ANALYSTS OFFER GRIM VIEW OF KYRGYZ POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000063

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: ANALYSTS OFFER GRIM VIEW OF KYRGYZ POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS

REF: A. BISHKEK 50

B. BISHKEK 46

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Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador and visiting Central Asia Office
Director Spratlen met January 23 with four leading Bishkek
think tank directors and political analysts to discuss the
current political turmoil in Kyrgyzstan, as well as the state
of U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. The analysts described a Kyrgyz
government acting to concentrate authority around a president
who had little interest in, or understanding of, public
policy or international relations. What motivated President
Bakiyev and his inner circle was money and power, which has
led to a worsening of corruption, a degradation of society as
a whole, and a "commercialization" of international
relationships. The analysts agreed that the U.S.-Kyrgyz
bilateral relationship would continue to be difficult, and
one urged the U.S. to speak out more forcefully about events
in Kyrgyzstan. There was no consensus on the way forward for
Kyrgyzstan, with one analyst saying that the only hope was
for the current administration to "resign voluntarily" and
another arguing that early parliamentary elections would give
the parliament a fresh mandate to balance presidential power.
END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Ambassador and visiting Central Asia Office Director
Spratlen met over dinner January 23 with former Foreign
Minister and current Institute for Public Policy president
Murat Imanaliyev, former director of the International
Institute for Strategic Research Valentin Bogatyrev, Economic
Policy Institute chairman and AKIpress director Marat
Tazabekov, and former NGO Coalition head Edil Baisalov.
Pol-Econ Chief and senior political FSN also attended.

No Understanding of Foreign Policy
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3. (C) Central Asia Office Director Spratlen began by asking
the guests for their views on U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. Former
Foreign Minister Imanaliyev said the current Kyrgyz
government did not understand that it should have good
relations with the United States, and the government's
actions of the past summer (specifically, the PNGs) were not
the actions of a serious country. Imanaliyev said that
President Bakiyev and the team around him did not understand
foreign policy or how to manage a country. Further, he said,
Bakiyev did not understand the U.S. role in the world.
Bakiyev remained oriented toward Russia -- Soviet Russia --
and his greed had led to a "commercialization" of
relationships. Imanaliyev said that this made a real
"political relationship" with the U.S. impossible. The
situation was not only bad for the U.S.; he said China faced
similar difficulties dealing with the Kyrgyz Government.

"Politics of the Absurd"
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4. (C) Imanaliyev was equally scathing about Bakiyev's
handling of the domestic political situation. Former
President Akayev had made mistakes, especially toward the end
of his years in power, but Bakiyev began making mistakes
immediately, causing corruption to become worse. While
Akayev had tried to control the legislature, Bakiyev was
trying to destroy the parliament. Imanaliyev said that this
"politics of the absurd" and resulting instability was having
a social impact, too, as much of the population was leaving
as labor migrants, even to poorer, but more stable, countries

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like Tajikistan. Imanaliyev said that the president was
"unteachable" and the only hope was for the "voluntary
resignation" of the government.


5. (C) Edil Baisalov described domestic politics as a
metronome, swinging ever more quickly between good events and
bad events. Analyst Valentin Bogatyrev agreed that
development of the country had stalled under Bakiyev, but
thought some bright, new leaders could rise up during this
"slow period." He thought there could be a "renaissance" of
political parties, and that early parliamentary elections,
perhaps as soon as the fall, would strengthen the role of
parliament and give "young leaders" a chance. Baisalov
agreed that early elections would give parliament a greater
mandate and would eliminate questions about its legitimacy.
Imanaliyev cautioned that a new parliament could be even
worse, given the problem of criminal elements within the
parliament.


6. (C) Marat Tazabekov said that the administration was
concentrating all power around Bakiyev, first by maneuvering
to get rid of Prime Minister Kulov, and then next by going
after parliament. Bakiyev's total orientation toward Russia
and connections to various Russian groups would continue to
affect U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. Tazabekov said that under
Bakiyev and his circle, there had also been a
"commercialization" of politics and government service,
leading to a degradation of internal political debate.
Imanaliyev said it was a degradation of the whole society.

Kulov Gone, and Won't Be Missed
--------------


7. (C) The analysts felt that Bakiyev had outmaneuvered Felix
Kulov, and that the parliament likely would not confirm his
nomination as prime minister. Baisalov said that the
Bakiyev-Kulov "tandem" had been a mistake, and Tazabekov
implied that Kulov's departure would not be a great loss,
given Kulov's autocratic tendencies. The group did not know
who Bakiyev might select in his place, and Bogatyrev pointed
out there was no one of similar stature from the north to
replace Kulov. Someone suggested that opposition MP
Tekebayev was a possibility, because although he is a
southerner, he is popular in the north. Speaker Sultanov was
also named as a possible successor to Kulov.

Base Shapes U.S. Image -- and GOKG Attitudes and Actions
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8. (C) Baisalov said that the public perception of the U.S.
was shaped by the Manas Air Base, and he said that he himself
wished for a time when there was no U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan.
He said it appeared that all U.S. interests in Kyrgyzstan
were viewed through the prism of the base, and as a result,
the U.S. turned a "blind eye" to events in the country. He
noted that the Kyrgyz government had made the calculation
that the USG only cared about the Base, and therefore it
could do anything. Tazabekov added that GOKG actions toward
the USG could only be characterized as a "slap in the face."
Tazabekov said that most Kyrgyz did not understand the scope
of U.S. assistance programs focused on democratic development
and broad economic projects. What people understood, he
said, were small scale, local projects in agriculture and
humanitarian assistance, and he urged the U.S. to do more
publicly with such type of projects.

Comment
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9. (C) In past meetings, these analysts have been strongly
critical of the Bakiyev government, but the group seemed
particularly negative on this occasion, describing a
leadership that only understands money and power and whose
words are meaningless. In their views, there was little hope
of an improved U.S.-Kyrgyz relationship in the near term, not
because of U.S. actions, but rather because of the Kyrgyz
government's strong orientation toward Russia, its lack of
foreign policy understanding, and its inability to stay
focused and consistent.
YOVANOVITCH