Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BISHKEK1137
2007-09-13 12:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZ INSIDERS PROMISE "BIG EVENTS" THIS FALL:

Tags:  PGOV PREL KG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6479
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHEK #1137/01 2561219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131219Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0152
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2264
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0701
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2667
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2048
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001137 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ INSIDERS PROMISE "BIG EVENTS" THIS FALL:
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM? PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS?


BISHKEK 00001137 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001137

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ INSIDERS PROMISE "BIG EVENTS" THIS FALL:
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM? PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS?


BISHKEK 00001137 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: After a relatively quiet summer, with
attention focused on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
summit in Bishkek and vacations at Lake Issyk Kul,
presidential insiders are predicting "big events" for the
fall. Constitutional reform, and the question whether to
adopt the amendments proposed by Prime Minister Atambayev's
committee in April, will be at the center of the debate. The
Constitutional Court appears poised to toss out the current
(December 2006) version of the constitution as having been
improperly adopted, returning to the 2003 constitution and
making the Atambayev amendments moot. Presidential insiders
have suggested that President Bakiyev will then propose his
own draft and hold a constitutional referendum, perhaps as
early as October. Under this scenario, the parliament very
likely would be dissolved, a new parliament elected according
to party lists, and a new government formed by the new
parliament. With the opposition relatively weak and divided,
and a successful SCO summit under their belts, President
Bakiyev and his advisors are clearly feeling confident and
think they can push through changes that will close the
debate on constitutional reform in a manner that favors
Presidential power. Just how this will unfold -- and what
reactions it will prompt -- is impossible to tell at this
point, and, as in the past, the political scenario may not
play out according to the administration's plan. End
summary.

Constitutional Reform, Again
--------------


2. (C) After a quiet summer politically, constitutional
reform and the debate over balance of power have returned to
the top of the agenda. In the past year, Kyrgyzstan has
adopted two new versions of the constitution (the "November"
and "December" 2006 constitutions),both of which were passed
by parliament and signed by the president, but were never
reviewed by the Constitutional Court (as required by the
constitution). In April 2007, as part of a political

compromise with the opposition, a committee headed by Prime
Minister Atambayev drafted amendments to the December
constitution that would shift some powers away from the
president and strengthen the role of the prime minister and
the independence of the courts. On April 10, the Atambayev
amendments were forwarded to the Constitutional Court; the
Constitutional Court has up to six months to review the draft
amendments (that is, by October 10). Separately, the
Constitutional Court has agreed to review a petition
challenging the legality of the adoption of the December
constitution.


3. (C) We have heard from administration insiders (and there
are now rumors in the press) that the Constitutional Court
will revoke both the current (December) constitution as well
as the November version because of procedural flaws in their
adoption, perhaps as soon as September 14. This would return
the country to the 2003 constitution, which gives greater
authority to the president, including the right to dissolve
the parliament. In addition, this would possibly make
consideration of the Atambayev amendments moot, as they are
amendments to the December version of the constitution.

Promises of "Big Events"
--------------


4. (C) In late August, Presidential Chief of Staff Medet
Sadyrkulov told the Ambassador that following the successful
SCO summit and the summer vacation season, there would be
"big events" in September. He said that President Bakiyev
was committed to constitutional reform, but there had been
serious flaws in the process of adopting the November and
December constitutions, as well as in drafting Atambayev's

BISHKEK 00001137 002.2 OF 003


amendments. Sadyrkulov said that under the current
constitution, the parliament had too much power over
government ministers, which hindered them in doing their
jobs. (Note: Under the current constitution, both the
president and the parliament can act to dismiss individual
ministers.) Sadyrkulov was confident that a new parliament,
elected by party lists, would be a substantial improvement
over the current body. Asked directly, he said it was "very
possible" that parliament would be dissolved, but "not now."


5. (C) During a conversation with the Ambassador on September
11, Presidential foreign policy advisor Islan Ryskulov
floated the idea of holding a constitutional referendum on a
new draft, perhaps in December. On September 12, political
analyst Valentin Bogatyrov (who remains close to the
presidential administration) outlined a scenario in which the
Constitutional Court would toss out the November and December
versions and the Atambayev amendments on procedural grounds,
thereby returning the country to the 2003 constitution.
Bogatyrov told us that President Bakiyev, in his scheduled
September 19 address to the country, was ready to introduce
his own version and announce a constitutional referendum,
perhaps set as early as October. He said that Bakiyev's
version would provide for the election of parliament entirely
by party list, and he thought elections might be as early as
December. (Comment: Last week, Bakiyev's former press
secretary, Klara Kabilova, was named acting chair of the

SIPDIS
Central Election Commission, and she is thought to enjoy the
president's trust. End Comment.)

Atambayev's Future: Out Either Way?
--------------


6. (C) When he put forward his committee's draft amendments
in April, Atambayev said he would resign if constitutional
reform was stymied and the amendments not adopted. According
to the transitional provisions included in his amendments,
the government (including the prime minister) would have to
resign as soon as the amendments are adopted, with the new
prime minister chosen by secret ballot in parliament. On
September 14, however, Atambayev seemed to acknowledge that
his amendments might not be adopted. He told the press that
"even if we go back to the 2003 constitution, it won't be for
long; the president favors reforms." Atambayev told the
Ambassador August 22 that he needed to stay on as prime
minister to help stabilize the country. However, rumors are
rife that he won't last long, and there is no shortage of
potential successors. We've heard a number of individuals
are being considered, including Sadyrkulov, Minister of
Transportation Sulaimanov, Deputy Speaker Isabekov, and
Minister of Energy Chudinov.

Analysts See Court Bowing to Politics
--------------


7. (C) During a roundtable discussion at the Embassy on
September 13, leading constitutional analysts agreed that the
Constitutional Court would make its decision based more on
political realities and personal interests, rather than on
legal principles. They felt that the Atambayev amendments,
if adopted, would mark a modest improvement over the December
constitution (itself an improvement over the November
constitution),at least as far as the balance of power within
the government. However, they faulted the current
constitution and Atambayev's proposed amendments for keeping
a "double-headed and double-bodied" executive branch, with
the president and his administration on one side, and the
prime minister and his cabinet on the other.

Comment: Many a slip . . .
--------------


8. (C) With the opposition relatively weak and divided, and

BISHKEK 00001137 003.2 OF 003


following the successful SCO summit, President Bakiyev and
his administration are feeling confident. They appear to
believe that they can push through constitutional changes via
referendum that will end the two-year-long debate over
"constitutional reform." In the past, however, the
administration has overplayed its hand when operating from a
position of strength. If the administration pushes too hard
to consolidate presidential authority, it is likely to
alienate Prime Minister Atambayev, galvanize the opposition,
and even activate the "swamp in the middle" -- those
parliamentary deputies that are only looking out for their
own self interest. Deputy Speaker Alymbekov told us on
September 4 that demonstrations and unrest are likely "if
Bakiyev wants to repeat the Kazakh example." We think
Alymbekov overstates the chances of unrest, but if you add in
a wild card such as rising bread and food prices, the chances
increase. While it is not clear how the elites will play out
their political scenarios, the autumn is shaping up to be a
politically active season.
YOVANOVITCH