SOME PROGRESS IN CORDOBA POST PARAMILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002528

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: SOME PROGRESS IN CORDOBA POST PARAMILITARY
DEMOBILIZATION, BUT RESIDENTS REMAIN FEARFUL

REF: BOGOTA 2392

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Our March 25-26 trip to the former paramilitary
heartland Cordoba showed some positive changes following
paramilitary demobilization: violence had decreased, security
improved, and new spaces for civil society activity had
opened. The demobilization and para-political scandal had
delegitimized paramilitary leaders, but members of Cordoba's
political and economic elites were nervous over what the
scandal might uncover. Still, compared to other north
Atlantic coast departments, people remained apprehensive to
speak openly about ex-para influence, especially after the
murder of victims' advocate Yolanda Izquierdo. GOC officials
and independent analysts were hopeful the influence of former
paramilitary groups in the local elections in October would
be minimal. End summary.


2. (U) Polcouns and poloff traveled to Cordoba on March
25-26 and met with the Catholic Church, civil society,
military, police, municipal and departmental officials, and
international organization representatives.

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Positive Evaluation of Paramilitary Demobilization
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3. (C) Cordoba was the heartland of the paramilitary
movement, the home to the largest paramilitary bloc, the
United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),and served as
the site for peace talks between the AUC and the GOC. Local
Catholic Bishop Monsignor Julio Cesar Vidal, an influential
interlocutor in the para peace process and Monteria native,
told us the demobilization of the AUC was a great victory for
the GOC since the paramilitaries had taken effective control
of the north Atlantic coast departments. Vidal said the
sharp drop in violence following the demobilization had
convinced many of Cordoba's residents that the power of
Mancuso and other ex-paramilitary leaders had been weakened.


4. (C) Monteria's MAPP/OAS Coordinator Patricia Rodriguez
told us violence had decreased, security throughout the
department had improved, and the local economy was growing.
Eleventh Brigade Commander Col. William Pena said the sense
of improved security in the area had boosted economic growth.
Cattle raising, rice, and cotton production had increased in
the last three years. Cordoba's Cattle Ranchers Association
(GANACOR) Deputy Director Ricardo Ramirez said the security
guarantees offered by the Public Forces were encouraging
cattle ranchers to return to their lands and invest in their
businesses.


5. (C) Ombudswoman Julia Rodriguez said civil society was
becoming more organized and the Justice and Peace Law process
was opening spaces that did not exist before. Monteria's
Justice and Peace investigators noted the amount of
information that had come to light in the last year
represented progress, because citizens were apprehensive
about speaking out prior to demobilization. Thus far, the
Justice and Peace investigators have collected 2,000 victims'
claims against the ex-paramilitary blocs and their leaders.

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More Progress Still Needed
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6. (C) Still, compared to other north Atlantic coast
departments, people remained uneasy to speak openly about the
ex-paras influence. The January 31 murder of victims
advocate Yolanda Izquierdo has discouraged many from

denouncing paramilitary abuses, but Izquierdo's group,
Popular Housing Organization, continues to work (ref. A).
Three other victims' groups we met with--CONFABIC, Fundacion
Maria Cano and Corporacion Taller Prodesal--said human rights
and victims groups in Cordoba continued to be targeted by
illegal armed groups (IAGs). CONFABIC President Rodrigo
Ogaza explained how his organization was created in response
to the Justice and Peace Law to assist and represent victims'
rights, but said he had received several threats from former
para groups. The representatives said the greatest threat
for their cause was the lack of jobs in the department. High
unemployment rates left young males vulnerable to recruitment
by criminal and illegal armed groups.


7. (C) MAPP/OAS Coordinator Rodriguez agreed that limited
employment opportunities, common crime, and narcotrafficking
were the key challenges facing Cordoba. Monteria Mayor Leon
Fidel Ojeda said the department's main economic
activities--cattle raising and agriculture--did not generate
much employment. The lack of formal employment opportunities
had encouraged the rise of the informal sector and a
subsequent increase in crime. Police Commander Col. Jaime
Velasco said the areas of biggest security concern were in
southern Cordoba, Bajo Cauca, and Nudo de Paramillo. In
these areas, one can find coca, guerrillas, ex-paras,
corruption, extortion, and contraband. Monsignor Vidal
warned that as long as the guerrillas remained active and
narcotrafficking continued, violence would continue.

