Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA297
2007-01-16 19:59:00
SECRET
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q4'06

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #0297/01 0161959
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R 161959Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1987
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8567
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 4628
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9867
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5285
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS//
S E C R E T BOGOTA 000297 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q4'06

REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 3814


B. 06 BOGOTA 7383

C. 06 BOGOTA 9448

D. 06 BOGOTA 11488

E. 06 BOGOTA 10214

F. 06 BOGOTA 4983

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
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S E C R E T BOGOTA 000297

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q4'06

REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 3814


B. 06 BOGOTA 7383

C. 06 BOGOTA 9448

D. 06 BOGOTA 11488

E. 06 BOGOTA 10214

F. 06 BOGOTA 4983

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) Greater COLMIL assertiveness kept the FARC on a
broadly defensive footing. Still, the FARC opportunistically
struck vulnerable COLMIL units in Meta and Catatumbo and
attacked police in strategic coca growing areas previously
dominated by paramilitaries. The ELN continued to decline,
making no attacks on the COLMIL in the quarter. COLMIL
offensives focused on multiple hot zones in the center,
north, and southwest of Colombia, stretching limited
resources and limiting COLMIL capabilities elsewhere. After
shifting intelligence resources to mid-level targets, the
COLMIL took down twenty FARC/ELN front and militia leaders.
End Summary.

--------------
'Point Man' War Against an Evasive FARC
--------------


2. (S) The Colombian military continued more aggressive
patrolling, forcing the FARC into smaller units to avoid
head-on combat and protect their leaders. FARC chieftain
Manual Marulanda issued unprecedented guidance to his troops
on avoiding capture by the COLMIL -- indicating the FARC's
concern over its now more limited room for maneuver. The
FARC surrounded their leaders with multiple rings of
security, limiting COLMIL contact to 'picket lines' of FARC
sentries and preventing it from closing in on FARC leaders.
This 'point man' war typically yielded only one or two
guerrilla kills per encounter. Smaller volumes of ammunition
found on captured or killed FARC suggest FARC supply lines
were also constrained.

--------------
FARC Attacks on Public Forces
--------------


3. (C) The quarter's main terrorist attacks were against
public forces, not civilians. The FARC set off a series of
car bombs at military sites, including a COLMIL academy in
Bogota. In Tierradentro (southern Cordoba),three FARC

fronts laid siege to a rural police post in a formerly
AUC-controlled center of coca cultivation, killing 17
officers. The FARC also opportunistically attacked whenever
COLMIL units made themselves vulnerable. In Catatumbo (N. de
Santander) bordering Venezuela, an area of established
narcotrafficking corridors, guerrillas ambushed a platoon of
a newly established Army brigade, killing 17 soldiers. On
Christmas Eve outside La Julia (Meta),14 soldiers were
killed in what appears to have been a FARC ambush. Still,
the fourth quarter of 2006 was far less lethal than the same
period of 2005 and represented a sharp downscaling of FARC
actions compared to prior years.

--------------
ELN: Ever Weaker
--------------


4. (C) The ELN continued its decline, launching no attacks
in the quarter. Peace Commissioner Luis Carlo Restrepo told
us only two percent of attacks ("a statistical error")
against the COLMIL in 2006 were perpetrated by the ELN.
Demobilizations and arrests of ELN guerrillas outnumbered
battle losses, as fronts fragmented. The ELN suffered battle
losses from COLMIL offensives in the northeastern departments
of Norte de Santander and Casanare and from feuding with the
FARC over control of nearby Arauca on the Venezuela border.

--------------
Combat Focus Areas
--------------


5. (U) Heavy combat and high FARC casualties continued in
Antioquia Department (ref C),where a diversified economy,
good infrastructure, and major narcotrafficking routes
supported several FARC fronts against an aggressive COLMIL
division. In a single week, 17 members of the FARC 9th front
were killed. Combat increased generally across Colombia's
north (Cordoba, Bolivar, Sucre, and La Guajira departments),
reflecting the continuing competition between FARC and COLMIL
to fill the post-AUC vacuum. In Cordoba, the Army and Air
Force launched massive operations against the FARC front
responsible for the Tierradentro attack. At least a dozen
guerrillas were killed, including the FARC leader, and a host
of camps and caches were destroyed.


6. (U) In the COLMIL's main effort area of Joint Task Force
Omega (JTF-O),combat tempo slowed due to a shift in forces
to protect cities over the holidays, the FARC's heavy
casualties mid-year, and the consolidation of COLMIL presence
in the area. Combat heated up in Caqueta, however, perhaps
due to COLMIL pressure on neighboring Meta. A police sweep
against the Teofilo Forero Mobile Column (TFMC) yielded 25
arrests and at least a dozen takedowns. A similar increase
was evident at the conjunction of Tolima, Huila, Valle, and
Cauca departments, as two Army divisions launched convergent
offensives against FARC fronts. Finally, following waves of
violence against police in the cities of Buenaventura and
Cali, the CNP moved its command headquarters to Cali and
undertook intensive operations to root out FARC militias and
narco-gangs. After the capture of a militia leader, 45 of
his rank and file demobilized en masse.


7. (U) Along borders with Venezuela and Ecuador, the FARC
and ELN were increasingly active, but combats were fewer due
to the COLMIL's insufficient resources to cover all the
national territory. In Norte de Santander, the FARC launched
a wave of attacks on infrastructure and transport and
threatened elected officials in the department's 40
municipalities. In Santander, the COLMIL captured nine FARC
fighters suspected of a 2005 massacre of 15 soldiers. In
Arauca, a sweep of FARC and ELN urban militias yielded 17
arrests, part of an initiative to use law enforcement and the
judiciary to defeat urban support networks (ref E). Narino
and Putumayo saw fewer COLMIL operations than in the third
quarter.

--------------
Success Against Mid-Level Leaders
--------------


8. (S) In the fourth quarter the COLMIL killed or captured
ten FARC and ELN front commanders, six urban militia chiefs,
and seven specialists in areas such as narco-finance,
political mobilization, and explosives. Also taken down were
several notorious leaders known for particular terrorist
attacks. Alias 'Fernando Caicedo,' a 25-year FARC veteran,
who replaced aka 'Granda' as the FARC's 'foreign minister'
equivalent, was arrested in Bogota, while aka 'El Medico,' a
leader of the FARC's western joint command and Jacobo Arenas
mobile column, was detained in Cauca. Besides removing these
veterans from the battlefield, the COLMIL captured documents,
computer records, and intelligence on FARC operations (ref
F). These mounting successes reflected a deliberate
channeling of intelligence resources towards mid-level
targets.

WOOD