SCENESETTER CHECKLIST FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002929

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR MARR PTER ECON ETRD KCRM
CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER CHECKLIST FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY
SECRETARY JOHN D. NEGROPONTE

SIPDIS

Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

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Introduction
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1. (C) Your visit follows President Uribe's May 2-4 visit to
Washington. Uribe fears unsubstantiated claims in the
Colombian Congress that he and his family are tied to the
paramilitaries are undermining prospects in the U.S. Congress
for continued high aid levels and ratification of the
bilateral Free Trade Agreement (CTPA). Uribe needs
substantial U.S aid and the CTPA to help him finish the fight
against narcoterrorism and to manage a complex domestic and
regional climate. He supports our efforts to locate and
rescue the three U.S. hostages held by the FARC. Uribe
remains popular with the Colombian public, but faces major
challenges in preventing the rise of new criminal groups
following the paramilitary demobilization, addressing human
rights concerns, and maintaining governability while
supporting efforts to uncover links between the former
paramilitaries and members of Colombia's political, military,
and economic elites. He maintains an uneasy, yet cordial,
relationship with Venezuelan President Chavez, and is trying
to maintain a dialogue with Ecuadorian President Rafael
Correa. Key issues:

-- U.S. Support for Plan Colombia

-- U.S. Hostages

-- Free Trade

-- Paramilitary Investigations

-- Drug Eradication and Narcotrafficking

-- Colombia's Regional Influence

-- Extradition

-- Human Rights

-- New Criminal Groups and Reintegration

-- FARC and ELN

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U.S. Support for Plan Colombia
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2. (C) U.S. assistance is key to help Colombia defeat
narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Uribe presented the
international community with a Plan Colombia Consolidation
proposal in January which seeks to lock in sustained, high
levels of U.S. and international support over the next five
years. The proposal emphasizes continued strong
counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts aimed at
establishing GOC control throughout the national territory,
but it also substantially boosts resources for education,
health, Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, and
development. We publicly welcomed the proposal and are
working with Colombia to obtain European support as well. We
are also urging Colombia to fund an increasing portion of
Plan Colombia components currently financed by the U.S., but
little progress has been made to date. Uribe fears Colombian
congressional debates on paramilitary links to politicians,
including charges that he and his family have paramilitary
ties, have harmed his image in the U.S. and adversely
affected prospects for Plan Colombia Consolidation and CTPA
ratification. Uribe was frustrated by former Vice President
Gore's withdrawal from an April 20 environmental event in
Miami due to Uribe's participation. We have no evidence
linking Uribe to paramilitaries.

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U.S. Hostages
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3. (C) The FARC has held three Americans for four years.
Uribe supports our efforts to locate and rescue them. He has
many times committed, publicly and privately, to ensuring the
three U.S. hostages are included in any humanitarian
exchange. The families of the FARC's so-called political
hostages, including the Americans, are pressing Uribe to
negotiate a humanitarian exchange with the FARC. The FARC

refuses to provide recent proof of life of our hostages, and
insists the GOC demilitarize an area long ago captured from
the FARC before starting humanitarian talks. With GOC
authorization, officials from three European
countries--France, Spain and Switzerland--met a senior FARC
official in March to revive talks, but prospects for progress
remain bleak.

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Free Trade
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4. (C) The Colombian Congress is in the process of CTPA
approval, with two of the four required votes successfully
completed. Uribe considers ratification essential for
Colombia to receive long-term investment, increase economic
growth, create jobs, and boost government revenues needed to
fund social spending. He is confident of Colombian
congressional approval, but is concerned the U.S. Congress
will delay or reject Colombia. The Colombians accept
proposed Democratic changes to the text, but are worried
about the form. U.S. failure to approve the CTPA soon would
be a major political blow to Uribe. It would also boost
Venezuelan President Chavez' alternative ALBA and convince
many our talk of a longer term strategic relationship is a
pipe dream.

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Paramilitary Investigations
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5. (C) Uribe's democratic security policy and the
paramilitary demobilization have created the space needed for
Colombia's institutions--the Courts, National Prosecutor, and
media--to work and provided incentives for individuals to
tell the truth about their crimes. Colombia's judicial
institutions are exposing ties between the paramilitaries and
members of Colombia's political elite. Six members of
Congress are in jail for alleged paramilitary ties; two more
are under house arrest; one is on the lam; and eight more are
under investigation. One governor is in prison, and another
is under investigation. The former head of the GOC
intelligence service, who was a close Uribe ally, was jailed
for links to paramilitary crimes, but released on a
technicality. He remains subject to rearrest. Uribe
strongly supports these investigations even though most of
those implicated to date are members of his coalition.
Despite the scandal, Colombia's Congress continues to
function, moving forward on CTPA ratification and key fiscal
measures.

