KYRGYZSTAN REFERENDUM IS "JUST POLITICS"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001296

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN REFERENDUM IS "JUST POLITICS"

REF: A. BISHKEK 1270


B. BISHKEK 1184

C. BISHKEK 1170

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Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kyrgyzstan will hold a nationwide
referendum on a new constitution and new electoral code on
October 21, despite a recommendation from the parliament that
the vote be postponed. The proposed constitution closely
resembles the recently annulled December 2006 constitution,
but it further tilts the balance of power in favor of the
presidency. It also provides that the parliament be elected
entirely on a proportional basis by party lists. The
proposed electoral code sets a high threshold for parties to
obtain seats in parliament: 5% of the total number of
registered voters, as well as 0.5% of registered voters in
each oblast, Bishkek, and Osh. A number of analysts have
expressed concern about the haste of the referendum and about
certain provisions in the drafts, and some opposition figures
have urged supporters to vote against the new constitution,
but most expect that the constitution and electoral code will
be approved.


2. (SBU) Parliamentarians and other political figures are
looking beyond the referendum and focusing on expected
parliamentary elections. Following the referendum, it is
likely that the parliament will be dissolved and new
elections called, possibly as soon as December. With the new
parliament to be elected on a party list basis, parliamentary
deputies are scrambling to secure places on party lists, and
smaller parties are looking to merge. On October 15,
President Bakiyev established his own political party, "Ak
Jol Kyrgyzstan," bringing together members of several
pro-presidential parties. Several opposition parties,
including Ata Meken, Ak Shumkar, and Asaba are also
discussing the possibility of uniting. Prime Minister
Atambayev's Social Democratic Party announced it would run on
its own. END SUMMARY.

A New Constitution -- What Would It Change?
--------------


3. (SBU) In November and December 2006, Kyrgyzstan adopted
two new versions of the constitution, both hastily drafted
and passed by parliament and signed by the president. On
September 14, the Constitutional Court invalidated these
versions on procedural grounds, returning the country to the
2003 constitution (with its strong presidential authority and
which itself was adopted by a flawed referendum). On
September 19, President Bakiyev announced that a national
referendum would be held on October 21 to consider a "new
version" of the constitution and a new election code.


4. (SBU) Bakiyev's draft is similar in most respects to the
annulled December 2006 constitution. The draft keeps the
split executive branch, with the president and his
administration on one side, and the prime minister and his
cabinet on the other. However, the draft appears further to
strengthen presidential authority over the government, the
parliament, the judiciary, and local administrations compared
to the December constitution. Under Bakiyev's draft, the
president has the right to dismiss members of the government
or the whole government on his own initiative. The president
appoints directly the defense, national security, internal
and foreign affairs ministers; other ministers are nominated
by the prime minister and appointed by the president. The
president nominates members of the supreme and constitutional
courts, subject to the approval of the parliament, and the
president appoints and dismisses local judges on the proposal
of the National Council for Judicial Affairs. Under the
proposed draft, the president keeps the authority to appoint
and remove the heads of local administrations (rayon level),
but the heads of local administrations gain the authority to

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appoint the heads of village districts and regional towns
(previously elected by local elected councils),strengthening
vertical power and presidential control of local
administration.


5. (SBU) The proposed draft expands the parliament from 75 to
90 members, with all deputies elected on a proportional basis
by party lists. The deputies from the party with over 50
percent of the seats nominate the prime minister, but if they
fail to do so, the president can select another party to
nominate the prime minister. Parliamentary deputies would be
under the strict control of their parties, as the mandate
belongs to the party, not the individual. A deputy would
lose his seat (and immunity) if he is expelled or withdraws
from his party, or if the party ceases activity (that is, the
party is de-registered by the Ministry of Justice). This
provision gives the executive substantial influence over
parliament.

