ENGAGING THE KYRGYZ ON MANAS AIR BASE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BISHKEK 000909

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE KYRGYZ ON MANAS AIR BASE

REF: A. BISHKEK 894

B. STATE 93188

C. BISHKEK 816

D. BISHKEK 544

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Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On June 22, the Kyrgyz government proposed
changes to the July 2006 Protocol of Intentions covering
payment for access to, and use of, Manas Air Base. The
Kyrgyz proposal includes a request for $18 million for
upgrades to their air traffic control system at Manas, as
well as a request that the U.S. continue to provide over $150
million in assistance and compensation each year to the
Kyrgyz government (Ref C). On July 10, per Ref B
instructions, we responded by diplomatic note to the Kyrgyz
government that while the Protocol set the annual terms and
compensation for a period of five years, we were prepared to
discuss issues concerning the operation of the base under the
Protocol (Ref A). The Kyrgyz have not/not proposed any
changes to the status of U.S. servicemen at the base. Some
of the Kyrgyz proposals are clear non-starters, but in post's
view addressing certain of the Kyrgyz proposals could result
in tangible benefits to the base. For example, many of the
issues raised by the Kyrgyz were under discussion during last
year's base negotiations, but were left unresolved. In
post's judgment, the U.S. would likely be able to address
many of the Kyrgyz concerns without opening anything
resembling formal negotiations. The Kyrgyz are looking to us
for the next steps in the process to begin face-to-face
discussions.


2. (C) Upcoming events, such as the August 16 Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, the
expected conclusion of the U.S. investigation into the
shooting incident, and parliamentary hearings on the base
scheduled for September, will contribute to existing public
and political pressure against the base. In post's judgment,
the base will continue to remain controversial, as Kyrgyz
politicians look ahead to parliamentary and presidential
elections in 2010. Kyrgyz officials, focused on the more
immediate events, have indicated to us that the government
wants to demonstrate engagement on base issues prior to the
SCO summit in order to relieve some of this pressure. A
meeting of "experts" from both sides (or even the
announcement of a meeting) would be a useful step, and the
experts could resolve some of the easier issues. While there
has been little U.S. receptiveness in the past to Kyrgyz
requests for air navigation equipment, radar refurbishment
would result in benefits to base operations and might be a
reasonable investment given the U.S.'s continuing projects to
upgrade base facilities. If support could be found for
moving forward on air navigation equipment, the U.S. would
derive the most benefit and credit by agreeing to do so
quickly, preferably before the August SCO summit, but in any
event prior to parliamentary hearings in September. End
Summary.

Kyrgyz Proposals to Change Protocol
--------------


3. (C) On June 22, the Kyrgyz government presented a draft
protocol on proposed changes to the July 2006 Protocol of
Intentions covering access to, and use of, Manas Air Base.
The July 2006 Protocol of Intentions provides $17.4 million
each year directly to the Kyrgyz government for access to
"facilities/real estate" associated with the base, and
clearly states that the U.S. may renew the agreement at
one-year intervals for a total of five years, without
reconsideration of the terms or payment amount. While Kyrgyz
officials, including President Bakiyev, have reaffirmed their
commitment to the continued presence of the base to support
operations in Afghanistan, they have also told senior U.S.
officials that they want to increase compensation for

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ecological damage and long-term wear and tear on their
facilities and equipment.


4. (C) The Kyrgyz likely believe that they can bring the U.S.
into discussions now because of changed circumstances and
increased public and governmental dissatisfaction with the
base following a series of incidents in fall 2006 (the still
unexplained disappearance of Major Metzger; the collision of
a U.S. KC-135 with a Kyrgyz passenger airliner; and the
shooting death of a Kyrgyz citizen by a base airman). In
addition, there are persistent public perceptions widely
echoed in the media that fuel dumping from base aircraft is
causing ecological damage. The Kyrgyz are looking to
capitalize on these concerns by seeking increased
compensation and revision of certain terms of the protocol.
On the plus side, they have not requested an increase in
direct payments to the government. Nor have they sought a
change in the legal status of U.S. servicemembers, despite
repeated calls by parliament to do so.

Proposal Details
--------------


5. (C) Some of the Kyrgyz proposals are non-starters, but we
think there is room for discussion on other issues, and that
engagement with the Kyrgyz in and of itself would be
beneficial to U.S. interests. Addressing certain of the
Kyrgyz concerns could also produce tangible benefits to the
U.S. and the base. From our conversations with Kyrgyz
officials, we believe the serious issues are the request for
air navigation equipment, a willingness to address ecological
damage, and a system for reimbursement for future damages.


