Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BISHKEK343
2007-03-28 10:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

BAKIYEV FIRES USENOV, TAKES OTHER STEPS TOWARD

Tags:  PGOV PREL KG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 000343 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: BAKIYEV FIRES USENOV, TAKES OTHER STEPS TOWARD
COMPROMISE WITH KYRGYZ OPPOSITION

REF: A. BISHKEK 334

B. BISHKEK 332

C. BISHKEK 316

D. BISHKEK 284

E. BISHKEK 270

F. BISHEK 228

BISHKEK 00000343 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 000343

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: BAKIYEV FIRES USENOV, TAKES OTHER STEPS TOWARD
COMPROMISE WITH KYRGYZ OPPOSITION

REF: A. BISHKEK 334

B. BISHKEK 332

C. BISHKEK 316

D. BISHKEK 284

E. BISHKEK 270

F. BISHEK 228

BISHKEK 00000343 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a dramatic move March 28, President
Bakiyev fired powerful and controversial First Deputy Prime
Minister Daniyar Usenov, four other cabinet members, and two
agency heads. The firings follow a series of moves by
Bakiyev to reach out to the broader opposition, as Felix
Kulov's United Front moves ahead with preparations for
open-ended street protests starting April 11 to demand early
presidential elections. In recent days, President Bakiyev
has met with selected members of the opposition, including
Almaz Atambayev, and he has proposed negotiations with the
opposition. He fired his controversial prosecutor general,
offered to form a working group to propose constitutional
changes, and rescinded his veto of the public television law,
clearing the way for the transformation of the state
television company into a public entity. The opposition For
Reforms movement appears to have split over the question
whether to support Kulov, with a number of members forming a
new "United Kyrgyzstan" bloc, calling only for constitutional
reform, not the president's resignation. Both government and
opposition are concerned about the possibility of violence
during the April demonstrations, and behind-the-scenes
discussions continue. At this point, it is too soon to tell
whether firing Usenov and the other measures will appease
Kulov or the broader opposition. End Summary.

United Front Gearing Up
--------------


2. (C) Felix Kulov's United Front for a Decent Future for
Kyrgyzstan is moving ahead with plans for nationwide
demonstrations in April. The United Front's executive
director Omurbek Suvanliyev told the Ambassador that they
would continue the protests until Bakiyev vacates the White
House, and the Front could count on the power ministries
(MVD, GKNB) to help. The protests would begin on April 5
with a ceremonial hunger strike of approximately 50

opposition leaders in Bishkek. Protests in the regions would
begin on April 9, followed by an open-ended mass
demonstration in Bishkek central Ala-Too Square on April 11.
The United Front is demanding that President Bakiyev call
early presidential elections (his term runs until 2010) and
carry out previously pledged reforms. United Front appears
to be well-funded, and it claims to have opened 51 offices
around the country (although a recent television report
showed that at least some of the addresses given were
actually private apartments with residents who were unaware
of any connection to United Front). Kulov has upped the
rhetoric, saying that the April rally aimed for a "peaceful
handover of power," and dismissing Bakiyev's offers of
negotiations and further constitutional reform as "empty
words."

For Reforms Splitting Up
--------------


3. (C) United Front has grown in size and strength, gaining
support from a number of parliamentarians, ex-government
officials, and members of the other large opposition
movement, For Reforms. In fact, the debate over whether to

BISHKEK 00000343 002.2 OF 004


support the protest action appears to have split For Reforms.
After For Reforms released a statement that its members were
ready to participate in peaceful protests, on March 28 a
number of For Reforms members, including MP Azimbek
Beknazarov, former FM Roza Otunbayeva, Almaz Atambayev, MP
Dooronbek Sadyrbayev, and Edil Baisalov, quit the movement in
order to form "United Kyrgyzstan." According to Sadyrbayev,
they want to create a "clean" organization, working for
constitutional reform, economic stability, and human rights
-- within the legal framework and without violence.

Bakiyev Reaching Out
--------------


4. (C) Bakiyev has said repeatedly that he would not respond
to threats and ultimatums, but he has taken a number of steps
to compromise and negotiate -- or at least appear to be doing
so. Over the past two weeks, Bakiyev has been reaching out
to the opposition, meeting with selected leaders, including
MP Temir Sariyev, MP Omurbek Babanov, and (now former) For
Reforms co-chair Almaz Atambayev. Bakiyev traveled to the
March 17 commemoration of the Aksy events -- a major
concession to Beknazarov. Bakiyev has also taken steps to
meet some of the opposition's demands, including dismissing
Procurator General Kongantiyev on March 19. In his address
to the nation on March 23, Bakiyev said he was ready to take
"any steps" in the interests of the people. Admitting
mistakes in the adoption of new constitutions in November and
December, he offered to establish a new working group to
draft changes to the constitution, which would be adopted
only with the approval of parliament and the constitutional
court. (Note: the November and December changes to the
constitution were adopted without following the
constitutional procedures. End Note.) He also challenged
the opposition to work with him in his speech marking the
two-year anniversary of the "tulip revolution" (Ref A). And
on March 26, Bakiyev withdrew his veto (from last September)
and signed the law to transform the state television company
into public television.

