(S) SHIELD S59A-05: GERMAN GOVERNMENT

S E C R E T BERLIN 000600

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB AND EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2032
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC GM IR AE
SUBJECT: (S) SHIELD S59A-05: GERMAN GOVERNMENT
INVESTIGATING IRANIAN CBW-RELATED PROCUREMENT

REF: A. STATE 34341


B. BERLIN 189

C. STATE 10911

D. 06 BERLIN 3374

E. 06 BERLIN 3057

F. 06 BERLIN 2776

G. 06 BERLIN 2767

Classified By: Global Affairs Counselor Donald R. Shemanski, for reason
s 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Global Affairs officer delivered ref A demarche to
German MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Andreas Kauke
March 20. He said he will convey the information to the
German inter-agency export control group for investigation
and report the results back to the USG.


2. (S) Kauke found no reference in his export control
databases to Nippon Express (Deutschland) GmbH or to
shipments of glass reaction vessels from Germany to Iran.
Nevertheless, the details provided in the demarche should
enable the German authorities to trace this case, Kauke said.



3. (S) Kauke said the Iranian firm, Samamicro Company, is
well known to German authorities for its involvement in WMD
procurement activities. The German Government included
Samamicro on its Early Warning List in 2003. (Note: The
Early Warning List includes foreign entities deemed
unreliable to receive controlled items. Although it is not
publicly available, German exporters can inquire whether
prospective clients are on it. If a prospective client is on
the Early Warning List, the exporter must apply for a license
to export controlled items to it. End note.) Kauke said
German authorities will have to investigate how a controlled
item could have been shipped to an end user on the Early
Warning List.


4. (S) Post will report any significant German response to
the demarche septel.
KOENIG