Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERLIN796
2007-04-19 15:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS NEW MUSLIM COORDINATING

Tags:  SOCI KISL GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0664
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0796/01 1091509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191509Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7981
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000796 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2022
TAGS: SOCI KISL GM
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS NEW MUSLIM COORDINATING
COUNCIL

REF: DUSSELDORF 10

Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000796

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2022
TAGS: SOCI KISL GM
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS NEW MUSLIM COORDINATING
COUNCIL

REF: DUSSELDORF 10

Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (U) Summary. Reftel reported the planned establishment of
a Muslim Coordination Council (KRM) by Germany's four largest
Muslim religious organizations. The Council would serve as
an umbrella organization representing German Muslims
belonging to or otherwise associated with the four
organizations. It would liaise with the German federal,
state and possibly local governments on religious issues.
The organizations announced the formation of the new Council
on April 10, unexpectedly quickly. Since then, positive and
negative commentary has issued from the political left and
right, from the media, from Christian authorities, and from
segments of the Muslim community. In fact, the new Council
has yet to complete many formalities needed for its own
establishment and faces several years at least of additional
legal steps before it can claim equal legal status to
officially established Christian or Jewish groups. Whether
the new group can hold together under the strains
accompanying its birth will be the first test of its
viability. End Summary.

Not Ready for Prime Time
--------------


2. (U) As reftel reported, even though the four organizations
reached agreement on the basic rules of the new KRM, they
have yet to develop the organization's full charter. This is
necessary before the KRM can be registered as an association
in German law. After that, the KRM would have to apply for
status as a "corporation in public law," which would grant it
certain rights, such as offering religious education (now
offered as a privilege, not a right) or establishing military
and hospital chaplaincies. The conditions for granting such
status would take the new organization several years to
fulfill, and some KRM-affiliated persons have created a
backlash by arguing that "Corporation" status should be
granted very quickly.


3. (C) Mounir Azzaoui, the former spokesman for the Central
Council of Muslims (one of the four constituent
organizations) told us that he thought the April 10
announcement was a mistake The organization itself does not
know enough about its future plans and structure to respond

to the many questions it now faces. He attributed the
premature announcement partly to pressure from within the
organization and from outside it (the German government has
long hinted that it would like to see the establishment of a
single Muslim religious partner). In addition, he criticized
the lack of professionalism and personnel in the KRM and its
parts. At a forum on Muslim organizations in Europe, the new
spokesman of the KRM, Ayyub Axel Koehler, did not respond to
questions about plans for the charter, but did say that the
KRM was established "with the intention of establishing an
independent religious community which would then be able to
enter into agreements with Germany's states." On the margins
of a recption April 19, Koehler told us he had not expected
the level of interest and comment that followed the April 10
announcement. (Note: Relations with religious communities
are a state responsibility in Germany.) The announcement was
also not coordinated with the German federal or state
governments, who have reacted positively, but cautiously.

Questioning the KRM's Legitimacy
--------------


4. (U) The focus of comment, largely critical, from the
majority ethnic German community has been the KRM's lack of
representativeness and its religious character. Critics
question the KRM's legitimacy because the four organizations
together represent only an estimated 60-80 percent of mosque
communities, and only 15-30 percent of persons with a Muslim
heritage are registered members of those communities. KRM
responds with three points. First, it is wrong to consider
all persons with a Muslim background as Muslims for religious
purposes (indeed, some studies have shown that as many as 50
percent of persons from Muslim countries are non-practicing
or consider themselves as secular or cultural Muslims. Such
persons have no reason for joining a religious organization
and could not be represented by it. Second, Muslim religious
practice does not involve any formal process of affiliation
with a mosque/religious community and it will take some time
for Muslims to absorb this religious/legal aspect of German
practice. Third, as the new Ditib Chairman told CG
Dusseldorf on April 18, since neither Christian or Jewish
umbrella religious organizations can be said to represent all
who call themselves Christian or Jewish or the breadth of
religious views within them, Germans cannot expect the Muslim
organization to meet a higher standard. However compelling

BERLIN 00000796 002 OF 003


these arguments may be, we also expect figures from the
majority community to continue trying to make the KRM more
"representative" out of concern that the organization is too
conservative or out of a desire that it take on a greater
role in the social integration of all persons of Muslim
heritage.


