A/S SHANNON MEETS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SANTOS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001232

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: A/S SHANNON MEETS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SANTOS ON
JANUARY 30


Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


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Summary
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1. (C) Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos told WHA A/S
Thomas Shannon and INL A/S Anne Patterson the U.S. and
Colombia should develop a coordinated message on Plan
Colombia's successes, a message he would take with him to
Washington when he met with Secretary of Defense Gates.
Santos urged the U.S. and UN to develop a common approach to
measure hectares under coca cultivation, saying the Colombian
and international publics were confused by different
methodologies that produced sharply varying results. Santos
said three key programs -- spraying, development aid, and
military assistance -- should be integrated more closely in
planning and executing programs and operations. On
nationalization, all agreed it would be helpful for the GOC
to show it was already preparing to assume key costs. Santos
welcomed news of approval for a fourth spray package. End
summary.


2. (U) On January 30, WHA A/S Shannon and INL A/S Patterson
met with Defense Minister Santos. Shannon and Patterson were
accompanied by Ambassador William B. Wood, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Mary Lee Warren, USAID Deputy Assistant
Administrator Mark Silverman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Steve Johnson, ONDCP Deputy Director James O'Gara,
INL Office Director for the Americas Tony Arias, WHA/AND
Director Phil French, Political Counselor John Creamer,
Defense Attache Rey Velez, and pol/mil officer (notetaker).
Santos was accompanied by Vice Ministers of Defense Juan
Carlos Pinzon and Sergio Jaramillo, Military Forces Commander
General Freddy Padilla, Ambassador to the U.S. Carolina
Barco, Colombian DCM Mariana Pacheco, and U.S. Office
Director Patricia Cortes.

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Communicating Plan Colombia Achievements
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3. (C) Santos opened the meeting by saying the U.S. and
Colombia faced a common challenge in highlighting Plan
Colombia's successes. He stressed the need for a coordinated
message, which he would use in upcoming meetings with
Congressional staffers. Plan Colombia was beyond the halfway
point to success; it was key that the U.S. continue to
provide the assistance needed to finish the job. Plan
Colombia's fundamental goal was to strengthen Colombian
democracy; the recent revelations of paramilitary-political
ties from the Justice and Peace process proved that it was
working. A/S Patterson was pleased with a pocket-sized
booklet and laminated charts noting achievements of the GOC's
Democratic Security program and suggested the GOC share them
with Congress. Despite a difficult climate in Congress,
Shannon said Colombia had a good story to tell, with
substantial progress made in a short time.

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Common Measures for a Clearer Message
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4. (C) Santos said different drug cultivation measurements
used by the U.S. and UN caused confusion, especially since
changes to the U.S. methodology had resulted in upward
revisions of the estimated hectares of coca cultivation. To
the public, an "overnight" change in the number of coca
hectares from 80,000 to 144,000 looked like failure. What
was needed was a common basis which could be calculated
retroactively to provide a clear comparison. Ambassador Wood
agreed with Santos' frustration, saying the U.S. and Colombia
were winning the war but lacked the numbers to show it. Wood
explained the former U.S. measure was inadequate and required
improvement; hence the changes in last year's approach. The
best way forward was to freeze the method now to allow
comparability in the future. Santos argued that what was
needed was a simple and clear metric -- a harmonized number
that could be used to establish a baseline against which to
measure progress.

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Coordination of Spraying, Military, and Development
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5. (C) Santos said three different program areas --
spraying, development aid, and military campaigns -- were
planned separately, leading to failure to consolidate
initial successes. Under the current approach, the FARC
returned to areas after military operations subsided, and
coca was resown where fumigation ended. By aligning these
three approaches, affected areas could be recovered
permanently. Wood agreed coordination was vital. The
difficulty, he said, was that spray and development projects
could not shift locations from one day to the next. For
example, in 2005 we shifted spray operations to Narino at the
GOC's request and lost the opportunity to spray 30,000
hectares. Moreover, alternative development programs targeted
places most likely to succeed. Still, he said we wanted to
support military efforts to hold terrain, and were looking at
supporting small projects in Putumayo.

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Helicopter Dilemma (Counterdrug / Counterguerrilla)
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6. (C) Pinzon said Putumayo showed the need for
coordination, particularly with respect to helicopters.
Spraying in Putumayo had been effective; no coca remained
there. The COLMIL had sent in a counterdrug battalion to
control territory, create an environment conducive to
development, and ensure coca would not be replanted. Still,
without helicopters, the battalion lacked the mobility to
carry out its mission and establish permanent control. The
U.S. had sufficient helicopter assets; the question was to
which mission they would be applied. The Ambassador said we
also believed flexibility was important, and we had approved
41 of 44 GOC requests to make spray helicopters available for
military operations. Still, the fundamental problem was the
shortage of helicopters. Using helicopters for military
missions translated into fewer hectares sprayed. A/S
Patterson said we would soon provide equipment for a fourth
spray package, which would increase spray capacity. The
Colombians were enthusiastic over this news.

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Wealth Tax Allocation
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7. (C) Pinzon noted that allocation of the new 'wealth tax'
for military spending was nearly finalized; a detailed budget
matrix would be shared soon. Wood noted a tendency to spend
new tax income on "things" and cautioned that those would not
serve their purpose if they were not sustained. Expenses
such as training, airstrip upgrades, logistics systems, and
personnel management must not be overlooked. The U.S. was
ready to help. Santos affirmed that the COLMIL's intent was
to "buy the minimum." Colombian purchases would not be
guided by actions in Venezuela or Ecuador. Still, certain
materiel required repair and refurbishment, such as the
Navy's four frigates which played an important role in
interdiction. The MoD urged candidly, "I ask for your help
in evaluating what we really need from my military's
wish-list." For the first time, he stressed, every COLMIL
capital investment included a study of maintenance costs.

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Planning for 'Nationalization'
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8. (C) A/S Patterson said the lack of pilots and mechanics,
as well as budgets for sustainment, was a major obstacle to
nationalizing our aviation assistance programs. Pinzon said
the COLMIL would begin on February 9 a planning exercise with
the Embassy. The exercise would review budgets for the next
two to three years and would prioritize expenditures with a
view to sustainment, maintenance, and logistical capacity.
Patterson noted that she and Pinzon would meet on February 5
in Washington to discuss nationalization programs. Shannon
added that it would be important to show that Colombia was
preparing now for nationalization.

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Pending Visit to Washington

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9. (C) Both sides looked forward to talks between Santos and
U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates on February 1. Santos
commented on the "positive chemistry" he felt with new
SouthCom Commander Admiral Stavridis. He said the strategic
framework agreement almost ready, and the COLMIL's 25-point
strategy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security policy
was evolving well. On High Value Targets (HVTs),Santos said
these were a means to an end not an end in themselves. Both
sides agreed that future planning documents should detail
specific programs. Ambassador Wood said the GOC's new
"Strengthening Democracy and Social Development" plan should
outline specific programs for which the GOC was seeking
funding. This would facilitate Europena support.


10. (U) A/S Shannon and A/S Patterson did not have the
opportunity to clear this cable before their departure.

DRUCKER