KYRGYZSTAN, MANAS AIR BASE AND THE SCO SUMMIT:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 000544

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN, MANAS AIR BASE AND THE SCO SUMMIT:
FOOD FOR THOUGHT

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Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. With the August 16 Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) summit in Bishek only three months away,
we need to move to closure now on two contentious incidents
-- an aircraft collision and a shooting -- that have
undermined public and political support for continued
operation of the Manas Air Base. The issues are linked to
the summit, as the 2005 SCO summit in Astana was marked by
pressure on Kyrgyzstan to close the base, and initial
indications are that this pressure will be renewed. The
Kyrgyz, who have recently taken a strategic political
decision to support the base, tell us that they are being
pressured by the Chinese and Russians (and sometimes the
Kazakhs) to close down the base. They also tell us they want
to deflect this pressure. This Kyrgyz goal is in our
interest as well, and over the next three months we have a
range of opportunities to influence the direction the SCO
summit takes on our key security issues. We will also need
to manage renewed calls by the Kyrgyz for increased
compensation for the base, fueled by parliamentary debate on
the base agreement and anti-American media. This cable lays
out Embassy Bishkek's proposals for managing Kyrgyz
expectations and laying the groundwork for an SCO summit that
does not challenge the presence of Manas Air Base, and that
could help validate its role in support of OEF. End Summary.

Kyrgyz Update on SCO
--------------

2. (C) Kyrgyz officials are concerned that at this year's
SCO summit in Bishkek they will again be pressured by Russia,
Uzbekistan and China to close Manas Air Base. In an effort
to deflect this pressure, the Kyrgyz plan to invite Afghan
President Karzai to the summit. According to Deputy FM
Sarbayev, the Kyrgyz have passed an oral invitation to Karzai
and will follow up with a formal written invitation in coming
days. To demonstrate that the SCO is not/not a military
alliance, and that it is an "open" organization, the Kyrgyz
are also planning to invite UNSYG Ban Ki Moon to attend.
Both Karzai and the UNSYG will be invited as guests of
President Bakiyev. We should encourage both dignitaries to
attend the summit.


3. (C) The summit will be preceded by three high-level
meetings in Bishkek. SCO member state National Security
Secretaries will meet at the end of May; Defense Ministers

SIPDIS
will meet June 22 or 25; and Foreign Ministers will meet on
July 9. These preparatory meetings will not include
representatives from any of the four observer states (Iran,
India, Pakistan and Mongolia). All six SCO members have
confirmed that Heads of Government will attend the August 16
summit. The Observer states have also confirmed
participation, but their level of representation has not been
settled. The Kyrgyz hope the summit will focus on economic
trade and development, and would like to see members commit
to invest in one or more large development projects in
Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyz will seek enhanced compensation for Manas Air Base
--------------

4. (C) Kyrgyz National Security Advisor Mametov and Deputy
Minister of Defense Oruzbayev have separately signaled to the
Ambassador that Kyrgyzstan will seek greater compensation for
Manas Air Base. The Ambassador understands that FM Karabayev
will seek to meet her the week of May 14 to begin these
discussions. The Kyrgyz appeal may take several forms,
including increased cash transfers, furnishing a ground radar
for Manas airport, compensation for alleged environmental

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damage, and direct GOKG participation in contracts for fuel
deliveries to the base. When the news of Airman Hatfield's
departure from Kyrgyzstan became public, Parliament scheduled
committee debate on the terms of the 2001 bilateral base
agreement beginning the week of May 21st. Parliament will
hold open hearings will begin on the 28th; they are likely to
be lopsidedly opposed to the base. The final outcome of
parliament's deliberations could be pivotal to the future of
the base. We can expect the Kyrgyz Government to use the
upcoming SCO summit to leverage us to accommodate their
demands. We believe the Kyrgyz leadership wants the base to
remain, but they want more in return for its continued
operation. We should begin now to plan for ways to engage
the Kyrgyz constructively on the issues they raise, while
lowering expectations for enhanced compensation.

U.S. Interests
--------------

5. (C) U.S. regional security interests would be served by
a SCO summit that acknowledges, via the presence of President
Karzai at the summit, the importance for regional stability
of OEF (and thus continued support for Manas Air Base) and
that highlights the prospects for enhanced trade, via
Afghanistan, with South Asia. To maximize this positive
outcome, there are several steps the U.S. can take with
respect to Manas Air Base.

Moving to closure on Base Issues
--------------

6. (C) First and foremost: we should move rapidly to
closure during the month of May on two unresolved incidents
related to the base: providing compensation for the widow of
the Kyrgyz truckdriver shot and killed in December by a U.S.
Airman; and providing compensation for the September
collision between U.S. and Kyrgyz planes that damaged
President Bakiyev's long-haul aircraft. Our understanding is
that DOD has completed its process in both cases and has
determined to provide compensation. The sooner we can effect
these transactions, and get public benefit for coming to
closure, the better. It is not in our interest for these
issues to be left hanging at the time of the SCO summit.
While we will not win the battle for public opinion in the
case of the shooting incident, being able to show that we
have acted on the widow,s claim will at least give us a
defensible public position.


