Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BISHKEK374
2007-04-05 11:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KULOV EXPECTS TO PREVAIL; "PROMISES" NON-VIOLENCE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR KG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000374 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG
SUBJECT: KULOV EXPECTS TO PREVAIL; "PROMISES" NON-VIOLENCE


BISHKEK 00000374 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000374

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG
SUBJECT: KULOV EXPECTS TO PREVAIL; "PROMISES" NON-VIOLENCE


BISHKEK 00000374 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY. On April 4, Ambassador met with United
Front leader and former Kyrgyz Prime Minister Feliks Kulov.
Kulov said that his goal is to build a system in which no one
individual has unlimited power, as is currently the case.
For this, constitutional reform is necessary, and it needs to
be done relatively quickly. He outlined a five-step process:
peaceful removal of President Bakiyev; a return to the
November 2006 constitution; establishment of a coalition
government with enlarged powers; passage of a new
constitution; early presidential -- and possibly
parliamentary -- elections. Despite repeated questions,
Kulov did not explain how this would come to pass or why
Bakiyev would remove himself from power without a fight. He
promised the up coming demonstrations would be peaceful, and
left no room for compromise or even conversation with
Bakiyev, except in a public setting, which so far Bakiyev has
refused. It seems clear that Kulov views the April
demonstrations as his one chance, as the people may not come
out again to support him. And if he's not successful this
time, the government will try to ensure that he won't be in
the future either. Finally, Kulov claimed he is not
receiving official support from Moscow. END SUMMARY.

READY TO TALK
--------------


2. (C) On April 4, Ambassador met with former Prime
Minister Kulov, the leader of opposition movement, United
Front. Kulov apologized for not meeting sooner, but said
that there were two reasons: 1) he had been traveling, and
2) he was not ready to meet; he wanted to have something to
say before he met with Ambassador. Immediately after he was
fired, he had spent two weeks listening to the people, and
they told him he needed to go into the opposition and lead
the country. Kulov added that while he wants to be friends
with all countries, the clear priority is the regional
neighbors and Russia and China.

BITTERNESS REMAINS

--------------


3. (C) Kulov replayed for Ambassador his last days in
office, and much bitterness remains. He noted that Bakiyev
could have fired him in different ways, but the manner in
which Bakiyev let him go had ensured there would be
instability in Kyrgyzstan. He had openly warned the
President about this. Looking further back, Kulov said that
there had been a number of issues on which he had not agreed
with the President, including the Uzbek refugee issue, but
since the President handled foreign affairs, he had not been
able to intervene.

"PROMISE" OF PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS
--------------


4. (C) Kulv said that although the United Front is
experiencing all sorts of pressure tactics (threatening phone
calls to members and their relatives, beating up activists,
vandalizing offices, etc.),Kulov "promised" the Ambassador
that the April demonstrations would be peaceful. He said he
does not intend to behave aggressively, and the United Front
will "handle" provacateurs. Unlike Bakiyev, who came to
power using questionable tactics in March 2005, the Front
will not take over the White House. Kulov said that he
understands that if there is violence, the United Front will
lose. However, if they act with restraint, they will win.
Moreover, with all the individuals that are joining the Front

BISHKEK 00000374 002.2 OF 003


and will join the Front, Kulov said the United Front does not
need to act with force. He said that local governments are
joining the cause, and on April 11, he expects 80% of the
police force to do the same. He noted that a number of
individuals joined the Front, wanting to make Manas Air Base
an issue. Kulov said he didn't argue; he simply said that
the Front needed to resolve internal questions such as
constitutional reform. Moreover, foreign policy questions
should be left to the experts and not be resolved on the
streets. Kulov added, however, that the December 6 shooting
incident had "ruined Kyrgyz relations with the Base."

RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW?
--------------


5. (C) Looking delighted by his own candor, Kulov opened
the issue of his relations with Moscow. He said that he
travels to Moscow so frequently in order to consult with "old
friends that (he) went to school with" and political
consultants. He said he is also working with the substantial
Kyrgyz diaspora, which is phoning home to Kyrgyzstan and
instructing relatives to support Kulov. He laughed that the
meeting with Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey
Ivanov was set up by the Ambassador's "good friend Kurmanbek
Saliyevich." Bakiyev had called President Putin to complain
about former President Akayev's alleged involvement in Kyrgyz
politics and about Kulov. Knowing that Kulov and Ivanov had
a close relationship, Bakiyev suggested to Putin that the two
meet and Ivanov tell Kulov to stop criticizing Bakiyev. The
Russians agreed, but Kulov said that Ivanov simply said
Russia's policy was one of non-interference, and Russia's
view was that any developments should occur peacefully.
Kulov concluded that Russian support for his political
efforts would be as counter-productive as American support.

THE GAME PLAN
--------------


6. (C) Kulov said that his goal is to build a system
whereby no one individual has unlimited power, as is
currently the case. For this, constitutional reform is
necessary and it needs to be done relatively quickly. He
outlined a five step process: peaceful removal of Bakiyev; a
return to the November 2006 constitution; establishment of a
coalition government with enlarged powers; passage of a new
constitution; early presidential -- and possibly
parliamentary -- elections. Despite repeated questions,
Kulov did not explain the mechanism for how this would
actually all come to pass and why Bakiyev would remove
himself from power without a fight. He simply said that
Bakiyev would find himself without allies, and the voters
would force parliament to empower the opposition. He
commented that it was not clear how long the first two steps
would take, but reckoned between two weeks and one and a half
months. Kulov reiterated his public statements that he would
not meet with Bakiyev in private, because he does not trust
him. Bakiyev, he said, constantly changes his position, so
Kulov will only meet him in public.

SUPPORT IN THE SOUTH?
--------------


7. (C) Kulov stated that in the South, he had asked his
supporters not to demonstrate on April 9, but all other
oblasts will start demonstrations then. He expected the
South would turn out in force on April 11 and 12. When
Ambassador said she had just been in the South and had
received a clear message that there was no support for the
Front or for more demonstrations, Kulov seemed to contradict
himself and agree. He said that people are tired and they are

BISHKEK 00000374 003.2 OF 003


afraid of pressure; therefore, only the activists will turn
out, but others will support the Front in their hearts.

KULOV UNDERSTANDS U.S. POSITION...AND THAT OF THE RUSSIANS
AND KAZAKHS TOO
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Kulov noted that this is the last chance to change
the system once and for all. People want reform; they are
tired of demonstrations and they want to go on with their
lives. However, if they aren't successful now, they won't
go out on the streets again. Ambassador shared with Kulov
the U.S. position, which she noted was the same as when Kulov
led the government: demonstrations and political actions
should be legal, constitutional, and peaceful, and both sides
needed to display restraint and respect for the rule of law.
She said that Kyrgyzstan is at a crossroads. Decisions that
are being taken now that will affect the future. Patterns
are being set, and it is important that rule of law prevail.
If the mob grabs power now, it will do so again. Kulov
nodded and said that it why it is important to change the
system, so that one person can't grab all the power for
himself. Kulov said he understood the U.S. position; it was
the same as the Russian and Kazakh positions. No other
country could support him at this point, he concluded.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) It is clear that Kulov is ready to go the distance,
in part because he doesn't think he'll have another chance.
In his view, people are ready to take to the streets again,
because Kulov is now finally in the opposition. Moreover, he
said that if systemic change is not pushed through quickly,
the government will ensure that it never happens. He claimed
one unnamed high-ranking official told him that by September,
Front members "will all be dead." So, if it doesn't work
this time, that's it, according to Kulov. Far less clear is
whether Kulov can pull this off or how he could pull off a
peaceful change of power. We also note with interest that,
amidst rumors of Russian support for Kulov, PM Atambayev
publicly implied that Russian Prime Minister Fradkov's
congratulatory letter to him should be understood as an
expression of support for the Kyrgyz government.
YOVANOVITCH