Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA1158
2007-02-16 16:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

RIVER WARS IN THE FARC'S HEARTLAND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001158 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: RIVER WARS IN THE FARC'S HEARTLAND

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: RIVER WARS IN THE FARC'S HEARTLAND

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
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1. (C) To cut guerrilla supply lines and interdict
narcotraffic, riverine battalions of Colombian Marines
(COLMAR) are fighting to take control of nearly 8,000 miles
of inland waterways. The tough river environment gives
inherent tactical advantages to the FARC, but the COLMAR is
building more defensible patrol craft and mobile forward
bases, as well as developing surveillance technologies, to
improve its offensive capabilities. Continued U.S. support,
from equipment to training, is vital in helping to win this
fight, particularly at a time when the COLMAR appears to be
under threat of cutbacks. End Summary.

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Vast Coca Highways
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2. (C) Running more than 7,800 miles through five major
river basins, Colombia's inland waters are key territory for
the Colombian military to control in their fight against
drugs and guerrillas. The Pacific Coast alone counts more
than 32 navigable rivers. In vast, underdeveloped areas of
Colombia's outlying departments, rivers are the main highways
for commerce and communications. Rivers are the FARC's
supply lifelines for food, medicines, and arms;
narcotraffickers use them to move precursor chemicals in and
coca out, in craft from large boats to canoes. The GOC's
commitment to fight illegal groups in the heartland requires
the military to take control of these routes. Five years
ago, the COLMAR was unable to reach most of them. A two-day
lag time to assist victims of a 2002 FARC massacre at Bojaya,
Choco, focused attention on the problem. The COLMAR now
claims coverage, but not control, of 5,000 miles of
Colombia's waterways.

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Riverine Battalions: Stretching for Coverage
--------------


3. (C) The COLMAR's eight riverine battalions conduct a
range of duties from combat to civil affairs:

- Landing, offensive assault, and combat
- Troop transport and supply for Colombian Army operations

- Patrol of rivers, including escort of tankers
- Interdiction checkpoints; boarding, search, and seizure
- Disaster relief and humanitarian aid to remote areas
- Mobile radio broadcasting to encourage guerrilla
desertions
- Intelligence gathering from civilian informant networks

Resources are overstretched. While Colombia has on paper the
second largest marine corps in the world, two-thirds of its
officer and NCO billets are vacant. Troops work a grueling
schedule of 100 days deployed aboard small craft, followed by
15 days of rest on base. (This compares to a U.S. 30/7
rotation.) COLMAR accounts for 85 percent of Colombian Navy
personnel, but it receives a minor share of COLNAV funding.
Its staff is frequently drawn down for land-based policing
duties.

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Riverine Warfare Favors the FARC
--------------


4. (C) Rivers offer substantial advantages to the enemy.
They are unpredictable, shifting courses and changing depths
(by up to 12 feet) with rain and tidal flows. Obstacles such
as shallows, sand bars, and plant debris limit
maneuverability on narrow tributaries. Dense jungle cuts the
range of radio communications, limiting the ability to
penetrate land on the banks. Logistics hurdles and long
supply lines hamper extending operations forward. While
doctrine requires land troops to vary routes, COLMAR riverine
patrol routes are predictable, with obvious choke points.
River patrols are highly vulnerable to ambush, either by
coordinated fire from both banks or by detonation of
explosive charges. While COLMAR boats are fully exposed
mid-river, the FARC and ELN are protected by trenches, trees,
and civilian homes. For these reasons, the COLMAR have
historically suffered high casualty rates, earning them the
grim nickname "formol" (embalming fluid for corpses).

-------------- -
COLMAR R&D: Advanced Boats, Mobile Bases, UAVs
-------------- -


5. (C) To improve their odds in riverine operations, the
COLNAV has created a subsidiary (http://www.cotecmar.com) to
develop and build advanced river craft ('NODRIZA') as support
hubs for its Vietnam era patrol boats. First designed in
2000 for logistical support (ferrying provisions and troops
upriver),the NODRIZA class has since evolved into a
multi-purpose platform for both defensive protection and
offensive operations. The latest model is faster and more
maneuverable, fully armored to protect troops, carries eight
weapon stations to repel attacks, and has a helicopter
landing pad. Built far more cheaply ($8 million) than
competing U.S. craft, the NODRIZA is a unique innovation with
export potential. Less high-tech but equally important are
mobile bases. These floating docking stations function as
patrol elements, enabling the COLMAR to sustain presence in
remote locations. With these docking stations as mobile
hubs, and the NODRIZA as a 'mother ship' operating on primary
rivers, the next challenge is to develop a class of smaller,
faster boats capable of pursuing illegal traffic along minor
tributaries.


6. (C) To minimize vulnerability to FARC attacks, the best
defense is offense -- via intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR). In sparsely populated areas where
human informants are few, the military must rely mainly on
technical means to locate enemy forces. The most promising
new technologies are unmanned aerial and surface vehicles
(UAVs, USVs) and fixed ground / maritime sensors (UGSs),all
remote controlled devices that transmit real-time images of
enemy movements. With UAVs, the COLMAR could overfly river
banks looking for ambushes; with USVs it could remotely
interrogate suspect traffic; and UGSs could alert it to
passing boats. The COLMAR currently has two UAV systems in
development, and the U.S. Navy is donating two surplus USVs.

--------------
U.S. Training: Combat, Logistics, Personnel
--------------


7. (C) Aside from boat and USV donations, U.S. contributions
to the COLMAR are primarily training. Given the rigor of
riverine operations, combat training ranges from basic
training to more advanced, special forces instruction.
Logistics assistance is of equal urgency, especially to fuel
and resupply forward locations upriver. The COLMAR suffers
chronic fuel shortages and lacks a professional fuels
management organization to protect fuel quality and manage
its distribution. Engine maintenance, repair, and spare
parts inventory are also spotty, sometimes crippling
operational readiness rates. Finally, fundamental changes
are needed to COLMAR doctrine with respect to career tracks
-- to define specializations, ensure continuity of skills,
and decrease command level churn. U.S. Army South (USARSO)
is working with the COLMIL to upgrade its personnel
management systems in these aspects.

--------------
Future Outlook Is Uncertain
--------------


8. (C) Despite the COLMAR's innovative efforts to develop
indigeneous crafts and technologies appropriate for riverine
warfare, its future is uncertain. As a component of the
Colombian Navy, the COLMAR is vulnerable to interservice
rivalry with its dominant blue-water sibling. The COLNAV
controls budgets, recruitment, and training, as well as
promotion of senior officers. COLMAR comprises 85 percent of
Navy personnel; it is selected for fewer than ten percent of
Navy flag officers and receives a minor share (perhaps 20 or
30 percent) of Navy budgets. Early indications are that even
those budgets may be cut in the coming fiscal year. Further,
the new 'wealth tax' for defense spending allocates 96
percent of the Navy's budget to open-water expenditures
(frigates, submarines, and the like),while only four percent
is allocated to riverine operations. Riverine investment
accounts for only $6 million in an overall budget of $3.15
billion. We will continue to support the COLMAR riverine
effort, not only with equipment and training, but in
encouraging the Colombians to provide the COLAR with the
resources needed to perform its duties.
DRUCKER