Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERLIN59
2007-01-10 16:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING: BILATERAL

Tags:  PTER KHLS CVPR PGOV GM 
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VZCZCXRO4549
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0059/01 0101643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101643Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6631
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000059 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/AGS, EUR/ERA, CA AND L
DOJ FOR OIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016
TAGS: PTER KHLS CVPR PGOV GM
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING: BILATERAL
WORKING GROUP MEETS

REF: A. BERLIN 3456

B. BERLIN 3435 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000059

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/AGS, EUR/ERA, CA AND L
DOJ FOR OIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016
TAGS: PTER KHLS CVPR PGOV GM
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING: BILATERAL
WORKING GROUP MEETS

REF: A. BERLIN 3456

B. BERLIN 3435 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary. The three main results of the first
meeting of the U.S.-German Working Group on Counterterrorism
Information-Sharing were: (1) the U.S. will provide Germany
with a draft bilateral agreement on enhanced biometric
data-sharing in January; (2) the U.S. invited a German
delegation to visit the Terrorist Screening Center, National
Targeting Center, and National Counterterrorism Center in
January or February; and (3) the U.S. agreed in principle to
the German proposal for more information exchange between the
FBI and their German counterparts on terrorist groups in
Iraq, in part in order to lay the foundation for more
biographic data exchange. The two sides agreed the Working
Group would meet again January 23-24 on the margins of the
U.S.-EU High Level Group on Justice and Home Affairs. A
subsequent March or April meeting would be in DC and a text
could be ready for ministers to sign by summer. The possible
bilateral agreement would use as a model Germany's "Pruem"
agreements with some of its EU neighbors. The Pruem
agreements enable, among other things, instant hit/no hit
access to another state's fingerprint and DNA data. End
Summary.

U.S.-GERMAN AGREEMENT MODELED ON PRUEM
--------------


2. (C) Head of the German Delegation for the first meeting of
the U.S./German Working Group on Counterterrorism Information
Sharing, which took place December 12 in Berlin, was Interior
Ministry (MOI) Office Director for Police Information
Systems, the BKA Law, and Data Privacy in Security Affairs
Andreas Schultz. He explained Germany's principal goal was
to facilitate information sharing with the U.S. under
existing German law. German data privacy rules, as well as
specific laws such as that governing the German Federal
Office of Criminal Investigations (the "BKA"),prevented
broad or batch sharing of data without a legal foundation.
Schultz recalled that the Pruem convention core model is a

hit/no hit system followed by data exchange on specific hits,
and noted that pilot exchanges begun between Germany and
Austria revealed 2300 DNA hits. Now officials on both sides
have to initiate legal assistance requests to exchange
detailed information. Initial bilateral fingerprint
exchanges would begin in spring 2007, Schultz said. Given
the success of the Pruem model and the Bundestag's agreement
to it, Germany could enter into a similar agreement with the
U.S., Schultz said. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Paul
Rosenzweig said there was great U.S. interest in reciprocal
DNA and fingerprint data sharing; Department of Justice
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz agreed.
Schultz said Interior Minister Schaeuble would be pleased to
hear this news.


3. (C) Schultz clarified that Pruem envisions DNA data
sharing for crime investigation and fingerprint data sharing
for crime investigation and prevention. Pruem did not
envision such data sharing for border entry controls, he
said. Rosenzweig referred to DHS Assistant Secretary Baker's
December 7 letter to MOI Director General Krause and
clarified the U.S. sought te use of fingerprint data for
border controls inspecial cases only, not routinely.
Rosenzweig pointed out Pruem envisioned batch automated
sharing of DNA data, but not fingerprints, and asked why.
Schultz explained the German DNA database (of 500,000) was
smaller and better automated than the fingerprint database
(of 3 million).


4. (C) Both Swartz and Rosenzweig raised the prospect of
expedited data sharing after a DNA or fingerprint hit;
Schultz responded Pruem did not address post-hit data sharing
in great detail. The Ministry of Justice representative on
the German delegation referred to the ongoing ratification
process of the bilateral and U.S.-EU agreements on mutual
legal assistance and extradition as additional/alternative
data sharing vehicles.

