Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BISHKEK284
2007-03-19 13:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZ ANALYSTS PREDICT POLITICAL STANDOFF TO BE

Tags:  PGOV PREL KG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000284 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ ANALYSTS PREDICT POLITICAL STANDOFF TO BE
RESOLVED BEFORE PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS

REF: A. BISHKEK 270


B. BISHKEK 228

C. BISHKEK 63

BISHKEK 00000284 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000284

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ ANALYSTS PREDICT POLITICAL STANDOFF TO BE
RESOLVED BEFORE PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS

REF: A. BISHKEK 270


B. BISHKEK 228

C. BISHKEK 63

BISHKEK 00000284 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a March 19 meeting with the
Ambassador, two leading Kyrgyz political analysts predicted
that the current standoff between the government and Felix
Kulov's United Front would be resolved ahead of street
protests planned for April 11. Former Foreign Minister Murat
Imanaliyev suggested that President Bakiyev was taking a
conciliatory approach by offering to meet with opposition
leaders, discuss further constitutional reforms, and even
bring a group from the opposition into government. Analyst
Valentin Bogatyrev suggested that Bakiyev was sending signals
directly to Felix Kulov, possibly about a deal that would
bring him back into government. Both analysts suggested that
First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov was on the "edge
of a fall," and they said that several other cabinet changes
were imminent. Imanaliyev and Bogatyrev are usually -- but
not always -- right in their forecasts, but they did admit
that they were describing a "best case" scenario, especially
with respect to Kulov. END SUMMARY.

Bakiyev Ready to Talk and Compromise?
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador met March 19 with former Foreign Minister
and current Institute for Public Policy president Murat
Imanaliyev and former director of the International Institute
for Strategic Research Valentin Bogatyrev. Both Imanaliyev
and Bogatyrev have been strongly critical of the Bakiyev
government in the past (see Ref C),and in this meeting they
continued to criticize the government, condemning the rising
influence criminal elements and increased corruption in the
government. In contrast to others who have raised concerns
about the possibility of violence if opposition protests
begin as planned on April 11 (see Ref A),Imanaliyev and
Bagatyrev predicted that the standoff between the government
and Felix Kulov's United Front would be resolved ahead of any
demonstrations.


3. (C) Imanaliyev said that President Bakiyev had decided to

take a conciliatory approach by offering to meet with
opposition members to discuss "all questions" of reforms,
including constitutional reform. (Note: Bakiyev met March
19 with opposition MP Temir Sariyev, and a group from For
Reforms, including co-chair Almaz Atambayev, has reportedly
agreed to meet with the president March 21. End Note.)
Imanaliyev suggested that Bakiyev was willing to consider a
new draft of the constitution, either to be put to parliament
or to a referendum in June. This would be followed by early
parliamentary elections in the fall, with the new parliament
possibly elected entirely by party list.

Reaching out to Kulov?
--------------


4. (C) Both analysts claimed that Bakiyev was trying to reach
out to Kulov. Bogatyrev said that Bakiyev had sent signals
to Kulov that he was ready to work out differences, but
Imanaliyev said that the challenge was to find a basis for
talks that would save face after the harsh words between them
(see Ref B). Bogatyrev sketched out a scenario of Bakiyev
backing Kulov as Speaker of Parliament, following early
elections in the fall. This would require a great deal of
money and coordination, and Bogatyrev acknowledged it as a

BISHKEK 00000284 002.4 OF 002


"maximum" or "best case" scenario.

Usenov on the Edge?
--------------


5. (C) The analysts agreed that powerful First Deputy Prime
Minister Daniyar Usenov was on the "edge of a fall," and
would probably be sacrificed to facilitate a rapprochement
between Kulov and Bakiyev. Recent scandals surrounding the
attempted backdoor privatizations of the Aurora Sanitorium
and the Kristall silicon factory, as well as Usenov's role in
the renegotiation of the agreement for operation of the
Kumtor gold mine all pointed to Usenov's increasingly bold
corruption. "He's just stealing, and sending his money to
the UAE," said Bogatyrev. The opposition is delighted with
Usenov's role; their view is that "the more (Usenov) does,
the sooner Bakiyev won't be president." (Note: Parliament
has scheduled a no-confidence vote on Usenov for March 20.
The vote itself would be symbolic, but it could give the
president an excuse to get rid of Usenov. End Note.)

Other Changes Coming?
--------------


6. (C) Bogatyrev predicted that Bakiyev would soon make
several changes in the government. He said that Prosecutor
General Kamabaraly Kongantiyev would move to the National
Security Council (Note: Kongantiyev was dismissed as
Prosecutor General late on March 19, but there was no
announcement of a new position for him. End Note.),and
Presidential Chief of Staff Myktybek Abdyldayev would move to
the Prosecutor's post (Note: Abdyldayev was chief prosecutor
during the Akayev regime. End Note.). He said that new
Prime Mininster Isabekov seemed unable to make a decision on
his own, going to Bakiyev on "everything," leaving Bakiyev
unable to plan for the future.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Imanaliyev and Bogatyrev are astute observers of the
political scene here; they are usually -- but not always --
right in their predictions. They are correct that Bakiyev is
reaching out to the opposition, offering to meet individually
with opposition members -- though to this point just with
opposition members who have not joined the United Front.
This may be a strategy of divide and conquer, or it may be
that Bakiyev feels the pressure and sees a political need to
compromise. Deputy Defense Minister Oruzbayev, an ally and
childhood friend of Kulov, told the DCM recently that Bakiyev
is "weak" and has no option but to reach out. In January,
Imanaliyev and Bogatyrev (and other analysts) were ready to
write off Kulov as a spent political force, outmaneuvered and
not trusted by others in opposition (Ref C). Now, they are
seeing a comeback for Kulov. While it is hard to imagine a
reconciliation between Kulov and Bakiyev, there will no doubt
be many behind the scenes conversations between the major
political players in the run-up to the planned
demonstrations, and a compromise is possible.
YOVANOVITCH