KYRGYZSTAN: NEXT STEPS ON MANAS AIR BASE ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001201

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA A/S BOUCHER FROM AMBASSADOR YOVANOVITCH
OSD FOR DASD SHIVERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN: NEXT STEPS ON MANAS AIR BASE ISSUES

REF: A. SECDEF 121443Z JUN 07

B. BISHKEK 816

C. SECSTATE 109577

D. IIR 6 955 2146 07

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Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY. The Kyrgyz have repeatedly requested a
U.S. response to their June diplomatic note, which requested
changes to the protocol covering payment for access to the
base, as well as information on the disposition of the case
regarding the December 2006 shooting incident. We
understand an OSD team is planning to travel in mid to late
October, and recommend that the team come as early as
possible. Ambassador also recommends that the USG provide
information regarding the investigation and disposition of
the case as soon as it is available, as well as the
recently-completed CENTAF report on environmental issues and
the base. END SUMMARY.

THE ROAD TO OCTOBER
--------------


2. (C) In June 2007, President Bakiyev told Secretary Gates
that the Kyrgyz side has concerns regarding the base, and
Secretary Gates responded that the U.S. side was prepared to

SIPDIS
discuss any concerns that were presented (Ref A). Shortly
thereafter, the Kyrgyz MFA gave the Ambassador a
long-expected diplomatic note requesting changes to the July
2006 Protocol of Intentions as well as additional
compensation for the presence of the base (ref B). In July,
an inter-agency group (including NSC, State, JCS, OSD, and
CENTAF) met and agreed that a Washington team should travel
to Bishkek to respond to the Kyrgyz diplomatic note. The
group also agreed to formally refuse the Kyrgyz FCA request
regarding the September 2006 collision and deliver the
investigation report and information regarding the
disposition of the December 2006 shooting incident to the
Kyrgyz following the Shanghai Cooperation Summit in mid to
late August. In August, on Washington's instructions, the
Embassy provided a diplomatic note officially informing the
Kyrgyz that a team would come in the early part of September
(ref C). In a meeting on August 14, the Ambassador informed
President Bakiyev of the same.

KYRGYZ TURNING UP THE VOLUME
--------------


3. (C) Since then, the Kyrgyz have repeatedly asked when
the Washington team would come to Bishkek. On September 17,
National Security Council Secretary Mamytov told the
Ambassador that the President was focused on this issue and
that "there is still time to resolve the issues." On
September 21, Deputy Defense Minister Oruzbayev called in the
DATT to express disappointment that the U.S. had not yet
reacted to the June diplomatic note (ref D). On September
23, Minister of Foreign Affairs Karabayev raised the June
diplomatic note with the Ambassador and noted that he would
raise this issue during his Washington consultations at the
end of the week. Karabayev said he would also raise the need
to provide information on the shooting incident, so that the
matter could be closed. He also noted the importance of
resolving outstanding environmental issues.


4. (C) On September 25, the President's Foreign Policy
Advisor, Islan Ryskulov, called in the Ambassador to inform
that the President had requested a formal report on progress
regarding U.S. responses to the September 2006 collision, the

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December 2006 shooting incident, and the June diplomatic
note; the Ambassador informed Ryskulov that the U.S. had
formally denied the FCA claim for $5 million, but was
prepared to offer a grace payment of $260,500. Despite
numerous discussions with Ryskulov on the shooting incident
and our comments that even in Kyrgyzstan deadly force can be
employed if a law enforcement officer is threatened, it is
clear that Ryskulov, no doubt reflecting President Bakiyev's
views, expects that the airman will be punished in some form
for killing a Kyrgyz national.


5. (C) We had hoped that the tumultuous domestic political
developments in Kyrgyzstan (a surprise referendum on October
21 on yet another constitutional draft and widely expected
dissolution of parliament and early elections) would have
distracted the Kyrgyz from focusing on the base. To a
certain extent this is true, as parliamentarians are all
thinking about their own survival and how to prepare for the
anticipated elections. We do not think deputies will hold
hearings on the base as originally planned, and even
Communist Party chief Masaliyev, one of the most vocal
opponents of the base, told us that "for now" the base is not
on his agenda. Once elections are called, however, press
attention could once again focus on the base, particularly if
some parties decide to run against the base. The election
campaign appears likely to coincide with the one year
anniversary of the December 6 shooting incident and the
parliament's December 15 non-binding resolution calling on
the government to take a number of actions, including
considering closing the base.


