COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q1'07

S E C R E T BOGOTA 003096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q1'07

REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 3814

B. 06 BOGOTA 7383

C. 06 BOGOTA 9448

D. BOGOTA 297

E. BOGOTA 2839

F. BOGOTA 1836

G. 06 BOGOTA 11488

H. BOGOTA 884

I. BOGOTA 3093

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) The most prominent FARC attacks in the first quarter
were urban bombings in Valle, Cauca, and Huila departments,
with the group mostly on the defensive or quiet elsewhere.
While ELN leadership continued talks with the GOC in Havana,
the group conducted few attacks and sustained heavy losses at
the hands of the COLAR and FARC. Emerging criminal groups
continued to grow, with the COLMIL confronting them mainly in
the north and northeast. In Buenaventura, the Marines and
Police increased their strength to confront violence among
feuding narco gangs and the FARC. In the campaign's main
'Omega' area in Meta and Caqueta, new offensive tactics may
be bearing fruit against the enemy, while territorial control
units establish permanent defense of civilians. The
Venezuelan border area grew more unstable, with increased
cross-border criminality. End Summary.

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FARC Urban Attacks in Cali, Buenaventura
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2. (C) The most significant FARC attacks in the first
quarter were urban bombings targeting the COLMIL. Most
victims were civilian bystanders. Buenaventura (Valle) had
nine grenade and bombing attacks, apparently in reprisal for
police efforts to break up the FARC and other narco networks.
The FARC also launched a series of bombing attempts against
the mayor of Neiva (Huila). In Cauca, the FARC twice blew up
electrical towers -- leaving up to 64 municipalities without
power. It also set off car bombs, attacked police, and
assassinated three members of a politician's family. These
events garnered more media attention than last quarter's
FARC ambushes of isolated COLMIL patrols (ref D). Outside
the southwest, the FARC remained on the defensive, aside from
its feud with the ELN. Local politicians in the northern
departments of Cesar and Bolivar told us the FARC may be
attempting to lay low and focus on the drug trade until the
end of President Uribe's term in 2010.

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ELN: Taking a Beating
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3. (S) As in prior quarters, the ELN launched few attacks
and suffered substantial combat losses at the hands of the
FARC and the COLAR. The ELN-FARC feud intensified in Arauca,
partly fueled by COLAR psyops efforts and by COLAR
intelligence exploitation of ELN deserters to strike FARC
targets. Sensitive sources reported the ELN had cut into the
FARC's drug sources in Norte de Santander, with coca
cultivators preferring ELN cash to FARC IOU's. In Narino,
the FARC declared an end to its 2006 local truce with the ELN
-- ostensibly in protest over the ELN's Havana peace talks
with the GOC, its offer to remove land mines, and its release
of two police hostages. Fierce competition for control of
narcotrafficking also drove Narino clashes.

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New Criminal Groups: A Growing Threat
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4. (C) The COLMIL increasingly confronted criminal groups
(coined by GOC as "BACRIM"s, for 'bandas criminales') some of
which include small numbers of renegade ex-AUC fighters. In
the COLMIL's quarter-end tally of enemy takedowns, criminal
groups accounted for the second largest share, 17 percent.
The FARC accounted for 60 percent and the ELN 8 percent.
Criminal groups were present in most of the country, but
COLMIL action against them was primarily in the north and
northeast. In Catatumbo, a joint Search Bloc of Army,
Police, and law enforcement services (DAS and CTI) killed two
and captured 15 members of the 'Black Eagles' (Aguilas
Negras) in its first month of operation. Another 15 Aguilas
were arrested in Magdalena. The COLMIL has not yet fully
mobilized in Uraba, where criminal groups containing some
ex-paras were expanding. In the southwest, new criminal
groups publicly announced their arrival in Tolima, blocked
roads and intimidated populations in Narino (ref E),and
forged alliances with Valle coca cartels. Closer to narco
gangs than the FARC, the new crminal groups required a law
enforcement and intelligence-centered approach.