Usenov Fired
--------------


5. (C) In a dramatic move March 28, President Bakiyev fired
controversial First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov and
four other cabinet members, including Minister of Emergency
Situations Rustembekov, Minister of Economy and Trade
Moldokulov, Minister of Health Niazov, and head of the Prime
Minister's administration Tabyldiyev. Prime Minister
Isabekov told the press that he had made the decision to
reshuffle the government, and that he welcomed suggestions
from political parties and civil society for replacements.
He said the government was ready to reach out to the
opposition.

Atambayev Playing Moderator
--------------


6. (C) Almaz Atambayev, former Minister of Trade, (now
former) For Reforms co-chair, and one of the organizers of
last November's protests, appears to be playing the role of
moderator. He told the Ambassador March 27 that he was
trying to bring the two sides together, but he was stuck
between Bakiyev, who can't make a decision, and Kulov, who
can't compromise. The core problem between them was that
Bakiyev won't agree to Kulov's only demand -- early elections.


7. (C) Atambayev said that the November protests had come

BISHKEK 00000343 003.2 OF 004


close to conflict, but this time the opposition was more
radical, "high" with power, and ready to drive toward
confrontation. Atambayev said it was impossible to predict
how the power ministries would react to the situation; it was
possible they would side with Kulov. Kulov is charismatic
and can attract people to his side, but with the exception of
MP Omurbek Tekebayev, all of Kulov's support is from the
north. Thus, any confrontation could spark a north-south
civil war.


8. (C) Atambayev has had a series of meetings with Bakiyev.
He said the president had offered him several positions,
including PM. Atambayev said he was only interested if the
president issued an edict on constitutional reform (done),
signed the public television bill (done),and fired the
corrupt people in the administration, bringing in 40-45% new
people, including from the opposition. Replacing personnel
would be difficult, but Atambayev claimed the president is
considering it (and, as today's firings confirm, has acted on
it but has so far left the PM in place). Atambayev said it
would be a "kamikaze" mission to go into the government
alone.


9. (C) Atambayev said the only solution to the current
standoff is to talk. While he doesn't trust the president,
Atambayev said that there was no alternative, and that it
would be a disaster for the country if Bakiyev were driven
from office. He told the Ambassador that within the next few
days a group of like-minded politicians would form a new
group "to save the country." (On March 28, Atambayev and
other members of For Reforms announced the formation of
United Kyrgyzstan.)

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Both the government (Ref B) and members of the
opposition (Ref E) have told us that they are very concerned
about the likelihood of violence during the April protests.
There are rumors of weapons being stockpiled on both sides
and other preparations being made for possible conflict.
Kulov has said repeatedly that the United Front's actions
will be peaceful and lawful, but there is no sign that he
will back down from his central demand of early presidential
elections. His strategy is to appear uncompromising and as
strong as possible -- whether through the whispers of Russian
support or the allegations of power ministry support.


11. (C) Kulov's strategy is clearly working, although the
effect has been to galvanize the usually indecisive president
into making major concessions -- concessions that Bakiyev
hopes will divide the opposition and cause supporters to
abandon Kuklov and his maximalist stand. But there is little
trust between opposition and Bakiyev, and while Bakiyev may
be forced to compromise now, the doubters will ask how long
any deal will last.


12. (C) Some in the opposition, while not trusting Bakiyev,
appear to be working to avoid a direct confrontation. The
government shake-up may be a first step towards the kind of
coalition government that Atambayev has been urging. Today's
developments are dramatic and could mollify some, but it is
not clear they will appease Kulov, although some had
previewed Usenov's departure as the necessary pre-condition
between Bakiyev and Kulov (see Ref C).


13. (C) The next move is clearly Kulov's. The political
situation remains unpredictable, as alliances shift and

BISHKEK 00000343 004.2 OF 004


behind-the-scenes discussions continue. At this point, no
one is willing to wager on the outcome, with Bakiyev and
Kulov still the main figures jockeying for power.
YOVANOVITCH