Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BISHKEK365
2007-04-03 13:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZ GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION RELAY VIEWS TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KG 
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PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHEK #0365/01 0931334
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P 031334Z APR 07
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000365 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION RELAY VIEWS TO
AMBASSADOR


BISHKEK 00000365 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000365

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION RELAY VIEWS TO
AMBASSADOR


BISHKEK 00000365 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings with the Ambassador
April 3, the prime minister's chief of staff Medet Sadyrkulov
and opposition MP Kubatbek Baibolov gave differing
assessments of the impact of the appointment of Almaz
Atambayev as prime minister. Sadyrkulov said that Atambayev
would be able to work constructively, raising tough issues
with the president and reaching out to the opposition.
Sadyrkulov predicted that President Bakiyev's proposal for a
constitutional working group would go forward, likely with
the participation of the opposition. Sadyrkulov thought that
he and Atambayev could find "common ground" with the
opposition prior to demonstrations planned for April 9 and

11. Baibolov, however, rejected Atambayev as "weak" and
"self-serving" and said that nothing would be resolved
without the direct involvement of the president. He said
that the opposition would present Bakiyev with a new draft
constitution on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Baibolov also
suggested that foreign heads of state could play a role in
resolving the standoff. END SUMMARY.

SADYRKULOV: EVERYTHING UNDER CONTROL
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting April 3, newly appointed PM Chief of
Staff Sadyrkulov told Ambassador that since he had "brought
in" PM Atambayev as "his project," he would ensure that they
would work with the president and opposition forces to effect
positive change, and diminish support for the opposition.
Sadyrkulov said that a constitutional reform commission would
be established by April 4, to include members of the
opposition, led by Atambayev. According to Sadyrkulov, the
United Front had suggested that the group consist of five
members each from United Front, For Reforms, and the
Government. Sadyrkulov said that his proposal was that a
10-12 member group be formed of half opposition and half
government. (NOTE: During the meeting, Ambassador overheard
a telephone conversation between Sadyrkulov and President
Bakiyev in which she heard that opposition leader Edil

Baisalov might be included within the commission. END NOTE.)



3. (C) Sadyrkulov said that the PM would hold a press
conference April 4, during which "all questions can be asked
openly." The president is also planning to participate in a
"direct-line" interview with the media, which would allow
questions from the public to be e-mailed or called-in, to be
published by April 6. Sadyrkulov was confident that these
steps would help take away most, if not all, of the
opposition's main rallying points. While he did not think
there was any basis for early presidential elections,
Sadyrkulov did not exclude the possibility that the president
himself could call for early presidential elections if a new
constitution is adopted. He added that although the
president is ready to institute constitutional reforms,
implementing a new constitution would take time, as it would
need to be reviewed not only by the Constitutional Court, but
possibly the Venice Commission as well.


4. (C) Sadyrkulov praised Atambayev's ability to work
assertively with the president, citing the dismissal of
former First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov as a case
in point. Sadyrkulov said the First Deputy Prime Minister
slot was being kept open for an opposition figure, possibly
MP Omurbek Babanov, and that Atambayev would raise difficult
issues with the president -- something Kulov failed to do as
PM. He pointed to the "resolution" of turning KTR into a
public media entity as an example of Atambayev's "hard work,"
and said that both he and the PM have "full latitude" to
build trust between the opposition and government, and find

BISHKEK 00000365 002.4 OF 002


common ground ahead of the mid-April demonstrations.
Sadyrkulov closed by stating, in English, that "step by
step,8 things are getting better -- one does not make a
president overnight."

BAIBOLOV: NO WAY OUT
--------------


5. (C) In a separate meeting April 3, opposition MP Baibolov
was quick to express his dissatisfaction with the president
and Atambayev, calling both "weak" and "self-serving."
Maintaining that nothing would change without the president's
direct involvement, Baibolov dismissed Atambayev's ability to
reform the government from within. He went on to predict
that Atambayev would not last long in the government, giving
him one to two weeks before leaving office. He claimed that
Bakiyev's lack of position on any policy means that the
president is not able to guide the reconciliation process
with the opposition effectively.


6. (C) Although Atambayev is willing to meet with the
opposition, the president's unwillingness to do so could
offset any chance of reconciliation between the opposition
and government, said Baibolov. He predicted that changes
within the government alone would not suffice, as real
constitutional reforms were needed. Baibolov said that a new
version of the constitution -- agreed upon by some members of
the opposition -- would be published by April 5, and later
presented Ambassador with a copy. The MP also laid out three
possible scenarios that ranged from early presidential
elections by 2009 -- to give the president "another chance"
at a five-year term -- to all-out civil war.


7. (C) To resolve these issues, Baibolov suggested that heads
of state from the U.S., Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan
and perhaps China establish a joint plan for Kyrgyzstan that
could be shared and implemented by the Kyrgyz accordingly.
Stating that Russia was actively working to this end,
possibly through Kulov, the MP wondered why the United States
could not follow suit. The Ambassador repeated the points
that she had made to Sadyrkulov and the F/reign Minister in
separate meetings earlier in the day. She said the U.S.
position is that this is an internal matter, which the Kyrgyz
should decide )- peacefully, constitutionally, legally.
Both sides need to show restraint and respect for the rule of
law. Baibolov ag2eed, but nevertheless forecast that
Kyrgyzstan's political and economic problems would continue
for another fifty years, and that the country could turn into
"another Afghanistan."

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) As these meetings illustrate, both sides are still far
apart. The president and the new prime minister think they
are reaching out to the opposition, but the opposition sees
little action behind the rhetoric and is not ready to back
down.

YOVANOVITCH