Electoral Code Sets High Threshold
--------------


6. (SBU) The draft electoral code, also to be voted on in the
referendum, sets a very high threshold for a party to obtain
seats in parliament. A party must get 5% of the total number
of registered voters (not 5% of votes cast),and the party
must get at least 0.5% of registered voters in each of the
seven oblasts, in Bishkek, and in Osh, in order to enter
parliament. This provision gives broad latitude to the
Central Election Commission (CEC) to disqualify parties that
"fail" to meet all these conditions. Depending on voter
turnout, the effective threshold could be much higher than
5%. (For example, with 50% turnout, the threshold would be
10% of the votes cast.) The draft code makes provision for
women, minority, and youth participation. No more than 70%
of candidates on a party's list can be of the same gender,
with no more than three candidates in a row of the same
gender. (Note: the current parliament has no women.) At
least 15% of the candidates must be under age 35 and 15% from
national minorities, although their place on the party lists
is not specified.

Preparations for the Referendum
--------------


7. (C) Having had only a month to prepare for the referendum,
the Central Election Committee (CEC) is struggling to get
ready the 2300 polling stations and ballots for 2.7 million
registered voters. OSCE and IFES (with USAID funding)
provided support to the CEC in preparing information
brochures for voters and manuals for poll workers. Voter
lists, however, have not been updated in some areas, and one
CEC member told the press that they had discovered deceased
voters on a number of lists. (Note: voter lists are based
on the residency registrations kept by local governments.)
There is also uncertainty about how many votes will be
required for the constitution and electoral code to pass.
According to the Soviet-era law on referenda, a measure must
obtain the approval of over 50% of all registered voters.
According to the presidential decree calling this referendum,
voter turnout must be at least 50% and the measure must
obtain at over 50% of the votes cast. With an estimated
500,000 to 800,000 Kyrgyz working abroad and little provision
made for them to vote, reaching the required 50% turnout will
be difficult, and there may be pressure on election officials
-- and the Kyrgyz embassies in Russia and Kazakhstan -- to
report high voter participation figures.

Politics of the Referendum
--------------


8. (C) Ever since the "tulip revolution" of March 2005,
constitutional reform has been at the center of the political
debate in Kyrgyzstan. Various commissions and working groups

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have put forward a range of constitutional proposals, and
opposition demonstrations led to (temporary) constitutional
compromises by the Bakiyev administration. By calling this
referendum on short notice, Bakiyev is moving to settle this
debate once and for all by pushing through a version that
suits his interests. Voters have little choice: vote "yes"
to the draft constitution with strong presidential powers, or
vote "no" and keep the 2003 constitution with very strong
presidential powers. Either way, Bakiyev appears to win.


9. (C) While some political figures, including Prime Minister
Atambayev, have called Bakiyev's draft a "step forward," a
number of analysts and opposition figures have criticized it
for augmenting presidential authority. Former Foreign
Minister Muratbek Imanaliyev complained that the draft
ignored the suggestions of constitutional experts, and the
hasty referendum meant that people were voting blind.
Opposition MP Kubatbek Baibolov warned in an open letter that
the referendum results would be disputed because it would be
conducted in violation of existing laws, and he said that the
draft undercut the benefits of election by party list because
of the increased presidential authority. Constitutional
expert Gulnara Iskakova criticized the draft for, among other
faults, "practically abolishing" local self-governance. And
analyst Tamerlan Ibraimov noted that the draft makes
impeachment of the president nearly impossible, because the
(presidentially appointed) prosecutor general must support
any charges put forward by parliament.


10. (C) Despite the criticism of the draft, there has been
little organized opposition to the referendum. Ak Shumkar
party leaders MP Temir Sariyev and MP Baibolov urged their
supporters at a party conference to vote against the
constitution and electoral code. Deputy Speaker of
Parliament Alymbekov urged voters to boycott the referendum
to prevent reaching the necessary 50% turnout. On the other
hand, Prime Minister Atambayev's Social Democratic Party is
conducting a "vote yes" information campaign.


