the revelers did not notice.
If not for the loud music, Araujo said, the camp would have
emptied before the assault began. Also, Araujo's high value
to the FARC meant that his guards had orders to keep him
alive. Araujo was saved by his own quick decision to flee,
narrowly dodging bullets, as well as his survival grit. The
terrain also played a part; this camp was in an isolated area
where water was scarce, FARC escape corridors few, and FARC
forces thinly spread. FARC-held hostages in southern
Colombia would be more difficult to access.

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Comment
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9. (C) The operation would have worked better, Araujo would
have been safer, and Martin Caballero might not have escaped
if the reconnaissance teams, or some other method, had been
able to determine the camp configuration in advance.


10. (C) Post will send septel with more detailed information
obtained from Araujo debriefings.
WOOD