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Reintegration and New Criminal Groups
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8. (C) The four employees of the local Center for Reference
and Opportunities (CRO) told us they administer benefits to
4,000 demobilized paramilitaries. They cited numerous
obstacles to reintegration including the termination of
humanitarian aid to many of the demobilized who have reached
the 18 month; the Reintegration Commissioner's suspension of
productive projects; stigmatization of ex-paramilitaries by
potential employers and the local community; and rearmament
pressures by new criminal and narcotrafficking groups.
Former paramilitary leaders told us 18 months of humanitarian
aid, complemented with educational and occupational training,
was not enough time to find viable employment. They voiced
hope that changes planned by the Reintegration Commissioner's
Office, such as an extension of humanitarian aid and
individual psychological attention, would help, but warned
time was not on their side. Moreover, the CRO employees were
concerned the Commissioner's hiring of extra personnel was
primarily going to psychological assistance--the process of
hiring 28 psychologists was underway--while the CRO's
administrative resources would remain the same.


9. (C) Monteria's MAPP/OAS Office, the Police, and the
Military said two new criminal groups were operating in
southern Cordoba: Los Traquetos (municipalities of Valencia
and Tierralta) led by AKA "Cobra," and Vencedores de San
Jorge (municipalities of Montelibano and Puerto Libertador)
led by "Pollo Lezcano." Both groups were involved in
narcotrafficking and extortion. Their membership was a mix of
demobilized, non-demobilized, and common criminals. Col.
Pena told us the police had captured 36 of Los Traquetos' 42
members. The remaining had outstanding arrest warrants.
Still, the police had only been able to capture 24 of the
Vencedores's 61 members because, according to Col. Pena, the
Fiscalia had been slow to develop cases. Cambio Magazine
reported on April 15 Cordoba's Fiscalia Sectional Office
employees were under investigation for corruption, including
shelving some 10,000 investigations.

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"Red de Cooperantes" Useful, but a Potential Problem
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10. (C) Col. Pena and Col. Velasco said the Public Forces in

Cordoba had over 12,000 members in their network of voluntary
collaborators or "red de cooperantes." This network was
composed of cattle ranchers, farmers, peasants, taxi and bus
drivers, businessmen, demobilized paramilitaries, and IAG
deserters. Their primary purpose was to keep the Public
Forces informed of any suspicious activity or persons through
radios and/or cell phones. Col. Velasco explained that even
though there was a greater Public Forces presence in Cordoba
than ever before, they still lacked the number needed to
completely cover the department. The "red de cooperantes" was
a useful intelligence mechanism that helped offset the
personnel shortage.


11. (C) Monteria's MAPP/OAS Mission said it had received
several complaints from residents that demobilized
paramilitaries had been incorporated into these "redes" by
the military and were committing abuses. In some cases,
residents said the individuals continued to work with corrupt
officials for control of illicit activities. Ombudswoman
Julia Rodriguez confirmed some residents had complained about
the Public Forces' red de cooperantes since they had seen
members of the new criminal groups participating in the
redes. Velasco acknowledged some risks with the red de
cooperantes program, but defended it as an effective tool as
long as the necessary controls were implemented to prevent
infiltrations. He said the police recently arrested a member
of the Traquetos group who had had infiltrated their red de
cooperantes.

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Effects of Para-Politics and October Local Elections
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12. (C) MAPP/OAS officials explained para-politics ties in
Cordoba were complex. Many members of Cordoba's political
and economic elite--either affirmatively or under duress--had
tacitly supported the AUC. Mancuso was from a respected
Monteria family, and many paramilitary leaders had enjoyed
entree into Cordoba's social elite. Prior to the
paramilitary's demobilization, nothing happened in the
deparment without their consent. Monsignor Vidal said the
para-politics process was positive for Cordoba, but cautioned
that the local political and economic elite were nervous
about what the para-politics scandal would uncover. These
same people who previously welcomed Mancuso and other
paramilitaries now shun them. Vidal said the nature of
individual's ties with the paramilitaries--and the degree of
guilt--varied greatly. He said any criminal investigations
of para-politics ties should take these distinctions into
account.


13. (C) Cordoba's Inspector General (Procuraduria) Lucas
Pulido was hopeful that the October 2007 local election would
be transparent. Pulido's office had been working closely
with the Registrar's Office to prevent fraud during the voter
inscription phase. His office was also part of a larger
mixed commission to supervise the elections. Monteria Mayor
Leon Fidel Ojeda claimed he had not seen or heard of ex-para
pressures on candidates in the October elections. Vidal
thought the October elections would be relatively free of
pressure by armed groups, noting that the demobilization,
revelations of paramilitary atrocities, and the para-politics
scandal had greatly eroded the former paras political and
economic power. He said the public's tolerance for
paramilitary activity had reached its limit.
Drucker