FERNANDO ARAUJO: LIFE AS A FARC HOSTAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001224

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PTER CO
SUBJECT: FERNANDO ARAUJO: LIFE AS A FARC HOSTAGE

REF: A. BOGOTA 00311

B. BOGOTA 01218

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


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Summary
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1. (C) Former GOC Development Minister Fernando Araujo was
kidnapped by the FARC in December 2000 and held hostage until
his dramatic escape during a COLMIL assault last New Year's
Eve (reftel A). In five hours of de-brief interviews with
Embassy officers, Dr. Araujo described the guerrillas'
treatment of political prisoners, his guard details, front
movements, and defensive maneuvers when under attack. Araujo
said the FARC had weakened markedly over the six years of his
captivity. His account may be unique to the northern front
which held him and hence not transferable to other hostage
cases, especially any in southern Colombia. End Summary.


2. (U) On February 19, President Uribe announced the
appointment of Fernando Araujo as Foreign Minister, replacing
Maria Consuelo Araujo (no relation) (reftel B).

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A Prized Asset, Handled With Care
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3. (C) Araujo was told that he was a valued asset, an "ace"
for bargaining with the GOC, and his health and comfort were
a priority. The only hostage held by the FARC's 37th front,
he never saw or heard news of any other. He had a cordial
relationship with the front commander, Martin Caballero, who
asked for his help in translating electronics manuals and in
teaching English. Although most FARC including Caballero
slept on a bed of leaves on the ground, Araujo was afforded
the relative comfort of a hammock. He was also allowed a
notebook in which he kept a diary, a radio with which he
followed national and world news, and whatever newspapers or
magazines might reach the camp -- their local editions a clue
as to his whereabouts. He was not permitted any tools that
could double as weapons. In terms of health or comfort, his
any concern was immediately attended to. His greatest
struggle was with boredom, not mistreatment. The duty of
care for hostages is an order in the FARC rulebook, he said.
The FARC observe it conscientiously seeing it as a political
message.

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Unbound but Set Apart
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4. (C) Araujo was not restrained, but his mobility was
restricted. He was initially tied by a belt at his waist
after he attempted to escape on the day of his kidnap, but
after seven months in captivity he was never again bound or
handcuffed. His face was never masked except near civilians,
nor were his eyes covered except when passing close to
landmarks that could reveal to him his location. Araujo
normally wore civilian clothing. Occasionally when passing
near a town or population he was dressed in a FARC camouflage
uniform to blend in with the group. FARC members had two
uniforms -- one in camouflage, the other a police uniform.
Still, they often dressed as civilians when their uniforms
were worn out, so street clothes would not necessarily set
apart a hostage from captors. What did set him apart was
that he was confined to one area of the camp, unlike everyone
else who moved freely performing chores. He was also not
allowed to join meetings or parties. This restricted
mobility, advised Araujo, was the best criterion which
surveillance teams could apply to distinguish a hostage in
the midst of a camp.

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Guards: Constant but Weak
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5. (C) The guard watch over him was constant, he said
rotating, in two-hour shifts. During most of the six years
there was only one guard, but this was increased to two last
October after President Uribe publicly advocated military
rescue operations. On marches, Araujo was led by three
guards in front and three behind. He was never able to
separate himself, even for a moment. While his captors were
kind and friendly, and Araujo tried to befriend them for his
own self-interest, he remained always aware that they would
kill him without hesitation if given the order. FARC members
told him that among guerrillas there could be no real
friendships for this reason. Surprisingly, given Araujo's
importance as an exchange asset, his guards were not the
front's most elite fighters. Instead they were often those
who were sick, pregnant, or otherwise less able to perform
regular duties. They would always be among the front's most
trusted members, however.

