Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BISHKEK1425
2007-12-04 04:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZ PARTY LEADERS AND OFFICIALS DISCUSS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001425 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ PARTY LEADERS AND OFFICIALS DISCUSS
ELECTION PREPARATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA OFFICE DIRECTOR
SPRATLEN

REF: BISHKEK 1421

BISHKEK 00001425 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001425

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ PARTY LEADERS AND OFFICIALS DISCUSS
ELECTION PREPARATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA OFFICE DIRECTOR
SPRATLEN

REF: BISHKEK 1421

BISHKEK 00001425 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a November 19-20 visit to Bishkek,
Central Asia Officer Director Pamela Spratlen met with
political party leaders, the head of the Central Election
Commission, civil society activists, and other leading
analysts. Discussion centered on the December 16
parliamentary elections, the first in Kyrgyzstan to be
conducted entirely by party list. Party leaders expressed
deep concerns that administrative resources would be deployed
to support the pro-presidential Ak Jol party, and that high
thresholds could lead to undemocratic results. The head of
the CEC defended the process, saying that the thresholds were
designed to force of consolidation of political parties and
prevent "regionalism." In each of her meetings, Spratlen
stressed the importance of a free and fair election, in which
the resulting parliament reflects the views of all the
voters. Spratlen's meeting with Foreign Minister Karabayev
is reported reftel. End Summary.

Technical Advisors: Problems with the Process
-------------- -


2. (C) The country directors for NDI, IRI, and IFES briefed
visiting Central Asia Office Director Pamela Spratlen on
their work with political parties, domestic election
monitors, and the Central Election Commission (CEC) to
prepare for the December 16 parliamentary elections. They
noted that the shortened campaign period made these tasks
more difficult. One representative pointed out that the CEC
had failed to clarify some points of the new election code,
and it had changed its interpretation of other provisions,
leaving the political parties confused. If the CEC is
uncertain about key provisions at this late date, what does
that say about the process, one asked.

Ata Meken: An Unfair Fight
--------------


3. (C) Spratlen met November 19 with Omurbek Tekebayev,
Kubatbek Baibolov, and Temir Sariyev, the leaders of Ata
Meken, the largest opposition party contesting the elections.

Tekebayev said that this election represented a moral
choice, because Kyrgyzstan was on the edge between
authoritarianism and democracy. Bakiyev, he said, lacked any
regard for the rule of law and was seeking uncontrolled
power. All three believed that in a fair fight Ata Meken
would win a majority of seats, and, therefore, Bakiyev was
using "all administrative resources" to support his Ak Jol
party. Baibolov noted that with very small salaries, local
officials and teachers (who make up the majority of the
positions on precinct election commissions) were susceptible
to administrative pressure. Tekebayev noted that the CEC's
interpretation of the 0.5% regional threshold effectively
created a very high barrier, and there was a substantial risk
of a one-party parliament. Sariyev chided the international
community for not taking a stronger stand against Bakiyev's
abuses, including against the fraudulent constitutional
referendum in October. To help prevent fraud, Sariyev asked
for many more international observers. (Note: OSCE/ODIHR
has requested 250 short-term observers for its election
observation mission. End note.) Noting that Bakiyev
controlled much of the mass media, Baibolov asked for more
U.S. support for independent media, including increasing the
broadcasting hours for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's
Kyrgyz-language Radio Azattyk.

Ak Jol: We're the Disadvantaged Party
--------------


BISHKEK 00001425 002.2 OF 004



4. (C) Ak Jol party co-leader Elmira Ibraimova told Spratlen
on November 19 that Ak Jol was the "most disadvantaged"
party. Unlike the other parties with longer histories, Ak
Jol was new and it was scrambling to get ready for the
elections, Ibraimova claimed. Further, candidates from other
parties were skirting the campaign rules by advertising their
businesses or giving interviews, but the CEC had stopped Ak
Jol from distributing its "purely informational" newspaper.
(Note: This meeting took place prior to the start of the
official campaign period on November 26. End Note.) She
said that while Ak Jol was a pro-presidential party, it was
not using administrative resources. Asked by the Ambassador
about the status of her position as the director of the World
Bank-funded ARIS rural development program during the
campaign, Ibraimova said she had an agreement with the World
Bank not to use the extensive ARIS structure for party
purposes.

SDPK: Caught between Government and Opposition
-------------- --


5. (C) Edil Baisalov, Executive Secretary of the Social
Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK),told Spratlen November
20 that his party was in a difficult position standing
between government and opposition. Some people supported the
party because it was close to power with party leader Almaz
Atambayev serving as prime minister, while some of the party
rank and file were upset with Atambayev's support for
Bakiyev. As long as Atambayev was prime minister, the party
was limited in what it could say, including criticizing the
high thresholds for entering parliament. (Note: Bakiyev
dismissed Atambayev on November 28. End Note.) Baisalov
said that Atambayev did not have real power as prime
minister, but he thought that history would judge that
Atambayev did the right thing in becoming prime minister in
April, because doing so had prevented bloodshed.