6. (C) The Kyrgyz have proposed the following specific
changes to the July 2006 protocol:

--A request for payment of $18 million in installments during
2007 for renovation of air navigation equipment at Manas
airport. The Kyrgyz have been asking for support in
replacing their dilapidated air traffic control radar since
the base opened. A new radar would create a safer operating
environment for both military and civilian air traffic, but
the cost to refurbish or replace the equipment is substantial
(from $10-20 million, depending on the source of the
equipment) and has never gained support from the U.S. side.
However, the USG continues to invest substantial amounts in
Manas Air Base, including new dormitories for 2000 personnel
and a new hospital; we understand there is also a proposal
under consideration for building a $30 million "strategic
ramp" expansion. In light of our continued major capital
investment in the base, support for a new radar offers the
U.S. an opportunity to demonstrate our willingness to make
airport operations safer, and to do so in a manner that would
have significant positive impact on public opinion.
Announcing this prior to the SCO summit would, we believe,
maximize the goodwill that such a gesture would generate. It
would also send a signal to SCO participants -- including
Russia, China, and Iran -- that the U.S. will support its
interests in the region.

--A request for payment of an additional $98.6 million in
2007 and a commitment to provide $150 million annually in
overall assistance and compensation to the Kyrgyz government.
The $150 million figure comes from the Joint Statement
issued at the signing of the July 2006 Protocol, which said
that the U.S. "expects" to provide over $150 million in total
assistance and compensation over the next year. The figure
represented an estimate of the value of airbase compensation
and all U.S. assistance programs in Kyrgyzstan, but the
Kyrgyz continue to (mis)interpret the sum as representing a
specific appropriation. The embassy has provided the Kyrgyz
government with detailed break downs of our FY07 programs
(which at present total some $147 million). A preliminary
estimate for FY08 programs yields a similar total, but future

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assistance levels depend on Congressional appropriations and
other variables, and we should make clear to the Kyrgyz that
we cannot commit to specific future assistance levels. The
request for an additional $98.6 million this year is a red
herring; it is based on inaccurate Kyrgyz estimates that we
have provided $51.4 million to date, and $98.6 remains to
reach our $150 million commitment.

--A request for payment of damages for ecological harm.
Since its establishment in 2001, the airbase has had almost
no interaction with the Kyrgyz on ecology issues. While the
headline issue is alleged damages associated with fuel
jettisoning, there are also concerns about the ecological
impact of the base itself. A number of steps could be taken
by the airbase to show its willingness to discuss
environmental practices, and this could go a long way to
placate the Kyrgyz. The establishment of a joint committee
on ecological issues to discuss issues of concern, creation
of an airbase environmental liaison officer position, regular
meetings with Kyrgyz environmental officials, and periodic
walk-throughs of the facilities would require minimal effort,
but would demonstrate U.S. willingness to engage on this
sensitive issue.

--A request for payment of 60,000 soms (approximately $1575)
per ton for jettisoning aviation fuel (a jettison of 40 tons
would be approximately $63,000). Kyrgyz concerns over fuel
dumping have persisted, and despite the fact that no dumping
has occurred since September 2005, area farmers continue to
claim damage to their crops from the practice. Providing
detailed information to Kyrgyz officials would be an
important first step in allaying concerns. U.S. fuel
jettisoning experts can and have addressed the technical
details of this procedure, and base officials can emphasize
the rarity of this event and the use of the procedure only
when lives are at risk. If anyone is going to convince
farmers in the region that poor crop performance is not due
to fuel dumping, it will be Kyrgyz environmental
representatives, not U.S. officials. But we need to make our
case to the Kyrgyz officials in order to persuade them on the
fuel dumping issue. The airbase potentially has a lot to
gain by developing and working these relationships.

--A request for payment of damages to Kyrgyz individuals and
legal entities. While clarification is needed, this proposed
change on reimbursement to legal entities and individuals of
the Kyrgyz Republic does not appear to change the existing
language on state-to-state and third-party incidents included
in the 2001 base agreement. It is possible that this
proposal reflects that the Kyrgyz were working off the 2006
protocol, and did not take into account the language in the
2001 agreement.

