Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERN113
2007-02-05 17:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bern
Cable title:
SWISS DFA STATE SECRETARY AMBUEHL HEARS NOTHING \
how-toVZCZCXRO8313 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHSW #0113/01 0361715 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 051715Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY BERN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3651 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0117 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2664
2007-02-05 17:15:00 07BERN113 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN113|07BERN98 VZCZCXRO8313\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0113/01 0361715\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 051715Z FEB 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3651\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0117\
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2664 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000113 \
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SIPDIS \
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SIPDIS \
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STATE FOR P, EUR, ISN \
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 \
TAGS: PARM PTER KNNP SZ IR
SUBJECT: SWISS DFA STATE SECRETARY AMBUEHL HEARS NOTHING \
NEW IN TEHRAN \
\
REF: BERN 98 \
\
Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
\
2007-02-05 17:15:00 07BERN113 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN113|07BERN98 VZCZCXRO8313\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0113/01 0361715\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 051715Z FEB 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3651\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0117\
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2664 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000113 \
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SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
STATE FOR P, EUR, ISN \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 \
TAGS: PARM PTER KNNP SZ IR
SUBJECT: SWISS DFA STATE SECRETARY AMBUEHL HEARS NOTHING \
NEW IN TEHRAN \
\
REF: BERN 98 \
\
Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
\
1.(C) Summary: Tehran offered no new ideas to visiting Swiss \
State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael Ambuehl during his \
hastily arranged trip over the weekend. According to Swiss \
Iran specialist Guillaume Scheurer, Ambuehl had traveled to \
Iran hoping to hear the regime's ideas on how to climb down \
from the current confrontation. Instead, Iranian Deputy \
Foreign Minister Sa'id Jalili and Supreme Council National \
Security director Ali Larijani presented a defiant posture \
towards the United States, the UN Security Council, and \
unnamed regional neighbors. Scheurer thought Jalili and \
Larijani might be using the meeting to send a message to the \
United States, namely that the USG should offer a concession \
in compensation for its victory on the UN Security Council. \
Ambuehl advised the Iranians that they should avoid \
inflammatory rhetoric during the February 11 celebrations, in \
order not to escalate the current crisis. End summary. \
\
-------------- \
Hopes Unmet \
-------------- \
\
2.(C) DFA Iran watcher Guillaume Scheurer invited DCM and \
Poloff to a briefing on Michael Ambuehl's February 3 visit to \
Tehran, as part of Ambuehl's efforts to keep the Embassy \
informed of Swiss activities. According to Scheurer, he and \
DFA nuclear disarmament official Jean-Daniel Praz accompanied \
Ambuehl. While Ambuehl and Jalili had made plans to \
follow-up on their December 2006 meeting, Scheurer described \
Jalili's invitation as rather sudden, since it was extended \
only a week prior. The invitation raised Swiss hopes that \
Iran might have something new to say about the nuclear or \
other issue, but the Swiss were disappointed. Ambuehl met \
with Jalili alone and jointly with Jalili, Larijani, and \
Sayaad Monfared. DCM welcomed Scheurer's assurances that \
neither the Swiss nor the Iranians raised the issue of Swiss \
mediation between Iran and the United States. \
\
-------------- \
Isolated and Defiant \
-------------- \
\
3.(C) Scheurer said that Ambuehl offered his assessment that \
all countries were concerned about Iran's nuclear program. \
Those less concerned about a nuclear Iran were nonetheless \
worried about the crisis escalating. Iran is isolated, \
Ambuehl stressed, and needs to find a solution. Scheurer \
said that he was surprised that neither Jalili nor Larijani \
seriously contested Ambuehl's assessment. Larijani cited the \
fall 2006 NAM Summit support for Iran's right to a civil \
nuclear program, but otherwise did not push back. \
\
