Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERLIN484
2007-03-09 14:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMAN GOVERNMENT ALERTED TO USG CONCERNS OVER

Tags:  KNNP KS MNUC PARM PREL KH GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0036
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0484/01 0681440
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091440Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7395
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1108
S E C R E T BERLIN 000484 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, EAP, EUR, AND TREASURY/TFI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: KNNP KS MNUC PARM PREL KH GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN GOVERNMENT ALERTED TO USG CONCERNS OVER
POTENTIAL SALE OF GERMAN PRESS TO THE DPRK

REF: A. STATE 25950

B. EDDY/MOON EMAILS FEB 27 2007

C. BERLIN 354

D. BERLIN 318

E. STATE 18308

F. 06 BERLIN 2224

G. 06 STATE 118598

H. 06 BERLIN 1876

I. RUGGIERO/CONWAY EMAIL JUNE 21 2006

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).

S E C R E T BERLIN 000484

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, EAP, EUR, AND TREASURY/TFI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: KNNP KS MNUC PARM PREL KH GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN GOVERNMENT ALERTED TO USG CONCERNS OVER
POTENTIAL SALE OF GERMAN PRESS TO THE DPRK

REF: A. STATE 25950

B. EDDY/MOON EMAILS FEB 27 2007

C. BERLIN 354

D. BERLIN 318

E. STATE 18308

F. 06 BERLIN 2224

G. 06 STATE 118598

H. 06 BERLIN 1876

I. RUGGIERO/CONWAY EMAIL JUNE 21 2006

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: DCM as Charge as well as senior Embassy
staff again raised the need for German government action to
preclude the possible printing press sale to North Korea by
the German firm Drent Goebel, as requested in refs. MFA
State Secretary Silberberg, Chancellery Deputy National
Security Adviser Nikel and other senior German officials
state they are well aware of North Korea's long record of
counterfeiting. Silberberg stated the German Government
could ultimately block the export of the printing press on
foreign policy/national security grounds in the event Drent
Goebel tried to go forward with the deal. However, senior
officials in the Finance and Foreign Ministries note while
the Government has the ability under German law to stop the
sale of an item not currently included in a dual-use, export
control or sanctions list for six months, the law would then
need to be amended during those six months to include the
particular item, e.g., the intaglio printing press, as
something requiring an export license. The process of
legally blocking the export would be complicated and lengthy,
and officials uniformly stated the German Government's case
would be bolstered by any additional evidence we could supply
on North Korean counterfeiting activities. Plese see action
request in para 7. End Summary.


2. (S) DCM (then Charge) delivered ref A demarche to German
MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg March 2. Silberberg
was familiar with the issue and indicated MFA Director
General for Economics and Sustainable Development Peter Ammon
had been in contact with Drent Goebel. In response to our

point noting the conflicting information we and the German
Government have received from the firm regarding their
intentions, Silberberg said the German Government fully
shares the USG's concerns. Silberberg also said he was aware
of North Korea's long record of counterfeiting, and noted
that even if Drent Goebel persisted in trying to export the
printing press to North Korea, the German Government could
stop the export. Charge and Polcouns also delivered the
points to German Deputy National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel
in a separate meeting March 2. Nikel said that although he
was unfamiliar with the case he would check into it. He
noted Germany would not wish to be involved in anything
potentially connected to counterfeiting U.S. currency.


3. (S) EMIN made the same points to Acting MFA Director
General for Economic Affairs Michael Witter and Office
Director of the International Economic Policy Division Ingo
Karsten March 2. EMIN underscored two USG concerns about
Drent Goebel: that it may have been duplicitous in what it
told the German Government about dropping plans to sell the
press and that Drent Goebel may have understated the
technical capabilities of the press to be used for
counterfeiting. EMIN urged the German Government to provide
assurances that it understands the USG concerns and that it
will ensure that this press is never exported to North Korea.



4. (S) Witter said the German Government shares the USG
concerns and that it does not wish to see counterfeit
currency come from North Korea. Witter noted that Drent
Goebel had told the German Government it would not export the
press, and if it changed its plans to complete the sale it
would notify the German Government. In the event that Drent
Goebel tried to export the press, the German Government could
stop it by invoking a "catch-all" provision in the German
Foreign Trade and Payments Act. (Note: According to the
"catch-all" provision, the German Government can restrict
legal transactions and acts in foreign trade and payments in
order to "guarantee the vital security interests of the
Federal Republic of Germany." End note.) The difficulty in
using this provision, continued Witter, is that the
government would need to use a single case intervention and,
since the printing press is not currently included in a
dual-use, export control or sanctions list, the sale could
only be blocked for a maximum of six months. During the six
month period the law would need to be amended to include that
particular item. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs,

Economics, Finance, and other federal agencies would have to
collaborate to coordinate the single case intervention.


5. (S) EMIN also met with Finance Ministry Deputy Director
General for Banking, Insurance, Investment, Stock Market, and
Currency Berthold Leber and Michael Findeisen, Office
Director of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance
Division. Findeisen said the Federal Office of Criminal
Investigation (BKA) had recently talked to him about this
case. He reported the BKA said technically the contract
between Drent Goebel and the DPRK is still pending, but that
North Korea has yet to pay the deposit of 90 percent of the
sales price of the press as required. Drent Goebel will not
even begin production of the press until it receives this
deposit. As a result, the firm has not started production on
the printing press. EMIN noted this situation should make it
even easier for Drent Goebel to walk away from the deal with
North Korea.


6. (S) Leber and Findeisen also stated that, since standard
export controls would not apply to this case, the deal would
have to be blocked on national security grounds. To do so,
said Findeisen, the Government would need to show the deal
entailed a "security risk." Findeisen said because the
burden of proof is on the German Government, the government
needs hard evidence that the DPRK Government is involved in
counterfeiting and that the machine will be used in
connection with this or other illicit purposes. Emboffs
noted the information already passed, including the Interpol
notice. Findeisen and Leber said additional information
would be needed to act further and requested the USG, if it
has additional information, to share it with the German
authorities.


7. (S) Action requested: Request Washington agencies
provide, as appropriate, any additional information we can
share with the German Government to support our assertions
that North Korea would likely use the printing press for the
purpose of counterfeiting western currencies.
TIMKEN JR