Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERLIN576
2007-03-21 16:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMANY AND MISSILE DEFENSE: STRATEGY FOR DEFUSING

Tags:  PREL MARR GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7593
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000576 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2022
TAGS: PREL MARR GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY AND MISSILE DEFENSE: STRATEGY FOR DEFUSING
DEBATE

Classified By: DCM John Koenig. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

Ref: Berlin 492

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000576

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2022
TAGS: PREL MARR GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY AND MISSILE DEFENSE: STRATEGY FOR DEFUSING
DEBATE

Classified By: DCM John Koenig. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

Ref: Berlin 492


1. (C) Summary. Discussion of missile defense (MD) in
Germany may become trapped by partisan domestic political
interests. Social Democrats (SPD),suffering in the polls
and without any major issues to distinguish themselves from
the conservatives (CDU/CSU),seem to see an opportunity to
reassert their position as the party of "peace" by opposing
U.S. plans for MD deployments in eastern Europe. SPD
leaders have made statements ranging from outright rejection
to deep skepticism. Mindful of public skepticism about U.S.
defense policy, Chancellor Merkel and the CDU/CSU have been
slow to defend U.S. plans. Neither side has shown much
interest in holding a fact-based debate about U.S plans and
how they fit into broader, ongoing Alliance and European MD
activities. If this trend continues, it could affect
bilateral relations in other areas (Afghanistan, Iraq) and
the study of MD options in NATO. Mission will remain engaged
with both allies and opponents on the German political scene
to help shift the German debate from general and emotive
terms to the specifics of U.S. plans and their impact. Key
interlocutors will include SPD party officials, Bundestag
members, and academics linked to the party; CDU/CSU foreign
policy spokesmen; and Chancellery officials. Secondary
interlocutors include SPD officials and activists at the
state level. End Summary.

Background
--------------


2. (C) The MD debate in Germany is largely about domestic
political concerns, although many politicians have tried to
portray it as a "European" issue. The SPD, whose rank and
file is increasingly unhappy with the domestic and foreign
policy of the Grand Coalition, is confronting a
substantial rebellion by its left wing: a third of the SPD
Bundestag caucus voted against both the deployment of German
Tornadoes to Afghanistan and the government's health care
reform package. The CDU/CSU has stolen the SPD's thunder on
traditional issues such as child care and dealing with
immigrants. The SPD (consistently under 30 percent in polls)
has been unable to find an issue with

which to fight major upcoming state elections in early 2008.

An Emotive Issue to Exploit
--------------


3. (C) Seen from the SPD's perspective, opposition to even
limited MD deployments, which the party has long opposed,
offers it an opportunity to reassert itself as the party of
peace and disarmament -- in opposition to the U.S. This
message resonates with German voters and is credited with
winning the 2002 election for embattled Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder. (It is worth noting that the SPD stance on MD is
driven by Party Chairman Kurt Beck, not by Foreign Minister
Steinmeier. Steinmeier, while respected by the SPD
rank-and-file, is neither a member of the Bundestag caucus
nor a party activist: he is more technocrat than politician.
While Beck and SPD headquarters have supported Steinmeier in
general in public, Beck has made clear that he does not
consider himself constrained by the Government's position.)


4. (C) The MD story broke just as the SPD Presidium approved
a draft position paper on arms control,
disarmament and missile defense, which, while not rejecting
MD outright, linked MD to arms control steps and urged a
dialogue between NATO and Russia on the issue. SPD Chairman
Kurt Beck has led the charge against MD, using emotive and
generalized language such as his March 18 statement opposing
a "new arms race between the U.S. and Russia" in Europe and
"new missiles in Europe." SPD General Secretary Hubertus
Heil said, with regard to the planned U.S. deployments, "we
reject them in their present form." Others, including MFA
Parliamentary State Secretary Erler, have offered similar
comments. Foreign Minister Steinmeier appears to be seeking
a middle ground between his party and the Chancellery's more
open approach. In a March 18 Op-Ed, he took a skeptical view
of MD, acknowledging the legitimacy of the U.S. need to
defend against missiles, but asserting that the demands of
disarmament are "our highest priority."


