MANAGING KYRGYZ CRITICISM OF MANAS AIR BASE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 000125

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: MANAGING KYRGYZ CRITICISM OF MANAS AIR BASE

REF: A. 06 STATE 199856

B. BISHKEK 124

C. BISHKEK 86

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Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Kyrgyz domestic political turmoil in
December and January over a new constitution and government
has shifted public and political attention away from Manas
Air Base. This welcome hiatus may prove temporary, however,
once the new government is in place. Looking ahead, we see
several events that could renew controversy over the base:
announcement of the results of our investigation into the
December 6 shooting incident; announcement of our response to
the victim's widow's compensation claim; our decision on
compensation for the September collision between a USAF plane
and a Kyrgyz airliner; parliamentary consideration of whether
to hold hearings on the base as agreed in December; MFA
consideration of whether and how to carry out the President's
instructions to renegotiate the base agreement; and
Kyrygzystan's hosting of the June summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (whose members have already
questioned the need for the base). Each of these events
could generate pressure on GOKG officials to take strident
public positions critical of the base. Our recommendations
for managing the consequences are at para eight below. END
SUMMARY.

TEMPORARY QUIET IN THE EAST
--------------


2. (C) Over the past month there has been a break in Kyrgyz
media criticism of Manas Air Base, as politicians focused on
internal politics, voting on both a new constitution and a
new prime minister. We expect that once the new Cabinet is
named in early February, Kyrgyz attention will return to the
base, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will inform us of
how the Kyrgyz Government would like to proceed following the
December 6 shooting incident at the Base in which a Kyrgyz
truck driver was killed by a U.S. Air Force security guard.
In fact, this renewed focus on the base may have already
begun. Parliamentary Speaker Sultanov, during his recent
visit to the U.S., indicated to the press on February 2 that
the GOKG would be seeking to renegotiate the terms of the
base agreement.

CABINET VOTES BASE SHOULD STAY
--------------


3. (C) On January 8, the cabinet met to discuss the shooting
incident and President Bakiyev's December instruction to the
MFA to renegotiate the base agreement with the purpose of
revoking the clause that the U.S. military retains criminal
jurisdiction over base personnel. We understand from Deputy
Minister of Defense Oruzbayev, Minister of Interior
Suvanaliev, and former Prime Minister Kulov that the cabinet
voted for and forwarded to the President a recommendation
that the base should remain in Kyrgyzstan. Most interlocutors
have also told us that the Kyrgyz Government has dropped the
demand for criminal jurisdiction over base personnel, as the
MFA has concluded this would not be consistent with
international law. MFA was also ordered to follow up with
the Embassy on this and other issues, which Suvanaliev said
included a request for changes in procedures at the base
including joint patrols at check points.


4. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Sarbayev told us he was
unaware of the January 8 cabinet meeting and to date we have
heard nothing from the MFA. While there is a question

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whether the new cabinet will honor the decision of the old
cabinet, we suspect that it will and have heard nothing to
the contrary. President Bakiyev is the real decision-maker on
base issues (although he likes to hide behind the
government),and Defense Minister Isakov has repeatedly
assured us that the President understands the continued need
for the base and wants the base to remain in Kyrgyzstan.
(Note: Isakov enjoys a very close relationship with
President Bakiyev, and we expect him to continue in his
current position in the new government. End Note.) It is a
positive development that the contentious base issues
(including processing of Kyrgyz Air's claim regarding the
Tupolev damaged in a collision with a USAF plane in
September, flight safety issues, the investigation into the
shooting, and the processing of Mrs. Ivanova's claim) are
currently being handled at the expert level rather than at
the political level.

TROUBLE AHEAD
--------------


5. (C) Nevertheless, this relatively quiet period will not
last indefinitely. We expect that potential flashpoints on
the horizon include the following: 1) possible public
announcement by Kyrgyz investigators that the airman is
guilty of a crime and the frustration of the Kyrgyz public
that the Kyrgyz cannot try the airman in the Kyrgyz system;
2) the possible later U.S. announcement that the airman will
not be charged with a crime and will therefore not stand
trial in the U.S.; 3) the conclusion of the processing of
Mrs. Ivanova's foreign claim resulting in an amount lower
than the $2.1 million requested or rejection of the claim;
4) our decision on compensation for the September collision
between a USAF plane and a Kyrgyz airliner; 5) the
possibility that parliament will follow up on its December 15
resolution and hold hearings on the base and specifically on
the details of base payments; 6) our upcoming April request
to renew the July 14, 2006 Protocol of Intentions, which
could spark a request for additional compensation ) although
the Protocol clearly precludes the Kyrgyz Government from
making such a request; and 7) Kyrgyzstan's hosting of the SCO
Summit in June could lead to renewed Russian and Chinese
pressure on Bakiyev to reconsider the base.


