KULOV OUT AS KYRGYZ PRIME MINISTER?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000050

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: KULOV OUT AS KYRGYZ PRIME MINISTER?

REF: BISHKEK 46

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Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. According to several well-placed Kyrgyz and
other officials, it appears increasingly likely that Acting
PM Felix Kulov's candidacy will be voted down in Parliament
on a procedural point that will effectively ease Kulov out of
office. The Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee that is
behind this machination has close ties to President Bakiyev,
and it is hard to imagine this is not being done without the
President's approval. This appears to be a cold betrayal of
Kulov -- who supported the President during the November
demonstrations -- by Bakiyev. Kulov's immediate fate is
uncertain -- he could move to the opposition, receive
appointment to another top government post or, less likely,
go into exile as Ambassador to a large country. Regardless
of the outcome of Parliament's voting, Felix Kulov will
remain a political figure with a long-term future in
Kyrgyzstan. End Summary.

SULTANOV LAYS OUT A POST-KULOV SCENARIO
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2. (C) On January 23, Ambassador and Central Asia Office
Director Pamela Spratlen met with Speaker of the Parliament
Marat Sultanov. Sultanov indicated that on January 24 there
would be a secret vote on whether to accept the finding of
the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Legislation
that the President's re-nomination of Felix Kulov to the post
of prime minister, following the Parliament's previous
rejection of Kulov, violated national legislation (reftel).
Sultanov said that he is recommending to deputies that they
accept the Committee's interpretation, as it gives the
parliament more maneuvering room. He said that he believes
the secret vote will allow deputies to vote their
consciences, and it is clear he expects that the parliament
will accept the Committee recommendation.


3. (C) Sultanov said that if the Committee's view prevails,
the President had already agreed to enter into discussions
with parliamentary factions on who should be the next prime
minister. Sultanov said the President was not in a
"confrontational" mood and was ready to compromise.
Moreover, Sultanov said there are other ways to keep the
tandem intact; the President could appoint Kulov to the State
Secretary slot or some other government position. (Comment:

SIPDIS
the State Secretary does not have to be confirmed by
Parliament, but one of the President's closest allies,
Adakhan Madumarov, currently occupies that slot, and it is
not clear where he would go in such an event )- unless it is
to the PM slot. End Comment.)

KULOV ACKNOWLEDGES REALITY
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4. (C) In a separate meeting on January 23, Ambassador and
Spratlen met with Acting Prime Minister Kulov. Calm as ever,
Kulov acknowledged that he might not be Prime Minister for
much longer, but suggested that he has views on how to solve
the problem. (Comment: We note that as the Ambassador and
Spratlen left Kulov's office, standing outside waiting to see
Kulov was Za Reformi leader, and vehement Kulov critic MP
Temir Sariyev. We can only assume they were discussing the
next day's vote.) However, if Kulov's ideas don't work, he
said that it was completely possible that he could come back
as Prime Minister at a later point.

THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY VIEW

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5. (C) On the margins of a conference on January 24, DCM
discussed current Kyrgyz political developments with Russian
Embassy Economic Counselor Valery Shageyev. Shageyev, who
has been in Bishkek for five years, noted that Russian
investors are extremely frustrated by the current political
paralysis where no decisions are being made. He then
commented, "but (Acting PM) Kulov will be confirmed and there
will be a new government soon." DCM replied that we were
hearing otherwise, that Parliament might vote on whether
Kulov could be nominated twice, and may decide he can't be,
forcing President Bakiyev to nominate a new PM. Shageyev
replied that that scenario didn't make sense. Kulov would be
dangerous in the opposition. Shageyev quickly phoned a
journalist contact of his, who confirmed that Parliament
would be voting on whether Kulov could be nominated twice.


6. (C) Shageyev later called a contact who used to be highly
placed in the Presidential Administration and still had
access. The contact confirmed to Shageyev that "Kulov is
out." Bakiyev will not appear in Parliament to support
Kulov's nomination. The situation offered Bakiyev a
convenient way to get rid of Kulov. There were two
"variants." Either Kulov would be eased out with an
Ambassadorship to the EU or the US. Or, Kulov would go into
the opposition. Shageyev's source said Kulov would not be
much of a threat in the opposition; his party was divided,
and Kulov was not necessarily welcome back. The opposition
was divided, too, and would not unite around Kulov. Shageyev
commented this second variant did not make a lot of sense;
sending Kulov out of the country to an Embassy would be a
better outcome for Bakiyev.

COMMENT
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7. (C) It seems increasingly likely that the Parliament will
uphold the Constitutional Legislation Committee's
recommendation, effectively denying Kulov the prime
ministerial slot. Kulov himself seems quite sanguine about
that prospect and clearly believes that he has a significant
political future; we tend to agree that it is a little early
to count Kulov out. It is hard for us to imagine Kulov
accepting an ambassadorial post -- unless forced -- as exile
abroad does not improve his political chances at home.


8. (C) We continue to find it hard to believe that the
Committee on Constitutional Legislation is acting
independently of the White House. The legal interpretation
seems tailor-made to a desired outcome (and not consistent
with the Parliament's previous disregard for parliamentary
regulations as recently as December 30 when the parliament
voted on the latest constitution). Moreover, the Committee
Chairman, Iskhak Masalyiev is a southerner and close to
President Bakiyev. However, while there is clearly a plan to
get rid of Kulov, it is not clear how well-thought out the
plan is and where it will lead the country.


9. (C) Commenting on possible alternative candidates for the
post of prime minister, Shageyev mentioned Deputy PM Usenov,
and Minister of Industry Kerimkulov. It is also possible
that Speaker Sultanov could be a credible candidate for prime
minister )- and he would certainly have the inside track for
parliamentary approval. He also fits Presidential Deputy
Chief of Staff Sadyrkulov's criteria of a young and active
economist.
YOVANOVITCH