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Buenaventura Under Siege
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5. (C) Buenaventura suffered from soaring homicide rates
(peaking at an annualized rate of 247 per 100,000 late last
year, or seven times the national average) due to violent
feuds among competing drug gangs (ref G) and the FARC. In
the city's worst neighborhoods turf was defined street by
street. Marines and police quadrupled their forces in the
city, producing a wave of arrests, including that of several
ringleaders, as well as mass surrenders of nearly 200 gang
members. Security forces were optimistic violence would
subside. Still, the long-term security situation in
Buenaventura was not yet clear. Gangs could regenerate
quickly, and it remained to be seen whether the COLMIL could
maintain the increased force levels needed to consolidate the
recent gains. (Note: A major bombing in Cali on April 9
virtually destroyed a Police headquarters. The attack,
attributed to the FARC, focused attention on the southwest.
President Uribe responded with additional security in the
region and relocated his seat of government to Cali during
the week of April 23 in a show of support for local
residents. End note.)

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Meta / Caqueta: Offensive Mobility, Defensive Consolidation
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6. (C) In the counter-FARC campaign's main effort area of
Joint Task Force Omega, the COLMIL was working to improve
offensive mobility and consolidate territorial control. The
Army began testing smaller, more mobile strike units (ref F)
to penetrate FARC fronts' outer defenses and to reach high
value targets (HVTs). Some units made contact with larger
FARC concentrations, yielding higher takedowns (10 or 12 per
combat, instead of one or two) in what may be a new trend.
Meanwhile, in key towns formerly controlled by the FARC
(Uribe, La Julia, La Macarena, and Calamar) the COLAR will
soon transition from mobile offensive elements (BCGs) to
fixed territorial units. This releases offensive forces to
clear new areas and sends a strong signal to the local
population of COLMIL commitment to defend civilians. The
case of Union Peneya (ref H) was a microcosm of the south:
its resettled townspeople were waiting to see if a dedicated
COLAR battalion could hold off hovering FARC units and if the
GOC would introduce additional basic services in the town.
Bombings of Nestle dairy processing plants in January and
February threatened the GoC efforts in Caqueta and recent
economic progress in the region.

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Venezuela Border: Cross-Border Criminality
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7. (C) The northeast department of Cesar contained several
battle zones -- against two FARC fronts in the north and ELN
and Aguilas Negras farther south -- mostly over control of
strategic mobility corridors for narcotics trafficking across
the border into Venezuela (ref I). Aside from transport of
coca (out) and arms and supplies (in),these corridors
provided communication for FARC leaders reportedly based in
northwest Venezuela (e.g. 'Ivan Marquez,' 'Timochenko,' and
'Grannobles'). Military sources in the region told us the
border area was showing increased instability due to growing
crime rates and cross-border operations by the FARC and ELN.
This caused some Venezuelans to migrate to the Colombian side
-- creating a mini construction boom in Cucuta (N Santander).
A Colombian commander in the area said his Venezuelan
counterparts had admitted the emerging problems. Corruption
inside Venezuela made a security crackdown unlikely, however.

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Combat Focus Areas
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8. (C) The areas of most intense combat continued to be
Antioquia, Arauca / Boyaca / Casanare ('ABC'),and Meta, with
increased clashes in the Cesar / Venezuela border zone and
substantial operations in Huila / Tolima / Cauca, Caqueta,
and Putumayo. In Antioquia, clashes continued at a high
rate. Three-way fighting in the 'ABC' zone intensified among
COLAR, FARC, and ELN. In Meta, battles have focused around
Villhermosa and Puerto Rico in the Macarena area -- a zone of
FARC concentration and extensive coca cultivation. In Cauca,
the COLAR was fighting to protect the Pan-American Highway
against FARC road blocks and infrastructure attacks along the
increasingly violent southwest Pacific Coast.
Drucker