HSPD-6
--------------


5. (C) Schultz referred to the November 8 Homeland Security

BERLIN 00000059 002 OF 003


Presidential Directive 6 delegation (ref B) and said Germany
did not have a counterpart due to the constitutional
separation of law enforcement and security services. The new
Counterterrorism Database draft law, however, will address
this issue and create a national database upon approval by
the Bundestag. The new law specifically banned sharing
information from the database with foreign governments,
Schultz said, but could permit continued sharing of
information with the individual German agencies who own the
underlying data. Rosenzweig asked for access to the German
lists of those banned from entry ("Einreiseverbotliste") and
those who pose a threat ("Gefaehrderliste"). Swartz
mentioned Pruem's article 16 ("Supply of information in order
to prevent terrorist offenses") as a way for both sides to
voluntarily provide information about small groups of
individuals. Schultz said data sharing pursuant to Article
16 could include DNA and fingerprints, but Article 16 was for
individuals, not groups or batches. Swartz highlighted the
benefit to Germany if it provided the U.S. with information
about a small group of individuals; then U.S. could inform
Germany if U.S. agencies learned of their movements or
actions.


6. (C) After Schultz mentioned German data privacy concerns,
Department of State Office of Consular Affairs Chief of the
Office of Policy and Public Outreach Alcy Frelick said the
U.S. wanted to learn more about German data privacy needs,
and wanted Germany to be comfortable with U.S. procedures.
She invited a German delegation to Washington to visit the
Terrorist Screening Center, National Targeting Center, and
National Counterterrorism Center in January or February 2007
to see for themselves U.S. attention to data privacy
concerns. Schultz said he agreed Germany did not know enough
about the subject and accepted the offer. He called the
precedent of the sharing of the U.S. Terrorist Screening
Database during the 2006 Soccer World Cup a "special
exception" based on Germany's overarching need to do all it
could to provide security for the games.


GERMANY REQUESTS INFORMATION ABOUT IRAQ JIHADISTS
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Schultz lauded existing bilateral cooperation between
the Legat/FBI and the BKA, but said it could be further
improved by intensifying discussion about Iraq. Steffen
Russ, BKA Office Director for Police and State Security,
circulated a proposal which sought to deepen information
sharing about the structures, financing, recruiting, travel,
and the goals of different terrorist and insurgent groups.
After some discussion about the need for such a new project,
Schultz clarified that under German law it was difficult to
share biographic and other personal information without a
specific basis. Establishing a BKA-Legat experts' group on
Iraqi terrorist groups would establish the sort of legal
foundation Germany needs. Swartz said if the exchange were
mutually beneficial, the U.S. had no objection.

DRAFT TEXT / DATA PRIVACY
--------------


8. (C) Schultz offered to table a draft text focusing on DNA,
fingerprints, Article 16, and data privacy. Swartz said the
U.S. could also draft a text and try to table it in time for
the January US-EU JHA meeting; Schultz agreed. Department of
Justice Office of the Deputy Attorney General Chief Privacy
and Civil Liberties Officer Jane Horvath pointed out the U.S.
would be unable to comply with Pruem's Article 34 ("Level of
data protection"). Schultz replied that Germany could not
agree to a level of data protection lower than the EU data
privacy rules and referred to Article 35 ("Purpose") and the
principle that the owner of the data could refuse its
transmission to third countries. Embassy Berlin
representative pointed out that upon further review in
Washington, U.S. agencies might determine to seek inclusion
of other Pruem provisions other than those already mentioned;
Rosenzweig and Swartz agreed. Schultz responded Germany
understood U.S. priorities to be those articulated in A/S
Baker's letter.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


9. (C) Summing up the meeting, Rosenzweig described the U.S.
agreement to table a draft in January, the U.S. invitation
for a German delegation to the TSC, the U.S. agreement in

BERLIN 00000059 003 OF 003


principle to discuss Iraqi terrorism, the U.S. pledge to
continue discussions in Washington in March/April, and the
U.S. desire to have a text ready for Ministers to sign during
early summer EU or G-8 meetings. Schultz agreed the proposal
was ambitious but agreed.


10. (U) This cable was cleared by the delegation subsequent
to their return to Washington.
TIMKEN JR