6. (C) We understand an OSD team is considering coming out
to Bishkek the week of October 8 or 15 to discuss the
base-related issues raised by the Kyrygz in their June
diplomatic note. We welcome this decision to engage with the
Kyrygyz, and fully understand that the team will not be in a
position to respond favorably to Kyrygz requests for
additional compensation. Face-to-face engagement is
extremely important here to demonstrate respect for Kyrygz
concerns, even if we cannot meet their expectations. A visit
will assist our allies in the Kyrgyz government in defending
the base against criticism that the U.S. does not care about
Kyrgyzstan and does not take Kyrgyz views into account.

EMBASSY RECOMMENDATION
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador strongly recommends taking the
following four steps as soon as possible:

-- Send the OSD team the week of October 8, vice October 15.
The team's trip does not have to be sequenced to the release
of information regarding the shooting incident (see below).
It does need to occur quickly, however, while public and
parliamentary (if not presidential) attention is firmly fixed
on domestic political issues. If the week of the 8th is not
possible, the week of the 15th is our next preference, in
order for the visit to occur before the proposed October 21
referendum on a new constitution.

-- Provide an abridged version of the investigation report of
the December 6 shooting incident to the Kyrgyz. OSI
representatives, the former Base Commander, and the
Ambassador have all repeatedly indicated to Kyrgyz
interlocutors that we would share the results of our
investigation. We believe that we should do so in as
detailed a manner as possible, as it will show that the U.S.
side thoroughly investigated the incident. We note that we
pushed very hard to get the Kyrgyz to release their entire,

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several hundred page report to us.

-- Provide information regarding the disposition of the case.
Until we provide the Kyrgyz with official information
regarding how we have concluded the case, we will be unable
to put the shooting incident behind us. Lack of resolution
on this issue steadily corrodes support for the base and
makes it difficult for our allies in the Kyrgyz government to
counter arguments that the U.S. does not take Kyrgyz concerns
seriously. We expect that as the December 6 anniversary of
the shooting incident approaches, President Bakiyev will feel
under some pressure to show the Kyrgyz people that he was
able to secure justice for the death of a Kyrgyz citizen -
especially since it is likely that there will be a
parliamentary campaign during this time. We recommend that
we provide information regarding the disposition of the case
as soon as it is available and well before December. We
understand that it is possible - even likely - that no
disciplinary action may be taken against the airman, and we
have foreshadowed this possibility with the Kyrgyz. As
disappointing as this may be to the Kyrgyz, not to convey the
final disposition of the case leaves us open to charges that
we never completed the investigation and review process, and
simply swept the issue under the rug. President Bakiyev can
be at times a volatile and unpredictable individual, and in
addition to domestic pressures, he faces constant and
high-level pressure from Russia to close the base. On
September 21, Presidential Chief of Staff Medet Sadyrkulov
recounted that he had just the previous day underscored to
CSTO Chief Bordyuzha that the Russians should not interfere
with the Coalition base. We note that in April 2006,when
Bakiyev appeared on national television to issue an ultimatum
regarding the base, none of his government advisors knew he
was going to do this. We do not expect Bakiyev to pull
another such stunt, but if he should do so, we would not get
any warning.

-- Provide the August 2007 CENTAF environmental baseline
study to the Kyrgyz. On August 10 the Kyrgyz submitted a
draft environmental MOU for consideration. This submission
coincided with the visit by a USCENTAF environmental team who
were conducting an environmental baseline study on Manas
Coalition Airbase. While the report has not been released,
those who have seen the report note that the reports shows a
stellar environmental record. The Kyrgyz MOU presupposes
that the base has been a detriment to the surrounding
environment. However, the Kyrgyz admit that the have no
scientific proof (only anecdotal evidence). Indeed, the
Minister of Agriculture recently stated to the press that the
Kyrgyz government did not believe the recent bad harvest in
the Chui District was linked to the base. Releasing the
report might put pressure on the Kyrgyz to abandon those
portions of the MOU which were designed to elicit
compensation and focus on areas of cooperation such as
conducting bi annual environmental inspections.


8. (C) At this point, we cannot predict with certainty
exactly when parliamentary elections may be held -- there are
conflicting rumors that the President could disband
parliament before the referendum, or that the referendum
might be delayed. Regardless of how this plays out, domestic
political issues will dominate the Krygyz agenda for the next
month, providing us a window of opportunity to begin to put
these unresolved base issues behind us. But the window will
close. Once the Kyrygz election season begins in earnest,
the base -- and any perceived lack of responsiveness to
Kyrgyz concerns about it -- could well emerge as a campaign
issue, to the detriment of our interests, image and influence
here.

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YOVANOVITCH