11. (C) Presidential Chief of Staff Sadyrkulov told the
Ambassador that the referendum was "just politics." When
asked why this referendum would succeed when previous
referenda (in the Akayev era) had laid the groundwork for
future problems, Sadyrkulov responded that "this time it's
going to be different because the people agree with us."
Turning to the electoral code, Sadyrkulov said that the
requirement that a party must get 0.5% of the vote in each
oblast was aimed to blunt the Sodruzhestvo party, whose
support comes from ethnic Uzbeks but was "established and
financed by the (Russian) FSB." With the high concentration
of ethnic Uzbeks in the south, Sadyrkulov estimated that
Sodruzhestvo could gain 25 seats in parliament if it ran on
its own, and 25 seats "controlled by the FSB" was not
acceptable. But because Sodruzhestvo lacks any constituency
outside the south, the regional minimum requirement forced
Sodruzhestvo to the table with the president's new party.


12. (C) Sadyrkulov did acknowledge that there were problems
with some provisions, and he told the head of the OSCE
Bishkek office, Ambassador Mueller, that he was forming a
working group to make changes to the rules on party
deregistration and the imperative mandate of parties in
parliament. It is not clear if these changes will be made
prior to or after the referendum, but such changes raise
questions about whether voters will know what they are voting
on.

Focus on Early Elections
--------------


13. (C) Following the referendum, the government will resign
according to the transitional provisions of the new
constitution. Sadyrkulov confirmed that Atambayev and all
his ministers would continue in an acting capacity. It is

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widely expected that Bakiyev's next move will be to dissolve
the parliament (either directly or through pro-presidential
deputies forcing dissolution) and call early elections.
While Sadyrkulov would not confirm parliamentary elections,
he hinted broadly that this would be the case. Most believe
that elections will be held on December 16.


14. (C) Many current MPs appear more focused on gaining a
place on a potential party list for their political survival
than on details of the constitution draft or raising
questions about the referendum procedure. MP Iskhak
Masaliyev (who supports the referendum, though he
acknowledges that it's not being carried out according to the
law) told us that deputies were working "feverishly" to
prepare for elections. A parliamentary staffer indicated
that large sums of money were changing hands in the scramble
by current deputies to be placed on party lists.


15. (C) With the increased role for political parties under
the new constitution, and the potentially high threshold to
enter parliament, many smaller parties are reportedly looking
at ways to merge or consolidate. On October 15, President
Bakiyev established his own political party, "Ak Jol
Kyrgyzstan," bringing together members of several
pro-presidential parties. Some pro-presidential parties,
including Sodruzhestvo, Moya Strana, and the Labor and Unity
party, have said that they may join Ak Jol, pending decisions
by their party conferences (or, in Sodruzhestvo's case,
instructions from Moscow). Several opposition parties,
including Ata Meken, Ak Shumkar, and Asaba are also
reportedly discussing the possibility of uniting. Prime
Minister Atambayev's Social Democratic Party announced it
would run on its own.

Comment
--------------


16. (C) These moves by Bakiyev -- a pro-presidential draft
constitution and the formation of a new presidential
political party -- raise questions whether Kyrgyzstan is
moving toward democracy or toward "managed democracy." The
hasty manner in which the referendum is being conducted also
raises questions, leaves the process open to future legal
challenges, and makes it unlikely that this referendum will
bring an end to the constitutional reform debate.
Constitutional Court Chair Cholpon Bayekova confided to the
Ambassador on October 16 that there were risks to moving so
quickly, and she did not think that this would be the last
constitution. When the Ambassador raised concerns about the
process with Sadyrkulov, stressing the importance of a
balance of powers and a level playing field, Sadyrkulov
responded that Kyrgyzstan faced serious problems in the south
and with certain neighbors, and that the country needed
"stronger tools" to deal with those problems. Nevertheless,
Sadyrkulov said, the country was moving "step by step" toward
democracy. The normally avuncular Sadyrkulov was more
sensitive to criticism than usual, indicating perhaps that
the game plan may not be proceeding as smoothly as suggested.
Despite Sadyrkulov's analysis that "this time will be
different," this referendum may just postpone the power
struggles to a later date. At the least, the questionable
legal basis of the referendum lays the groundwork for future
legal and political challenges to Bakiyev.
YOVANOVITCH