APRIL 18 MEETINGS PROVIDE VALUABLE CLARIFICATION

S E C R E T BERLIN 000813

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGE CLASSIFICATION)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS NATO PREL GM RS
SUBJECT: APRIL 18 MEETINGS PROVIDE VALUABLE CLARIFICATION
ON MD ISSUES

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR JOHN BAUMAN. REASONS:
1.4 (B) AND (D).



1. (C) Summary: A delegation from the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (USD/P) visited Berlin April 18 to respond to a long
list of detailed questions from German technical experts and
analysts regarding U.S. MD plans in Europe. The delegation
also met with a handful of parliamentary staffers
representing both parties in the governing coalition to clear
up any lingering misconceptions about the MD system and U.S.
intentions. Coming on the heels of recent consultations with
MDA Director Lt. Gen. Obering and USD/P Edelman, this visit
was extremely helpful in giving German working-level
officials and experts a thorough understanding of how the
European-based MD system will work and why it is key to
maintaining the long-standing transatlantic defense link. In
particular, the delegation provided very useful
clarifications on politically charged issues like debris,
noting that missiles aimed at the U.S. would be destroyed
over the Atlantic Ocean and that the resulting debris would
not fall on Europe.
Debris would only be an issue for missiles fired at Europe
itself. The Germans greatly appreciated having these
detailed consultations before the April 19 reinforced North
Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings. While we continue to make
headway in bringing elites around to our point of view on MD,
we still have our work cut out for us with the German public
at large: in a poll published earlier this week, only 17
percent of those surveyed thought it "made sense" to put
Germany and a portion of Europe under the protection of an
American MD umbrella. More than 70 percent thought it did
not. End Summary.

MEETINGS
--------------


2. (C) MDA Deputy for Engineering Keith Englander conducted a
2-1/2 hour briefing and Q&A session on U.S. MD plans in
Europe for the benefit of some 20 experts from the German
MOD, Intelligence Service (BND),MFA and Chancellery in
Berlin on April 18. Accompanying Englander were MDA Deputy
for International Affairs Nancy Morgan and Roger Davison,
Principal Director of Resources and Plans in the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The delegation
also met separately for more than an hour with a handful of
parliamentary staffers from the two governing parties
(Christian Democrat Union and Social Democratic Party) who
work for Bundestag members on the defense or foreign affairs
committees.

MD COVERAGE AREA
--------------


3. (C) Englander organized his briefing at the MOD around a
long list of technical questions about the capabilities of
the U.S. MD system that had been submitted in advanced by the
Germans. Englander addressed doubts about the promised
coverage of the MD system in Europe (a preliminary BND
analysis reportedly concluded that only Iceland and Greenland
would be actually covered) by noting that, contrary to common
belief, the MD interceptor does not have to hit an incoming
missile at exactly a 90-degree angle in order to destroy it.
The angle of the strike can be significantly less than that
and still achieve the desired result. On the margins of the
meeting, a BND analyst said this was critical in
understanding, for example, how a ground-based interceptor
from Poland could interdict a missile fired from Iran against
Madrid. Englander also reassured the group that the planned
MD system would be capable of protecting everything against
long-range threats within its coverage area-- this was not a
point defense system in which, for example, only major cities
would be covered.

OPTIMAL LOCATION OF INTERCEPTORS AND RADAR
--------------


4. (C) The German MD representative at NATO, BG Ganser, noted
that the NATO MD Feasibility Study had recommended placing
interceptors in Romania and the associated radars/sensors in
Bulgaria to maximize coverage of the European area. He
wondered why the U.S. had not followed this recommendation.
Englander responded that the European-based MD system had the
dual function of providing redundant protection to the U.S.
homeland (in addition to that already provided from MD assets
based in Alaska and California) as well as extending MD
coverage to U.S. forward deployed forces friends and allies
in Europe. Based on those criteria, the optimal location for
the MD system was Poland and the Czech Republic. Englander
conceded that some of the southern
NATO Allies (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey) would remain
uncovered by the U.S. MD system, but he explained in detail
various options for covering these gaps with existing medium
and short-range missile defense systems (i.e., THAAD, MEADS,
Aegis, Patriot, etc.). He emphasized that the U.S. is
committed to making the U.S. MD system and whatever national
and/or NATO systems are s
ubsequently deployed completely
compatible and interoperable with one another.