4.(C) Rather, Larijani complained that the "U.S. blocked \
everything with a stupid pre-condition." Larijani cited a \
Persian proverb to argue that Washington was not serious \
about negotiations: "One can wake up one who is sleeping, but \
not one who is pretending to sleep." Both Larijani and \
Jalili expressed bitterness over the passage of the UN \
Security Council resolution. They countered (somewhat \
curiously) that, since the United States had one that round, \
it should offer Iran a concession, "so that the score would \
be one-to-one." The one proposal they offered was a return \
to the "Berlin Process." \
\
5.(C) On a roll, the Iranian officials reviewed \
post-revolution history, portraying their country as faced \
with international pressure and threats from the beginning. \
"If these threats did not work 27 years ago, they will not \
work now." The Iranian people would reply with "one voice" \
to further UN sanctions. With a note of bravado, Larijani \
said that Iran was prepared for all scenarios, even military. \
"The U.S. would make a tragic mistake with bitter \
consequences," he said. Reminded by Ambuehl of the ill \
consequences facing Iran in this scenario, Larijani replied \
that Iran was also prepared for a "lose-lose situation." \
Ambuehl warned the Iranians not to exacerbate the tension by \
indulging in counterproductive rhetoric during the upcoming \
February 11 anniversary of the revolution celebrations. \
\
-------------- \
Touching on the Regional Angle \
-------------- \
\
6.(C) Jalili offered little substantive response to Ambuehl's \
briefing of his recent trip to Lebanon and Syria (reftel). \
\
BERN 00000113 002 OF 002 \
\
\
Jalili welcomed Ambuehl's engagement with Syria and described \
Iranian hopes for an all-party Lebanese agreement, whereby \
the opposition (including Hizballah) would be allotted 11 of \
the 30 cabinet seats. He also alluded to Saudi-Iranian \
brokered discussions on a Fatah-Hamas stand down. On Iraq, \
Jalili merely charged that "some regional countries" were \
giving bad advice, leading the USG to believe Iran was \
supporting terrorism, when in fact it was those very \
countries who were doing so. \
\
-------------- \
Unresponsive on Swiss Protecting Power \
-------------- \
\
7.(C) According to Scheurer, Ambuehl also used the occasion \
of the meeting to reiterate concerns about the security of \
the Swiss Embassy and SPP offices in Tehran. Jalili turned \
the Swiss concerns around, charging that Iranian Embassy \
employees in Bern were also concerned about the presence of \
Mujahedin e-Khalq members in Switzerland. \
\
-------------- \
Comment \
-------------- \
\
8.(C) Perhaps the most notable aspect of Ambuehl's \
discussions in Tehran was the sense he and his Swiss \
colleagues felt that the Iranians were actually hoping to \
address the United States by proxy, given Switzerland's \
status as protecting power. If this was the case, there was \
little in the way of constructive proposals. While we \
welcome Scheurer's assurances that neither side brought up \
the notion of Swiss mediation, Ambuehl is determined to be \
helpful and will certainly look for opportunities to do so. \
That said, we have no doubt that Ambuehl understands the \
USG's views on such "helpfulness." \
CONEWAY \
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0113/01 0361715\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 051715Z FEB 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3651\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0117\
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2664 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000113 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
STATE FOR P, EUR, ISN \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 \
TAGS: PARM PTER KNNP SZ IR
SUBJECT: SWISS DFA STATE SECRETARY AMBUEHL HEARS NOTHING \
NEW IN TEHRAN \
\
REF: BERN 98 \
\
Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
\
1.(C) Summary: Tehran offered no new ideas to visiting Swiss \
State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael Ambuehl during his \
hastily arranged trip over the weekend. According to Swiss \
Iran specialist Guillaume Scheurer, Ambuehl had traveled to \
Iran hoping to hear the regime's ideas on how to climb down \
from the current confrontation. Instead, Iranian Deputy \
Foreign Minister Sa'id Jalili and Supreme Council National \
Security director Ali Larijani presented a defiant posture \
towards the United States, the UN Security Council, and \
unnamed regional neighbors. Scheurer thought Jalili and \
Larijani might be using the meeting to send a message to the \
United States, namely that the USG should offer a concession \
in compensation for its victory on the UN Security Council. \
Ambuehl advised the Iranians that they should avoid \
inflammatory rhetoric during the February 11 celebrations, in \