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Drug Eradication and Narcotrafficking
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6. (C) Uribe is committed to fighting narcotrafficking, but
is frustrated record aerial and manual eradication numbers do
not appear to be reducing coca crops. The CIA will soon
release its annual coca cultivation estimate. If it shows an
increase, both Uribe and the U.S. will be assailed by
critics, who will claim aerial spraying of herbicide does not
work. Still, the UN cultivation estimate will show a
decrease of 10 percent or more compared to the previous
estimate. Uribe is concerned about the competing numbers and
will be more so if the U.S. estimate shows an increase and
the UN estimate shows a drop. The GOC uses the UN figure as
its official estimate. Uribe will ask for greater U.S.
resources to end narcotrafficking. We are planning to give
him less.

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Colombia's Regional Influence
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7. (C) Uribe is working with Peru, Chile, Mexico, and
Central America to strengthen regional economic and security
cooperation. He envisions a Pacific Coast bloc of
like-minded democracies linked through interlocking free
trade agreements, including deals with the U.S., and
committed to greater integration that would be a de facto
alternative to Chavez' Bolivarian model. Recent visits by
Peruvian and Chilean Presidents Garcia and Bachelet appear to
have accelerated that process. Colombia's close commercial
ties and shared border with Venezuela lead Uribe to maintain
cordial relations with Venezuelan President Chavez despite
sharp ideological differences but he vigorously defends
Colombia's security and commercial interests. Uribe is

reaching out to Ecuador's Rafael Correa, but fears Correa's
unpredictable nature and close ties to Chavez.

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Extradition
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8. (C) Uribe is aware of the high priority the U.S. Congress
places on extraditions of drug traffickers. Colombia is the
best U.S. partner in the world on extraditions, with over 430
traffickers and terrorists sent to the U.S. since Uribe took
office in 2002. Uribe has suspended the extradition of four
narcotraffickers due to their participation in the
paramilitary demobilization process. Human rights groups
argue several paramilitaries violated the terms of the
demobilization process and should be extradited. The GOC has
not made such a determination, preferring to keep the
paramilitaries in the Justice and Peace Law Process for now.


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Human Rights
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9. (C) Colombia's human rights record is improving, but
progress in the prosecution of major human rights violators,
especially involving military personnel, remains slow. The
recent UN High Commissioner on Human Rights' annual report on
Colombia recognized advances, but flagged an increase in
extrajudicial killings by the military as a concern. We
regularly push for progress on emblematic cases, but
Colombia's historically dysfunctional criminal justice system
is an obstacle. We are helping Colombia transition from its
antiquated inquisitorial system to an accusatorial system --
a process that now covers 75 percent of the population -- and
this will speed progress in recent human rights cases. A
proposed reform of the military criminal justice system will
also help. We are working with the GOC to implement
legislation to achieve justice and reparations, as well as to
strengthen protection programs for victims and witnesses. We
also support a special prosecutorial team set up by the
National Prosecutor's Office to investigate 204 crimes
against union members.

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New Criminal Groups and Reintegration of the Demobilized
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10. (C) The rise of new criminal groups in areas previously
controlled by the paramilitaries is a growing problem. The
new groups lack the national structure and political
ambitions of the defunct United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC),and the GOC has set up police stations in
rural areas as well as joint police-military task forces to
combat them. We support Colombia's efforts to reintegrate
32,000 former paramilitaries into civilian life, but these
efforts are hampered by the magnitude of the problem and
insufficient resources. The lag in effective reintegration
programs and the easy money of narcotrafficking and extortion
have led some ex-paramilitaries to return to crime. Still,
only a relatively small number of paramilitaries are believed
to have joined the new criminal groups.

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FARC and ELN
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11. (C) Increased Colombian military presusure forced the
FARC to withdraw to rural areas and reduced its military
capabilities, but has not compelled the group to start
serious peace negotiations. Narcotics trafficking continues
to finance operations. The GOC continues peace talks with
ELN, a smaller left-wing terrorist group, but without
agreement. Talks continue in Cuba.
Drucker