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Movements Among Camps
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6. (C) Araujo referred to the FARC as nomads, a mobile corps
continually shifting from camp to camp. The frequency of
these movements increased with military pressure in the area
and/or scarcity of water, decreasing at times of illness
among the troops. In 2006, the front moved 26 times, or on
average once every two weeks. Forces would move out of a
camp at any time of day, or by night when the moon was
bright. Distances between camps ranged from three to ten
kilometers (which Araujo estimated by counting his paces),
and movements lasted one to three days. The front kept its
distance from the civilian population. Araujo never
encountered adjunct militias, but the front used local
campesino guides who knew where mines were laid on the
trails. Advance teams were also sent ahead in areas of risk.
The entire front marched in an organized file, in a mandated
order by company, on foot without mules or vehicles. FARC
members were loaded down by twenty extra pounds of cargo over
and above their weapons, ammunition, and personal belongings.
In tough terrain where the climate was hot and water scarce,
marches were difficult. Rest stops were frequent, and day
marches could last from one hour to eight hours, limited by
the pace of the slowest member.

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FARC Disciplined, COLMIL Not
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7. (C) The FARC would "erase" camps and trails as it left
them, spreading grasses and leaves in their wake to prevent
their traces from being detected by air. Trash was buried in
the ground. They were similarly very careful with smoke from
their cooking fires, which they believed that U.S.
surveillance would detect. Rare visitors, like emergency
doctors would be led to the camp in relay fashion by a chain
of guides, so that no single person would know the entire
route from town to camp. Visitors would normally be kept on
the camp periphery. Similarly, when moving camps even the
FARC's own rank and file did not know the final destination.
Marches were conducted in silence, except for a roll call up
and down the line, relying on hand signals to communicate the
presence of enemy or civilians. By contrast, guerrillas
scoffed at what they considered to be poor COLMIL discipline.
The front often knew the positions of COLMIL troops, who
traveled loudly in groups of 12 to 20 and left behind
footprints and trash.

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Vigilance and Vulnerability
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8. (C) The FARC was normally quite vigilant for overhead
aerial activity. Guerrillas recognized aircraft types by
sound and had nicknames for each. Sentries eavesdropped on
pilots' radio conversations to determine directions and
targets. Araujo said Caballero also received tip-off calls
from air bases - although it is unclear whether he meant from
inside infiltrators or from FARC militia posted outside
runways. When a plane or helicopter was heard, an alert was
raised. All then remained silent and took cover under trees.
If an aircraft came closer, the front dispersed to a radius
of about 500 yards in all directions to avoid being a
concentrated target. Araujo noted that moments of greatest
vulnerability were: 1) while breaking up camps; 2) at the
exhausted end of long marches; and 3) during downpours, when
guerrillas huddled under tarps and were unable to see or hear
much but the rain. The front's guard was even lower during
weekly 'culture time,' from six to eight on Sunday evenings.
During such sessions the guerillas were distracted by
drinking, flirting, dancing, and loud music. Rifles were
confiscated when gueriles were drunk.

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Military Pressure
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9. (C) Military operations in the 37th Front area of Bolivar
department were continual, said Araujo. The FARC believed
that COLMIL offensive capabilities and U.S. technology were
very advanced. When attacks were most intense, the hostage
was separated from the front in a small guard company, to
avert injury or escape. Araujo stressed that every hostage
case was different (by type of front, number of hostages and
guards, terrain, etc.). Hence, the lessons from his
experience could not necessarily be applied to other
prisoners. In his own case, "military rescue for me was a
valid option." Although devastated by the news of fellow
political hostages killed during COLMIL rescue operations,
Araujo still supported the attempt, saying "I always wished
they would rescue me." As for his captors, they never
blamed or punished him for casualties suffered at the hands
of the COLMIL. They differentiated him from the war and told
him the fighting was not his fault.

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37th Front: Weakened and "Worried"
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10. (C) Reflecting on the changes he had seen in the 37th
Front over the course of the last six years, Dr. Araujo said
COLMIL attacks had taken a heavy toll on the FARC. "At the
moment they have no capability. They are beaten up,
diminished. That is, the guerrilla that I knew six years
ago, they're much more affected now. Many of the guerrillas
I knew died or have been captured. Many have also fled."
Araujo described Caballero as a genuine revolutionary,
inspired by Castro and Chavez, who believed the FARC would
win but was dismayed by the reality of its decline. COLMIL
had not only weakened the front materially but also had
scarred it psychologically: "I want to insist on one point.
In September 2005 we were completely surrounded (by the
COLMIL). (The FARC) put on music and joked about it all.
But that was also part of their psychological
reaction....Clearly they feel afraid. The worry is
permanent."

DRUCKER