"STURM UND DRANG" FOLLOWED BY "STAY THE COURSE" -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002081

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR YI KO GM
SUBJECT: "STURM UND DRANG" FOLLOWED BY "STAY THE COURSE" -
WHAT TO EXPECT FROM GERMANY ON KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 146242


B. BERLIN 01913

C. BERLIN 01995

Classified By: Charge John Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite deeply-rooted German desires for a
UN-mandated Kosovo/Serbia settlement, the German government
has indicated it will recognize Kosovo if, as expected,
Pristina unilaterally declares independence following the
completion of the Troika process. The German government has
also signaled that it will continue to maintain its military
presence in Kosovo through KFOR and press for a planned
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission. While
some German politicians are likely to call for a new
parliamentary mandate to cover German forces in Kosovo after
UDI, this should not be a serious threat to the governing
Grand Coalition's decision to stay the course and maintain
Germany's KFOR mission in Kosovo. END SUMMARY.

Working Hard for Compromise...
--------------


2. (C) Germany remains one of the most active members of the
Contact Group/Troika process. MFA Political Director Volker
Stanzel recently highlighted German efforts to get all 27 EU
members "comfortable" with the way forward, and is hosting
the EU PolDirs in Germany on November 18 to discuss these
matters in advance of the next meeting of EU Foreign
Ministers. However, according to MFA Kosovo Desk Officer
Christian Plate, the most recent Troika meeting in Vienna on
November 5 left German MFA officials with a pessimistic
outlook on the chances for a Serb/Kosovar settlement. EU
Troika Representative Wolfgang Ischinger had earlier forecast
a 10 percent chance for success. "That number is slipping
quickly" lamented Plate. With only two more Troika meetings
remaining before December 10 deadline, the Troika wants to
put "new ideas on the table," and Ischinger plans to discuss
a proposal modeled after the German-German Basic Treaty of
1972, which allowed special relations between East and West
Germany by granting de facto, but not de jure, legal
recognition of both sides' sovereignty.


3. (C) In his effort to reach an agreement, FM Frank-Walter
Steinmeier met November 7 with Serbian FM Vuc Jeremic for
bilateral talks in Berlin before receiving the Kosovar Unity
Team on November 8. Both meetings failed to produce new
results with Steinmeier making clear to Jeremic that he had
no intention of agreeing to any extension of talks.
Steinmeier urged the Kosovars to closely coordinate all steps
with "key allies" prior to and immediately following a UDI.
Officially, the government line remains that there is no Plan
B after December 10. According to MFA State Minister Gernot
Erler, "even if chances are slim, every effort must be made
to find a negotiated solution."

...But Recognizing Realities
--------------


4. (C) Privately, MFA Western Balkan Division Chief Joachim
Bleicker admits that he expects a Kosovar UDI sometime after
December 10 and "preferably not before late January."
Speculation in Germany about the time frame ranges from "the
day after" the December 10 Troika deadline to the second half
of 2008. According to Bleicker, Bundestag (Parliament)
members are anxious that a Kosovar UDI during the winter
recess could require a special recess session to deal with
the question. Regardless, the German government is prepared
to recognize an independent Kosovo, "if not in the first
wave, then shortly thereafter," said Bleicker. According to
Dirk Sawitzky, Erler's Chief of Staff, MFA officials and
Bundestag members' biggest concerns remain social unrest in
Kosovo, a radicalization of Serbia's domestic politics, and
destabilizing effects in Bosnia with the possible separation
of Republica Sprska. Germany is also increasingly concerned
with Russian actions in the region, especially Russian
threats to link Bosnia and Kosovo by only supporting a
limited extension of the EUFOR mandate at the UN.

Government: No New Mandate Required
--------------


5. (C) Traditionally, Germany's legalistic tendencies would

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call for a new UNSCR on Kosovo following UDI, and we expect
some German parliamentarians to make this demand. According
to SPD Bundestag member Johannes Jung, a new UN mandate would
provide the EU with a sound legal basis for the planned ESDP
mission (Germany has already begun to recruit experts to
participate) and also calm concerns expressed by German
Bundestag members about the legal footing of Germany's
participation in the NATO KFOR deployment. However, the
German government recognizes Russian intransigence makes this
increasingly unlikely and is therefore prepared to keep UNSCR
1244 as a legal basis for its Kosovo deployment. The GoG is
also defending this decision within the EU (where there is no
consensus as of yet). Furthermore, the GoG believes that a
new Bundestag mandate authorizing Germany's participation in
the KFOR mission is not required. The situation, however, is
similar to the debate on Germany's Tornado deployment to
Afghanistan earlier this year. The government was certain
early on that the deployment was covered by the
already-existing ISAF mandate, a view which was widely shared
by legal experts. Nevertheless, political pressure resulted
in the government seeking a new, separate mandate for the
Tornados. The Bundestag has not, in fact, debated Germany's
role in Kosovo for some time and such a debate, while
cumbersome, could reinvigorate the public and the Bundestag
to continue Germany's role in the region during this "next
stage."

Bundestag: New Mandate
-------------- -


6. (C) Under the German constitution, the German Bundestag is
responsible for authorizing the deployment of the German
military abroad. While all parties are still considering how
to respond to UDI, some initial conversations indicate that:

(a) An advisor to CDU/CSU Deputy Caucus Chair Andreas
Schockenhoff told us that the Union parties do not see any
need to rush a debate on Kosovo. They believe that there is
a sound legal basis to continue the KFOR deployment even
after UDI. They do recognize that a new Bundestag mandate
may be forthcoming, but that "Germany's commitment to Kosovo
is unwavering."

(b) SPD staffers emphasized that the debate within the Caucus
had only just begun. (NOTE: The SPD-affiliated
Friedrich-Ebert Foundation is hosting a public event on
Kosovo during the week of November 26. END NOTE.) While we
expect the SPD's debate to be a bit more controversial than
in the Union parties, the SPD will not want to damage the
SPD-led MFA (which assesses that there is no need for a new
mandate) and, according to Jung, the SPD "remains committed
to keeping the Bundeswehr in Kosovo, even after UDI."

(c) Green Party staffers noted that there is a "real desire"
in the caucus to keep the Bundeswehr in Kosovo, but that
there is still a need to discuss the issue internally and to
reconcile this with more fundamental convictions of the
rank-and-file party members. The Greens expect to have a
position by the end of November and a call for a new
Bundestag mandate is "highly likely." The party's Balkan
expert, Marieluise Beck, plans to visit Pristina and Belgrade
at the end of November.

(d) FDP Caucus staffers noted that at this point the party
would be comfortable moving forward with the current mandate,
but this could change as caucus members and the public begin
to focus on Kosovo in the coming weeks.

(e) Only the left-wing Linke caucus indicated it will
challenge a decision to keep the Bundeswehr in Kosovo at the
Constitutional Court. While a new Bundestag mandate for
Kosovo is not a foregone conclusion, Bleicker commented that
the MFA is already working to respond should that occur.

A Longer Road, But in the Right Direction
--------------


7. (C) Comment: UDI will spur a lively debate here in
Germany, and some politicians, including from the coalition
parties, are likely to claim that a new UNSCR and/or a new
Bundestag mandate are required for German military forces to
continue to operate in Kosovo or for the new ESDP mission to
proceed. While this domestic debate could prove messy and

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difficult, the government remains committed to the position
that the existing UNSCR 1244 and the current Bundestag
mandate provide a sufficient legal basis for continuation of
the KFOR operation as well as the launch of the ESDP mission.
Importantly, all major political players and parties in
Germany are supportive of Germany's ongoing role in Kosovo
and the western Balkans. End comment.
KOENIG