Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA2283
2007-04-09 18:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

PRESSURE INCREASES ON ELN TO REACH PEACE DEAL WITH

Tags:  PTER PGOV PHUM KCRM CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #2283/01 0991835
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091835Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3937
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1275
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 0002
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7473
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 8862
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR 8602
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 4926
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 9726
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0376
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 5559
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002283 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KCRM CO
SUBJECT: PRESSURE INCREASES ON ELN TO REACH PEACE DEAL WITH
GOC

REF: BOGOTA 2103

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002283

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KCRM CO
SUBJECT: PRESSURE INCREASES ON ELN TO REACH PEACE DEAL WITH
GOC

REF: BOGOTA 2103

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The GOC, Catholic Church, guarantors, and
international community are pressing the ELN to agree to a
ceasefire and release its kidnap victims when the next round
of talks resumes in Cuba on April 12. Peace Commissioner
Luis Carlos Restrepo said publicly on April 8 the ELN's
failure to reach such an agreement would deal a death blow to
the talks, and told us he still put the prospects of success
as 50-50. Norwegian Charge Dag Nylander told us the ELN was
struggling to accept that its leverage was limited, and its
legacy uncertain. End summary.

--------------
Restrepo Issues Ultimatum
--------------


2. (U) On the eve of the next round of GOC-ELN talks in
Cuba, scheduled to start April 12 and last for up to 6 weeks,
Restrepo publicly told the ELN the time for "interminable"
talking was over and said the terrorist group should commit
to a ceasefire and release its kidnap victims. If it failed
to reach a deal in Cuba, the peace process would be mortally
wounded. Colombians would not accept the ELN's continued
kidnapping and increasing involvement in drug trafficking.


3. (U) Restrepo confirmed in an April 8 press interview that
the GOC would insist on justice and truth for ELN victims.
He said crimes against humanity, such as kidnapping, could
not receive amnesty, and ELN leaders would have to face
Justice and Peace Law terms, or a legal process akin to it.
Lower-ranking ELN members who had not committed such
atrocities could participate in the political process.
Restrepo criticized the ELN for disavowing deals its
negotiators reached during the Andres Pastrana presidency
(1998-2002). He urged the ELN to include in its negotiating
team military commander Antonio Galan, to ensure the ELN
respected any deal concluded in Havana.


4. (C) Restrepo told us on April 3 he still estimated the
prospects for success in Havana as 50-50. He said the ELN
continues to focus on a proposed agenda of social/political
issues rather than on a framework accord that would include a
ceasefire and release of kidnap victims. The GOC is stepping
up pressure on the ELN, including by cutting off funding for
the Casa de Paz in Medellin and the negotiating "mesa"
(thereby limiting opportunities for the ELN to travel within
and outside Colombia),reducing contacts between the ELN and
the international community (especially the Spanish, Swedish,
Swiss, Italian, and Dutch Ambassadors),and hardening the
GOC's public comments.


5. (C) If the talks in Havana are not successful, Restrepo
told us the GOC would slowly reduce the ELN's privileges.
The GOC would end the Casa de Paz, revoke its authorization
for Antonio Garcia, Pablo Beltran and other ELN negotiators
to move freely in Venezuela (although it was unsure if the
GOV would cooperate),and push the international community to
break contact with the group.

--------------
Facilitator Says ELN Worried About Legacy
--------------


6. (C) Norwegian Charge Dag Nylander told us on April 5 the
ELN understands its leverage in the talks is limited to
whether and how to release its kidnap victims. After 40
years of struggle, it has no other cards to play. If it were
to agree to ceasefire and release the victims, the ELN
worries the GOC will not participate in "national convention"
sessions at which the ELN planned to advocate social reforms.
Without at least obtaining GOC commitments to participate in
the national convention, the ELN's legacy for 40 years of
struggle would be a few seminars. Nylander was somewhat more
optimistic than Restrepo that the Havana talks would produce
an agreement, but coincided with Restrepo that the ball was

in the ELN's court.


7. (C) Nylander suggested the GOC's public pressure on the
ELN was working. International community representatives
were losing patience with the ELN's inability to make
decisions. The ELN was frustrated the Casa de Paz funds were
being cut off, annoyed it could no longer talk to the
international community without a GOC presence, and
embarrassed by public Catholic Church calls for a ceasefire
and release of kidnap victims. He said even the civil
society guarantors, who are generally considered sympathetic
to the ELN, have threatened to walk away if the ELN refuses
to reach a deal.



Drucker