6. (C) We believe that with pre-cleared, pre-positioned
press statements and/or guidance that the Embassy and base
can deploy immediately, we can weather these storms. But
based on the pattern over the last two years, we predict the
public mood could turn ugly. We can expect harsh,
ill-thought-through pronouncements by the ever-changeable
President Bakiyev. We can expect the parliament, the press,
and the public to take their cue from the leadership and
respond just as irresponsibly. We can also expect media
based in Russia, which has greater penetration in Kyrgyzstan
than Kyrgyz media, to also play an unconstructive role.
Nevertheless, we think that )- barring an unforeseeable
catastrophe -- we can probably ride through these events as
we have others. Moreover, we believe that if the Kyrgyz
calculation changes, our steadfast allies on the base at the
Ministry of Defense will let us know, and we will be able to
adjust accordingly.


7. (C) However, the issue of base payments is potentially
the most damaging, as U.S. silence on the amount we pay
directly to the government fosters the erroneous but widely
held belief that we are paying off Bakiyev. Even the
ever-agreeable Parliamentary Speaker Sulatanov is starting to
push on this issue, and it is clear that no one in the
government understands -) or perhaps wants to understand --

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how the Kyrgyz Government is compensated. To the extent
that we can be more forthcoming on what portion of our
overall $150 million assistance package consists of direct
transfers for services received from the government, it would
help both the base and the bilateral relationship.

GETTING AHEAD OF THE POWER CURVE: EMBASSY RECOMMENDATION
--------------


8. (C) We expect the unpredictability of the current
domestic political situation to continue in 2007, with both
the opposition and the administration using the base in their
own domestic political arguments. Issues that should be
resolvable could become mired in politics, and older issues
constantly re-opened. It is likely this will be accompanied
by inflammatory rhetoric, which does not necessarily reflect
where President Bakiyev or the Kyrgyz Government are, but
serves to show the Kyrgyz people and the Russians that the
Kyrgyz are not American lackeys. All this makes for an
uncertain ally, complicates our efforts to manage public
perception as well as political support for the base, and
increases the likelihood that the base will continue to lurch
from crisis to crisis.

We suggest the USG take the following steps to try to get
ahead of the curve:

-- Regular high level visits to underscore to the senior
leadership here the importance of the relationship and the
base. A visit by Secretary of Defense Gates could have a
positive impact on rebuilding the military relationship,
smoothing troubled waters, and setting the forward course. A
visit by the Secretary for as short as four hours while en
route to Afghanistan could be useful.

-- Other members of the Kyrgyz elite, who make decisions and
influence public opinion, also need to understand that the
base is in their interest. We recommend identifying key
individuals (e.g., the President's National Security Council,
senior parliamentary leaders) and have their Afghan
counterparts invite them to tour Afghanistan with Kyrgyz
media in tow. The point will quickly be made that the
situation in Afghanistan is complex, but that in contrast the
Kyrgyz security situation is vastly improved since 2001 when
the Taliban provided safe haven and a launching pad for
terrorists and extremists into Central Asia. If the
Coalition is unsuccessful in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, whose
borders are less than 100 miles away at their closest point,
will be one of the first to suffer.

-- The U.S. provides briefings on the situation in
Afghanistan to those who cannot or would not travel there,
such as President Bakiyev. To help generate public support
for the base, we could even consider a briefing for
parliamentary leaders and the Kyrgyz press.

-- The U.S. provides briefings to key neighbors who also have
an interest in seeing a stable Afghanistan, but have played
an unconstructive or neutral role on the base: Russia,
China, Kazakhstan.

-- The U.S. encourages President Karzai to establish a
relationship with President Bakiyev, so that Bakiyev hears
first hand from his Central Asian neighbor that the Base is
necessary.

-- Embassy Bishkek and Manas AFB continue base
familiarization trips for Kyrgyz decision-makers and media.


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-- Embassy Bishkek and Manas AFB continue public outreach
with our messages; the most important message being that
Kyrgyzstan needs the base as much as the base needs
Kyrgyzstan.

-- Embassy Bishkek and Manas AFB continue to engage Kyrgyz
decisionmakers who are influential on base issues on a
regular basis, and in response to inflammatory public
statements made by government officials, to reiterate the
positive security, economic and political benefits of the
base and to refute disinformation about the base.

-- The U.S. be more forthcoming publicly about the
compensation package for the Base. The public perception
that we are paying off the Bakiyev family continues to harm
us.
LITZENBERGER