order not to escalate the current crisis. End summary. \
\
-------------- \
Hopes Unmet \
-------------- \
\
2.(C) DFA Iran watcher Guillaume Scheurer invited DCM and \
Poloff to a briefing on Michael Ambuehl's February 3 visit to \
Tehran, as part of Ambuehl's efforts to keep the Embassy \
informed of Swiss activities. According to Scheurer, he and \
DFA nuclear disarmament official Jean-Daniel Praz accompanied \
Ambuehl. While Ambuehl and Jalili had made plans to \
follow-up on their December 2006 meeting, Scheurer described \
Jalili's invitation as rather sudden, since it was extended \
only a week prior. The invitation raised Swiss hopes that \
Iran might have something new to say about the nuclear or \
other issue, but the Swiss were disappointed. Ambuehl met \
with Jalili alone and jointly with Jalili, Larijani, and \
Sayaad Monfared. DCM welcomed Scheurer's assurances that \
neither the Swiss nor the Iranians raised the issue of Swiss \
mediation between Iran and the United States. \
\
-------------- \
Isolated and Defiant \
-------------- \
\
3.(C) Scheurer said that Ambuehl offered his assessment that \
all countries were concerned about Iran's nuclear program. \
Those less concerned about a nuclear Iran were nonetheless \
worried about the crisis escalating. Iran is isolated, \
Ambuehl stressed, and needs to find a solution. Scheurer \
said that he was surprised that neither Jalili nor Larijani \
seriously contested Ambuehl's assessment. Larijani cited the \
fall 2006 NAM Summit support for Iran's right to a civil \
nuclear program, but otherwise did not push back. \
\
4.(C) Rather, Larijani complained that the "U.S. blocked \
everything with a stupid pre-condition." Larijani cited a \
Persian proverb to argue that Washington was not serious \
about negotiations: "One can wake up one who is sleeping, but \
not one who is pretending to sleep." Both Larijani and \
Jalili expressed bitterness over the passage of the UN \
Security Council resolution. They countered (somewhat \
curiously) that, since the United States had one that round, \
it should offer Iran a concession, "so that the score would \
be one-to-one." The one proposal they offered was a return \
to the "Berlin Process." \
\
5.(C) On a roll, the Iranian officials reviewed \
post-revolution history, portraying their country as faced \
with international pressure and threats from the beginning. \
"If these threats did not work 27 years ago, they will not \
work now." The Iranian people would reply with "one voice" \
to further UN sanctions. With a note of bravado, Larijani \
said that Iran was prepared for all scenarios, even military. \
"The U.S. would make a tragic mistake with bitter \
consequences," he said. Reminded by Ambuehl of the ill \
consequences facing Iran in this scenario, Larijani replied \
that Iran was also prepared for a "lose-lose situation." \
Ambuehl warned the Iranians not to exacerbate the tension by \
indulging in counterproductive rhetoric during the upcoming \
February 11 anniversary of the revolution celebrations. \
\
-------------- \
Touching on the Regional Angle \
-------------- \
\
6.(C) Jalili offered little substantive response to Ambuehl's \
briefing of his recent trip to Lebanon and Syria (reftel). \
\
BERN 00000113 002 OF 002 \
\
\
Jalili welcomed Ambuehl's engagement with Syria and described \
Iranian hopes for an all-party Lebanese agreement, whereby \
the opposition (including Hizballah) would be allotted 11 of \
the 30 cabinet seats. He also alluded to Saudi-Iranian \
brokered discussions on a Fatah-Hamas stand down. On Iraq, \
Jalili merely charged that "some regional countries" were \
giving bad advice, leading the USG to believe Iran was \
supporting terrorism, when in fact it was those very \
countries who were doing so. \
\
-------------- \
Unresponsive on Swiss Protecting Power \
-------------- \
\
7.(C) According to Scheurer, Ambuehl also used the occasion \
of the meeting to reiterate concerns about the security of \
the Swiss Embassy and SPP offices in Tehran. Jalili turned \
the Swiss concerns around, charging that Iranian Embassy \
employees in Bern were also concerned about the presence of \
Mujahedin e-Khalq members in Switzerland. \
\
-------------- \
Comment \
-------------- \
\
8.(C) Perhaps the most notable aspect of Ambuehl's \
discussions in Tehran was the sense he and his Swiss \
colleagues felt that the Iranians were actually hoping to \
address the United States by proxy, given Switzerland's \
status as protecting power. If this was the case, there was \
little in the way of constructive proposals. While we \
welcome Scheurer's assurances that neither side brought up \
the notion of Swiss mediation, Ambuehl is determined to be \
helpful and will certainly look for opportunities to do so. \
That said, we have no doubt that Ambuehl understands the \
USG's views on such "helpfulness." \
CONEWAY \