5. (C) The SPD's opposition to U.S. MD plans has been
challenged increasingly in recent days. But Chancellor
Merkel has been preoccupied with her own EU Presidency
agenda, and initially saw the MD issue as a potentially
damaging distraction. She and the CDU/CSU have, with a few
exceptions, focused on process rather than substance, calling
for a dialogue within NATO and with Russia on the program.

BERLIN 00000576 002 OF 002


The lone contrarian in the SPD Bundestag caucus has been
Deputy Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose,
who has spoken publicly about the benefits of MD. The
CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman, Eckart von Klaeden, has
repetedly attacked the SPD's position, focusing on thereal
threat from Iran and the need for skepticis about the
Russian opposition to MD. CSU MdB Kal-Theodor zu Guttenberg
has attacked the SPD diretly for making the issue a
political football and thereby playing into Russian hands.
Former Chief of Defense Klaus Naumann accused unnamed
politicians (clearly implying Beck and the SPD) of "almost
unbelievable ignorance."


6. (C) Media and editorialists have followed the story
closely, focusing more on the SPD's attempts to build its
profile and support on the back of the MD issue, rather than
on the merits of MD. The media have published several
stories about the technology involved, but are largely
focused on the political dimension. This is a generally
positive development, as it underscores the political, rather
than substantive issues that are driving the SPD's position.

Impact
--------------


7. (C) We have begun to see a backlash against the SPD
leadership's populist opportunism. Nevertheless, the SPD's
handling of this issue could portend more long-lasting
problems for German-American relations. Part of the SPD
leadership's strategy appears to be to revive the blanket
criticism of U.S. policy heard in the run-up to the Iraq war
in 2002, which could have implications for our ability to
work with the Grand Coalition on Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and
the Israeli-Palestinian
issue. With the Bundeswehr's Afghanistan mandate up for
renewal in the fall and unpopular in the SPD and public at
large (in a recent poll by Der Spiegel, 57 percent of
respondents favored withdrawing German soldiers "soon"),the
SPD's MD policy could be the opening in a larger campaign
aimed at distancing the SPD from the CDU/CSU by focusing on
foreign policy disputes. Mission is also concerned that
despite the good will of the Chancellor and the
conservatives, the overall tone of bilateral relations as
well as possibilities for international cooperation generally
could suffer if the CDU/CSU are unable to reach a MD
settlement with the SPD that does not impinge on U.S.
security interests.

Mission Plan
--------------


8. (C) We are adjusting our strategy with these factors in
mind. Visits by senior Washington officials, such as the
March 15 visit by LTG Obering and the expected March 28 visit
by DoD U/S Edelman, will remain critical to post's approach
to MD. We are focused on:

a) a forward-leaning presentation of the facts to the SPD
leadership and to persons and organizations with influence on
the party leadership;

b) engagement with key CDU/CSU figures to arm them with these
facts and encourage them to steer the discussion in Germany
toward security policy; and

c) engagement with the Chancellery to press the government
for a more supportive stance on MD as a
component of security policy and on the specifics of U.S.
deployment plans in eastern Europe.


9. (C) Our media strategy focuses on the facts, especially
on the Iranian threat and the USG's transparency with our
NATO Allies and Russia. By emphasizing the facts, rather
than the domestic politics, we seek to avoid being
instrumentalized by the SPD and others in the internal debate
-- an outcome that might please them only too much.


10. (C) Our public diplomacy on MD will reflect post's
suggestions in reftel and will pay special attention to the
SPD, using the resources of the Embassy and Consulates
General to reach out to local SPD organizations and
state-level politicians to explain U.S. policy and deliver
the facts on the lengthy process of MD consultations in NATO
and with Russia that proceeded the eastern Europe deployment
announcement. Persistence will be necessary. Given the
widespread skepticism about MD and the absence of any
decision-forcing event, the duration of this domestic debate
will be determined mainly by partisan political calculation
and the attention-span of the German public.
KOENIG