5. (U) The criticism of the KRM and its constituent parts as
"not religious" is more difficult to understand. Some may
derive from a misunderstanding of Islam and an expectation
that, like the Christian churches, it should have a
(hierarchical) structure of religious leadership. Others
appear to believe that the KRM is a sort of lobby or pressure
group for Muslims, but that it does not (or in the future
will not) structure Muslim religious life. Still others have
said that because the KRM is composed of organizations,
rather than natural persons, it would not fit the German
legal definition of a religious organization. These
arguments, however, seem to lack a solid legal foundation.
In several cases, German courts have ruled that the
organizations or their affiliates involved in the KRM are
religious organizations.

Real Issues
--------------


6. (C) #1 Turkey: Ethnic Turks make up about three quarters
of Germany's Muslim population. Ditib, by far the largest
Muslim religious organization, is an affiliate of the Turkish
Ministry for Religious Affairs. Because of its size, it will
enjoy veto power over Council decisions, which Arslan
confirmed to CG Dusseldorf at their meeting. Two of the
other three organizations, the Islamic Council and the
Association of Islamic Cultural Centers, are also primarily
Turkish. Ditib presents a potential legal problem, according
to the Azzaoui, who said that Interior Ministry sources have
told him that as a foreign-affiliated organization, Ditib's
right to participate in a German religious organization is
questionable. The greater problem, described to us by
Berlin's Commissioner for Integration, Guenter Piening, is
the potential that the KRM could, because of Ditib's
influence and because two of the other three member
organizations are largely Turkish, could end up pursuing a
Turkish nationalist agenda, rather than the integrative
development of a German Islamic identity sought by the German
government and very many Muslims. We believe this is a
serious concern: While Ditib has relaxed somewhat its
anti-integration stance, it continues to be tightly tied to
Ankara. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's April 16 comments
in Hanover, regarding education for ethnic Turks in Germany,
"first teach Turkish and then see about German," are telling.


7. (C) #2 Professionalism and Openness: We see these as
linked. It is not surprising that Muslim religious
organizations would be religiously and socially conservative.
What is surprising is the extent to which their leaderships
and staff are culturally isolated and consequently
ineffective in dialogue with the larger German society. At
its most extreme, this can lead to advocacy of parallel
societies for Muslims and other Germans. In most KRM
organizations, support for separate social lives for boys and
girls is still favored. Except for the Central Council of
Muslims, all the other organizations are led by first
generation immigrants and operate their organizations in a
traditional and non-transparent way. Ditib is actually
headed by an Ankara-designated official of the Religious
Affairs Ministry, elected (i.e., confirmed) in a managed vote
by Ditib's constituent communities. He carries the title of
"Counselor of Embassy for Religious Affairs." Significantly,
Ditib asked if we could give the Turkish Embassy a seat in
Secretary Rice's February roundtable with German Muslim

SIPDIS
leaders. We declined, and the Ditib representative confined
himself to reading verbatim a lengthy statement, presumably
cleared by Ankara.


8. (C) #9 Rising Expectations: The establishment of the KRM
has boosted expectations among the Muslim community, as seen
by calls for early "corporation" status for the group.
Managing these expectations will be a major task and if not
handled carefully, could undermine the Council's own
legitimacy and viability as well as push some younger Muslims
to reject the legal, constitutionalist approach of the
conservative but moderate and decidedly non-violent
mainstream.
Comment
--------------


9. (C) The establishment of the KRM is an important and
positive step forward, but, because of the way it was
launched, much German skepticism/opposition, and internal
problems, its success is not assured. The KRM will need

BERLIN 00000796 003 OF 003


considerable support from the German government (primarily
the Interior Ministry) and from established Muslim
organizations in Europe and (we hope) the United States to
overcome these. We are particularly concerned about Ditib's
and the Turkish government's role: we have the impression
that Ankara's soul would prefer to maintain its authority
over the Turkish community, but its mind recognizes that
opposing political assimilation is a long-term burden for
Turkish-European relations.
TIMKEN JR