Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA1558
2007-03-08 16:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

PEACE COMMISSIONER RESTREPO ON PARAMILITARIES, ELN

Tags:  KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 1263
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 8777
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 8566
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 4848
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9657
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RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 0070
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1033
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 5490
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RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0364
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL IMMEDIATE 3903
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0140
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001558 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER RESTREPO ON PARAMILITARIES, ELN
PROCESS, AND THE FARC

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001558

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER RESTREPO ON PARAMILITARIES, ELN
PROCESS, AND THE FARC

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said
he is talking to the former paramilitary leaders in Itagui
prison to encourage them not to disrupt the Justice and Peace
Law process. President Uribe is concerned by his security
forces, failure to capture Vicente Castano and other
renegade paramilitary leaders, and has told Restrepo to make
a first-hand assessment of security conditions in areas where
demobilized paras are concentrated. Restrepo said the GOC is
pushing the ELN to implement a cease-fire and release
kidnapping victims by April 8; the ELN continues to delay a
decision due to internal differences. Restrepo put the odds
of concluding an agreement by the end of March at 50/50. He
said FARC intransigence made the prospect of serious talks
with the terrorist group on either a humanitarian accord or a
peace process unlikely in the foreseeable future. End
Summary

--------------
PARAMILITARY PROCESS
--------------


2. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told us March
6 President Uribe had instructed him to resume a dialogue
with the former paramilitary leaders held in Itagui prison.
Uribe fears the leaders, discontent with the conditions
within Itagui will lead them to try to disrupt the peace
process. Restrepo,s goal is to encourage the leaders to
participate in the Justice and Peace Law process and to
refrain from promoting the emergence of new criminal groups
by addressing their concerns regarding prison conditions,
visiting privileges, reintegration programs for demobilized
paras, etc. He is not authorized to restart negotiations on
substantive issues such as extradition or asset forfeiture.
Restrepo said he has met three times with the former para
leaders over the last month, but has made little progress in
assuaging their concerns. It is difficult to do so, since he
has little to offer them, he noted.


3. (C) Restrepo said the Colombian security forces, failure

to capture paramilitary leader Vicente Castano and other
paramilitary figures that have abandoned the peace process is
embarrassing the GOC. He met with the military High Command
three weeks ago to push them to energize their efforts
against Castano et al, but they do not appear to have done
so. Restrepo said corruption within the military and police
is a major obstacle in this regard. President Uribe is so
concerned by the security forces, failure that he has
ordered Restrepo to reach out to Castano again to try to
persuade him to rejoin the peace process. Uribe has also
asked Restrepo to travel to the regions where demobilized
former paras are concentrated to make a personal assessment
of security conditions on the ground. Restrepo doubts his
efforts to reach out to Castano will succeed. Castano is
under little military pressure, and Restrepo cannot meet
Castano,s demands. (Note: In an open, undated letter to
Restrepo released in November, Castano alleged the GOC had
violated numerous commitments made during the peace
negotiations, including extradition, political status, and
incarceration.)

--------------
ELN DEAL BY END OF MONTH?
--------------


4. (C) Restrepo put the odds at 50/50 that the GOC will
conclude a ceasefire agreement with the ELN by the end of
March. He has largely agreed on the details of an accord

with his counterparts at the table, but the ELN
leadership*reflecting internal differences*continues to
delay the signing of a deal. Some ELN members would prefer
to seek a rapprochement with the FARC. Hence, the ELN is
currently pushing the GOC to agree to hold public discussions
on issues such as political reform and &the legislative
agenda for peace.8 After these discussions, the ELN would
sign a ceasefire deal. Restrepo said the GOC has rejected
this approach. The GOC is insisting the ELN conclude a
ceasefire accord by the end of March, and begin
implementation on April 8. This would include the ELN,s
release of all kidnapping victims. Restrepo said the
deadline could slip if the ELN asks for more time, but the
GOC will not make further substantive concessions absent a
ceasefire.


5. (C) Restrepo said the ELN is under military, diplomatic
and political pressure to make a deal. The FARC is trying to
exterminate the group to seize its arms and drug routes; the
Europeans have suspended financing (at Restrepo,s request)
for the ELN,s Peace House (Casa de Paz) in Medellin and for
the negotiating table; and Polo Democratico Mayor of Bogota
Lucho Garzon said he will not meet with the group again
unless it accepts a ceasefire. He said Venezuela and Cuba
continue to provide logistical support to the talks, and also
appear to be encouraging the ELN to sign the accord.


6. (C) Restrepo said the Colombian military is prepared to
implement a &mobile8 ceasefire, through radio
communications with ELN units. The GOC expects the OAS to
help verify an accord--with the United Nations playing a more
political role--but this remains to be settled. In addition
to Spain, Switzerland, Norway, Cuba and Venezuela, the GOC
wants Italy, Holland and Japan to be involved. The ELN is
pressing for Nicaragua and Ecuador to play a role. He said
once the ELN implements a ceasefire and releases its kidnap
victims, the GOC will likely urge the European Union to lift
its designation of the ELN as a terrorist organization. It
will also provide the ELN increased political space inside
Colombia. He said the ELN continues to push for a total
amnesty. The GOC will insist the ELN tell the truth about
its criminal actions, and will only support an amnesty for
political crimes. In the end, the Colombian Congress will
have to resolve this issue.

--------------
FARC REMAINS INTRANSIGENT
--------------


7. (C) Restrepo said there is no prospect of serious talks
with the FARC on either a humanitarian accord or a peace
process for the foreseeable future. Encouraged by the
parapolitical scandal and the presence of leftwing
governments in Ecuador and Venezuela, the FARC is already
looking past President Uribe,s tenure. The FARC,s General
Staff met recently and decided to eliminate the ELN, launch
new military and organizational efforts to build its capacity
in the mid-term, and start a diplomatic initiative to boost
its international standing. In this context, the FARC is
organizing pro-FARC fora in Sweden and Mexico, and Raul Reyes
has agreed to receive Swiss and French representatives to
hear their proposals--not those of the GOC--on a humanitarian
exchange. Restrepo said despite his pessimism, the GOC
maintains communication channels with the FARC. He confirmed
the recent &secret8 GOC emissary to the FARC, who he
identified as longtime associate of Alvaro Leyva and
part-time journalist Lazaro Vivero, returned with the
standard FARC position*GOC demilitarization of Florida and
Pradera municipalities prior to the start of humanitarian
talks.


--------------
INCIPIENT DOUBTS ABOUT GOC STRATEGY
--------------


8. (C) Restrepo voiced concern that opinion polls show a
gradual weakening of public support for the GOC,s democratic
security policy. Uribe remains personally popular, but a
growing body of public opinion doubts the credibility of the
paramilitary process, supports a humanitarian exchange, and
questions the president,s handling of the guerrillas. He
has proposed that the GOC strengthen its discourse on
democratic security and push coalition political parties to
be more active in their defense of the strategy.
DRUCKER