--A request that determination of damages be made by a joint
commission. The U.S. side already has legal procedures in
place to determine damages in the event of a claim. While we
would favor activating the proposed joint commission to
address sensitive issues related to the base, including in
the event of further incidents involving damage claims, the
commission should not have specific authority to assess
damages. Rather, the joint commission should focus on issues
such as coordinating responses to future incidents, and on
improving procedures for flight safety, security, and even
environmental practices.

--A request to provide information on base contractors and
subcontractors. The U.S. has never provided the Kyrgyz with
a list of contracts associated with the airbase, despite
being prepared to do so on a number of occasions. Post
understands that the USG is permitted to release this type of
information upon request by the host nation. The Kyrgyz have
asked for information on contracts -- names of the firms
under contract and value of the contracts -- in a number of
different forums over an extended period of time. There had

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been a concern regarding Kyrgyz intentions on taxation of
these entities in the past, but in our view this is not a
reason under the current circumstances not to move forward
and provide the requested information that we are legally
allowed to release.

--A request to add "air navigation equipment" to the
definition of "facilities/real estate." While we see no
downside to this proposal, provided we make clear that it
would in no way obligate the base to pay air navigation fees
for military aircraft, we also see no need for this change
either.

--A request that annual renewal of the 2007 protocol be
contingent upon Kyrgyz as well as U.S. consent. The current
protocol is renewable annually by the U.S. side until 2012.
The 2001 agreement allows either party to withdraw from the
agreement with six months' notice. We see no reason to
change these arrangements.

"Negotiations" or Implementation of Existing Agreements?
--------------


7. (C) Several Kyrgyz officials have stressed to U.S.
representatives the importance of at least beginning
bilateral discussions as soon as possible, hinting that the
Kyrgyz would like to demonstrate that engagement is underway
before the SCO summit on August 16. On the U.S. side, there
may be a reluctance to engage with the Kyrgyz on some of
these issues, especially because the Kyrgyz have reiterated
(and continue to do so) their strategic commitment to the
presence of the base. However, not responding -- in some
fashion -- to Kyrgyz concerns does not serve U.S. interests.
Three upcoming events will focus increased negative attention
on the base. First, the August 16 SCO summit in Bishkek will
bring renewed pressure, particularly from the Russians, on
the Kyrgyz to show that they are in control of the situation
with the base. Second, the release later this summer or
early fall of the results of the U.S. investigation into the
December 2006 shooting of a Kyrgyz citizen by an airman, and
the decision whether or not take disciplinary action against
the airman, will likely generate a firestorm of controversy
in the media and in parliament. Third, parliamentary
hearings on the base, scheduled to take place in early
September, will concentrate on problems connected to the base
and can be expected to contribute to the widespread public
sentiment against the base. Looking beyond these immediate
events, the base will continue to be a lightning rod, and can
be expected to become an election issue as Kyrgyzstan heads
into parliamentary and presidential elections in 2010.


8. (C) In our view, the U.S. would very likely be able to
address many of the Kyrgyz concerns without commencing
anything that would resemble formal negotiations or
re-opening the Protocol of Intentions. Several of the Kyrgyz
proposals should not be difficult to address, and in some
cases coming together on the issues presents a benefit to the
U.S. For example, the U.S. currently has a nearly
non-existent relationship with Kyrgyz environmental
administrations. We believe that the Kyrgyz are not looking
for a large, formal commencement of negotiations as occurred
last year. The Embassy and airbase representatives can
address a number of the issues. A small team of experts from
OSD could kick off discussions, address some of the issues,
and provide a framework for continued implementation of
existing agreements. These discussions could be considered
an activation of the proposed "joint commission."

Next Steps
--------------


9. (C) As a way forward, the embassy offers the following
steps that we could take:


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--agreeing to a meeting of experts to address base issues;
this could be accomplished through the proposed joint
commission, and could include representation from OSD. The
U.S. side should have sufficient decision-making authority to
resolve those issues we are prepared to discuss;

--accomplishing a pragmatic assessment of the Kyrgyz request
for air navigation equipment, i.e. a radar for Manas airport,
in light of continued U.S. investment in the infrastructure
of the air base. If not this, then assess what can be done
to increase support and attention to Kyrgyz Air Navigation
(KAN),an organization that is vital to U.S. operations and
flight safety.

The timing of these steps will directly affect the degree to
which they will help the GOKG deflect pressure from
Kyrgyzstan's neighbors, the parliament, the media and the
public to restrict coalition operations from Manas air base.

LITZENBERGER