RELIABILITY AND TESTING
--------------


5. (S) In addressing questions regarding reliability,
Englander noted that while each individual interceptor had
about an 80-percent chance of successfully engaging an
incoming missile, the U.S. system would routinely take "two
shots," thereby increasing the overall rate of success to 95
percent. Englander reviewed in detail the battery of tests
conducted on the system and while conceding a handful of
failures, he pointed out that none was related to the design
of the system. All were due to human error or to the
malfunction of an ancillary component (like a retraction arm
that failed to move upon launch of the interceptor). He also
demonstrated that the tests had been conducted under
realistic conditions, noting, for example, that in one, the
interceptor had been able to differentiate among three
different objects and to hit the right one.

MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT DEBRIS
--------------


6. (C) Falling debris and a possible electro-magnetic pulse
(EMP) from successful interception of missiles were raised as
key concerns and as a justification for having a discussion
at NATO on rules of engagement, but these were based on the
misperception that missiles fired at the United States from
Iran would be intercepted over European territory, thereby
subjecting Europe to the resulting fall-out. Englander noted
that, in fact, missiles aimed at the U.S. would be shot down
over the Atlantic Ocean and that none of resulting debris
would fall in Europe. Instead, relatively small amount of
debris --
approximately eight inches in length -- would continue to
travel forward a significant way due to inertial forces and
eventually fall about 150 km short of the intended target of
the missile. This means that debris would only be an issue
for missiles fired at Europe itself or failed missiles
intended for the U.S. None of the German interlocutors
argued with the point that falling debris was hardly an issue
if the alternative was getting hit by a possible nuclear
missile.

POLICY CASE FOR MD
--------------


7. (C) Richard Davison of USD/P outlined the policy case for
deployment of the U.S. MD system, arguing that the main
purpose was to ensure that the security of the United States
and Europe remain coupled. If the U.S. and Europe continued
to have different levels of MD protection, it could be
exploited by an adversary bent on dividing the Alliance.
Davison countered the concern about MD stimulating an arms
race by pointing out that Iran and others have been
developing a ballistic missile capability precisely because
there have been no defenses against it. Deploying MD will
raise the cost of pursuing this capability and should deter
them from continuing to do. If deterrence fails, deployment
of the MD system will offer a defensive option for dealing
with the threat. Davison said the United States was
determined not to let itself become "blackmailed" from
fulfilling its security obligations by a rogue state with
ballistic missiles holding a U.S. city hostage.

LITTLE TALK ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANGLE
--------------


8. (S) Surprisingly, Russia was hardly mentioned in either
session, apparently because most German interlocutors seemed
to agree that the Russians were not genuinely concerned about
the effect of the MD system on their strategic deterrent or
that the MD sites could be used in nefarious way. Instead,
Russian opposition was based on geo-political concerns about

MOD CONCLUSION
--------------

9. (C) At the conclusion of the session at MOD, the deputy
director for political military affairs and arms control,
Col. Wiermann, noted that while the German government has
"not yet made up its mind yet" on whether to support U.S. MD
plans, "we'll probably get it anyway." He argued that
Germany should accept the inevitable and welcome the "free
defense" without quibbling over the probabilities of a
successful intercept by the MD system. "We can't complain."
Some defense is better than nothing. Wiermann said the only
question is whether NATO will decide to take on MD itself, or
just leave it to individual nations. If NATO decides to
pursue MD, he thought the key issue will be how to ensure
connectivity and data exchange with the U.S. system. Even if
NATO as a body decides not to pursue MD, NATO will be the
appropriate forum for discussing how to mitigate or handle
some of the possible negative side effects, such as debris.
Wiermann made clear that the MOD sees NATO as playing a
critical role in providing political cover as the MD project
moves forward.


10. (U) This message was cleared with the MDA.
TIMKEN JR