GUARDED OPTIMISM ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF GOC-ELN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PTER PHUM PGOV PREL CO
SUBJECT: GUARDED OPTIMISM ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF GOC-ELN
CEASEFIRE AND RELEASE OF ELN KIDNAP VICTIMS

REF: BOGOTA 1109

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Presidential Counselor Jose Obdulio Gaviria and
GOC-ELN guarantor Alvaro Jimenez separately expressed to us
guarded optimism about the possibility of a GOC-ELN ceasefire
being announced in the near future. Jimenez said the two
sides hoped to present a ceasefire agreement at the end of
the February 22-28 fifth round of peace talks in Havana. He
understood the ceasefire would initially run from May through
November, during which period the ELN would release kidnap
victims. Still, even if the ceasefire is implemented, it is
unclear whether the ELN's Central Command controls fronts
that are increasingly involved in narcotics trafficking. End
summary.

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Caracas Talks
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2. (C) Gaviria told us President Uribe's principal goal in
talks with the ELN was to secure a ceasefire. Separately,
Jimenez said Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo and a
delegation from the ELN's Central Command (COCE) are "far
advanced" in ceasefire talks. At the conclusion of the
February 22-28 fifth round of talks in Havana, Jimenez told
us the parties expected to announce a ceasefire and a plan to
release ELN kidnap victims. The ceasefire would begin in May
and last through November, when it was expected to be
renewed. ELN kidnap victims would be released during this
initial ceasefire phase.


3. (C) Jimenez claimed there was oral agreement by all
parties on a ceasefire verification mechanism, led
politically by the UN but whose spade work would be done by
the OAS. The ELN had dropped its objection to the OAS being
involved. ELN fighters would not concentrate; rather, the
verification teams would be responsible for ensuring they
were in certain zones and that their weapons had not been
used. The weapons would not be confiscated during the first
phase.


4. (C) Gaviria noted President Uribe was willing to allow
elements of the ELN to engage in "political" activities.
Jimenez understood the ELN would not run candidates itself,
but expected to have opportunities to move throughout
Colombia during the ceasefire period and launch social
initiatives, working with local governments and the GOC to
promote regional economic development.

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Justice for ELN Victims
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5. (C) Gaviria said President Uribe would support terms on
justice for ELN victims that were acceptable to the
international community. He emphasized international law had
evolved since the days when blanket amnesties were feasible,
and said any deal the ELN reached with the GOC would have to
be made available to the ex-paramilitaries. Jimenez said the
guarantors had not yet addressed justice with the COCE,
although ELN negotiator Francisco Galan privately told the
guarantors there could be no escaping the subject.

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Looking Forward
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6. (C) Jimenez confirmed the agenda for the second phase
(from November forward) was not yet agreed. He said the goal
of the guarantors and the GOC was an ELN commitment to
reintegrate its combatants by June 2008, which necessarily
would involve disarmament and demobilization. Jimenez said
he did not know the ELN's position on this matter. After the
Havana round, future talks would be in Colombia and Venezuela.


7. (C) Gaviria insisted the GOC would not agree to a
Constituent Assembly to address the ELN's political agenda.

Any legislative success the ELN had would depend on its
ability to persuade the Congress to act. The GOC would not
make substantive concession to a group with "500 effective
fighters". Jimenez said the ELN had dropped its interest in
the Assembly. Both Gaviria and Jimenez claimed ELN
foot-dragging in recent months was due to its consistent
inability to read Colombian politics accurately. Gaviria
reported the ELN took seriously Polo Democratico Senator
Gustavo Petro's attacks on Uribe and incorrectly regarded the
Administration as shaky.


8. (C) Jimenez blamed ELN military commander Antonio Garcia
for the slow progress in recent months. He claimed the ELN
had prepared a ceasefire agreement in December but Garcia had
refused to release it to the GOC. Instead, Garcia had
pushed for his own idea of small concessions in return for
GOC agreement to a broad social agenda, something the GOC had
not been keen on. The COCE had recently insisted Pablo
Beltran attend all meetings Garcia had with Restrepo. In
Jimenez's view, this was positive, and diluted Garcia's
idiosyncratic decision making.

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Narcotrafficking Complications
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9. (C) Even if the GOC and ELN were to reach agreement on a
ceasefire, growing evidence of narcotrafficking activities by
ELN fronts raise questions about the COCE's ability to
deliver during a demobilization and reintegration phase
(reftel). If the COCE's admonitions against participating in
the drug trade are to be believed, front activities suggest
the COCE's writ does not run far. If the COCE's admonitions
are disingenuous, it remains unclear how many fronts would
agree to demobilize. The alternatives of some ELN fronts
joining the FARC or collaborating with ex-paramilitaries
cannot be ruled out.

DRUCKER