7. (C) The intense media hype and speculation surrounding
the May 7 traffic accident involving a U.S. civilian
contractor in which a Kyrgyz pedestrian was killed shows how
tenuous the political atmosphere remains related to the base.
We need to wrap these incidents up as long before the SCO
summit as possible, especially in the expectation that the
results of the U.S. investigation into the shooting incident,
which are likely to exonerate the U.S. Airman, will be
completed prior to the SCO summit. There is no/no political
or public comprehension that the Airman could possibly be
exonerated, so pervasive is the commonly held belief that he
murdered the Kyrgyz truck driver.

Building up support for OEF
--------------

8. (C) There are also steps we can take to persuade Kyrgyz
leaders and the public that OEF is an important, ongoing,
worthy undertaking that directly benefits Kyrgyz security.
On May 19, the Embassy and Manas Air Base are sponsoring a
VIP orientation flight for 15 senior Kyrgyz government and
parliament leaders. The flight, aboard a KC-135 refueling
tanker, will demonstrate in-flight refueling of a C-17 cargo

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plane to reinforce the logistical mission of Manas Air Base
for OEF operations.


9. (C) We are also working with CENTCOM and Embassy Kabul to
organize a VIP visit to Afghanistan in mid-June for cabinet
ministers and parliamentarians. We foresee three main
purposes for this 1-2 day trip. First, to allow senior
Kyrgyz leaders to see first-hand operations in Afghanistan to
persuade them that the struggle continues and the Taliban
continue to pose a threat to regional security. Second, to
permit the senior Kyrgyz leadership to meet with their Afghan
counterparts, to hear from them how important OEF is to the
successful development of their country. Third, through a
visit to a PRT, to show that we are not pursuing a
military-only strategy, and that reconstruction and
civil-military operations are at the core of our presence.
This will also serve to give the Kyrgyz some idea of the
types of reconstruction projects underway, given Kyrgyz
interest in bidding on contracts in Afghanistan.


10. (C) Finally, we would urge USAID and DOD to send a
small team of experts to Bishkek to meet with Krygyz
government and business leaders to explain how the
contracting and sub-contracting process in Afghanistan works.
It is in our interest to walk the Kyrgyz through this
process in detail, and encourage them to submit bids on
projects. Significantly, both of these VIP events should be
completed prior to the meetings of SCO Defense and Foreign
Ministers in the run-up to the summit.

Pre-Summit Demarches
--------------

11. (C) As the Department considers a strategy for
pre-summit demarches, we would urge that they include not
just SCO members, but also Afghanistan and SCO observers
India and Pakistan. For Afghanistan, President Karzai can be
encouraged to participate, make the point that OEF
contributes to SCO stability, and publicly thank Kyrgyzstan
for hosting Manas Air Base. India and Pakistan can be
encouraged to send senior economic representatives who can
encourage the development of a regional energy market.

Using upcoming visits
--------------

12. (C) We can also maximize the effectiveness of a series
of upcoming visits by senior U.S. military and civilian
leaders. Ambassador Neumann will visit in late May, Secretary
of Defense Gates plans a stopover in early June, followed by
SCA A/S Boucher and CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, also in
June. It is essential that each of these visitors reinforce
the importance of OEF to Kyrgyz and regional security, and
engage their Kyrgyz interlocutors on the planning and agenda
for the SCO summit. Ideally, these visits would occur in the
wake of having completed compensation payments for the
shooting and collision incidents.

Timeline
--------------

13. (C) This cable lays out a complicated series of events
which, if carefully orchestrated, can combine to lay the
groundwork for an SCO summit that does not challenge the
presence of Manas Air Base, and that could in fact validate
its role in support of OEF. Here follows a timeline of
upcoming events and opportunities to affect this result.

Week of May 14: Kyrgyz request enhanced compensation for
Manas Air Base


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May 19: Orientation refueling flight for Kyrgyz VIPs

May 21: Kyrgyz parliament begins committee discussion of
Manas Base agreement

May 23: Visit of Ambassador Ron Neumann; briefing to
National Security Council and MOD

May 28: Kyrgyz parliament begins open hearings on Manas Base
Agreement

End May: SCO National Security Advisors meeting in Bishkek

TBD: Compensation payment to widow

TBD: Compensation payment for collision

TBD: Completion of U.S. investigation into shooting incident
at Manas Air Base

TBD: SCO Demarche cable to SCO, observer states and
Afghanistan

June 5: Visit of Secretary of Defense Gates

June 9: Visit of A/S Boucher

(TBC) June 11-12: VIP Flight to Afghanistan for Kyrgyz
leadership

TBD: Visit of DOD/USAID Contracting specialists to Bishkek

June 14-15: Visit of CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon

June 22 or 25: SCO Defense Ministers meeting in Bishkek

July 9: SCO Foreign Ministers meeting in Bishkek

August 16: SCO summit in Bishkek


14. (C) The SCO summit clock has already started ticking;
we should begin to synchronize our actions to it as soon as
possible.



YOVANOVITCH