6. (C) In the coming election, Baisalov said, the SDPK wanted
to present itself as the "reasonable alternative," and he
thought the party could get 15 seats in parliament, though
this would be difficult given the regional thresholds and
administrative pressure. Right now, he said, the
administration was acting as if it could get away with
anything, and there was a great deal of pressure on local
officials. He hoped that the administration would allow the
opposition to get seats in the parliament.

Communists: What Can We Do?
--------------


7. (C) Head of the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan, Iskhak
Masaliyev, told Spratlen November 20 that he had suggested a
regional threshold for election to parliament, and it would
have been a good idea if based on the population in each
region. He claimed that the White House had deliberately
mis-written the provision so that the 0.5% regional threshold
would be calculated based on the national list of voters
(creating a disproportional impact in the different oblasts).
But now that the law was adopted, he said, it was too late
to change the rule. He said that Bakiyev was trying to
create a single-party parliament, following the example of
Kazakhstan.

Kulov: Bakiyev Seeking Monopoly of Power
--------------


8. (C) Former Prime Minister and Ar Namys party leader Felix
Kulov warned of Bakiyev's unchallenged authority. He
predicted fraudulent activity, particularly in the south,
during the elections, and he feared that Bakiyev would hold a
monopoly on all government authority if the pro-government
parties gain control of parliament. Kulov did not think that

BISHKEK 00001425 003.2 OF 004


fraudulent elections would provoke much reaction. He said
that he would not dispute the results, and he thought that
the weak economy would keep the population from protesting
the election results. However, Kulov claimed that following
the elections, there would be a 30% hike in gasoline prices,
and that this shock could spark civil unrest.

CEC: Thresholds Will Strengthen Parties
--------------


9. (C) CEC Chair Klara Kabilova defended the CEC's
interpretation of the 0.5% threshold, saying that it
reflected the views of the president and the administration.
She said that Kyrgyzstan had too many political parties, and
the thresholds would force parties to "merge and grow,"
improving the quality of the candidates. Spratlen pointed
out that the likely result of such thresholds was a
parliament with only one or two parties, and she stressed the
importance for all voters to be represented in the
parliament.


10. (C) Asked about the credibility of the process given
reports of widespread fraud during the October constitutional
referendum, Kabilova claimed that the CEC had received no
complaints about the referendum and said this election would
be conducted according to the code. Kabilova acknowledged
that some local election officials (incorrectly) perceived
pressure on them, but this was a problem of "inherited
mentality." She said she planned to travel to all of the
regions to meet with local administrative officials to tell
them there should be no pressure put on local election
commissions. Kabilova said that after a month and a half on
the job, she had come to view the international community as
a "partner," and she greatly appreciated the technical
support from organizations such as IFES.

Econ Analysts: Administrative Resources for Ak Jol
-------------- --------------


11. (C) The local World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) representatives, as well as two Kyrgyz business sector
executives, highlighted for Spratlen over a dinner
conversation the business support and governmental
"administrative resources" being employed to support the
pro-Bakiyev Ak Jol party. The two Kyrgyz drew parallels
between recent political developments and former President
Askar Akayev's attempts to create a "pocket parliament." The
World Bank's Roger Robinson separately engaged Spratlen and
the Ambassador in a heated discussion about concerns that Ak
Jol party leader Elmira Ibraimova was using her position as
the head of a World Bank-funded rural development project to
benefit her party.


12. (C) Robinson also outlined his efforts to secure a
judicial system "diagnostic" to complement planned Millennium
Challenge Corporation activities. The IMF's James McHugh
noted that IMF-funded training of judges would begin in
January. Among other highlights -- a third version of the
long-debated tax code should be presented to the new
parliament by March 2008, and the government is focusing on
monopolistic conditions in wheat distribution rather than
mooted price controls at the retail level to combat wheat and
bread price inflation.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) Most interlocutors were concerned that the use of
administrative resources during the campaign and fraudulent
manipulation of the vote could keep the new parliament from
being representative. All of the parties were concerned
about the barrier created by the CEC's interpretation of the

BISHKEK 00001425 004.2 OF 004


0.5% regional threshold, requiring parties to get
approximately 13,500 votes in each of the seven oblasts, in
Bishkek, and in Osh city. Such a threshold makes it likely
that no more than one or two parties will get into
parliament. In each of her meetings, Spratlen stressed the
importance of a credible process, and the risk to Kyrgyzstan
if the resulting parliament does not reflect the views of all
the voters.


14. (U) Central Asia Office Director Spratlen has cleared
this cable.
LITZENBERGER