SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL'S CRAWFORD VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001980

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECUN EU GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL'S CRAWFORD VISIT

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. John Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
.


1. (C) Summary: Angela Merkel will arrive at Crawford riding
a wave of public approval surpassing 70 percent. Her
popularity is credited to her effective leadership style,
Germany's economic growth, and her skill in turning centrist
appeals on climate change and social issues to her advantage.
Despite the weakness of her Social Democratic coalition
partner (SPD),Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
faces challenges as it enters the second half of the
legislative term. German public opinion is edging leftwards
generally, and widespread skepticism about U.S. policy often
constrains Merkel's Atlanticist instincts. Merkel has the
power to shift public opinion when she engages directly on a
priority issue. She has not taken a strong leadership role
on Afghanistan up to now; there are indications that she may
soon visit Afghanistan, which could increase her level of
commitment to our shared goals. Merkel has shown her
willingness to be tough with Russia on its foreign policy and
on its domestic direction. She will want to compare notes on
how we are approaching the transition in Russia, and how we
prioritize key issues where the Russian position is critical
(such as Iran, Kosovo, the CFE Treaty, and Missile Defense).
Most importantly from a domestic point of view, we believe
Merkel will want Crawford to highlight progress on some of
her signature themes, especially climate change (on which she
increasingly seems to be staking her chancellorship),but
also on the Transatlantic Economic Council and possibly the
Middle East peace process. End Summary.

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Merkel Still Riding High
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2. (C) Angela Merkel remains firmly on top of the German
political scene as the country's most popular postwar
politician. Approximately 80 percent of the public approves
of her job performance. Due in large part to her personal
popularity, her CDU holds a lead of about ten points over the
SPD in opinion polls. The path is not completely rosy for
Merkel, however. After her international successes at the
G-8 and EU summits in the first half of 2007, public
attention increasingly is focused on the domestic front,
where (despite declining unemployment) many feel that
Germany's economic "upswing" has eluded most Germans. Growth
estimates are being revised downward, from 2.6 percent in
2007 to 2.2 percent in 2008. As elections draw closer,
Merkel increasingly will seek to demonstrate the results of
her leadership in the international sphere with a particular
emphasis on binding commitments to address climate change,
which she has defined as the central issue facing the planet
that demands common action.

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Merkel's Expectations from Crawford
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3. (C) With domestic policy-making in the Grand Coalition
increasingly plagued by partisan rivalry in the approach to
2009 elections, Merkel will need to maintain her standing
within the EU and internationally, which has proven
instrumental in buttressing her domestic popularity. Climate
change offers an opportunity not only to satisfy her domestic
audience, but to elaborate a broader leadership role for an
EU audience as well. Merkel is committed to pursuing
aggressive international measures to meet the challenges of
global warming. Her support for mandatory, targeted global
limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an international
cap-and-trade regime reflects a deep-seated belief that only
drastic, concerted efforts on the part of the international
community can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the human
contribution to global warming. In pursuing activist climate
change policies, the Chancellor enjoys overwhelmin support
at home, across the board. Her unwaverng support for an
overarching, mandatory framewor of emissions caps could put
her increasingly atodds with our approaches and could lead
to more isible disagreements, especially if Germany and
ther like-minded countries push hard for mandatory global
GHG targets at the UN Bali Conference in ecember. Germany
also plays a particularly key ole as Europeans continue to
focus on future energy needs. With a strong political
mandate to reduce GHG emissions, Merkel recognizes that
increasing attention to alternative energy sources is
essential. Focusing on U.S.-EU cooperative efforts in this
regard could be an advantageous way to downplay our
differences.


4. (C) Merkel is competing with a more dynamic French
President Sarkozy for attention on the international stage
(his visit to Washington and appearance before a joint

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session of Congress November 7 will not have escaped notice
here),and Crawford thus offers her the opportunity to remind
the German public of her key role in international politics
and Transatlantic relations -- and for us to push her for
progress on key issues. Merkel was caught off guard by the
French proposal for further EU sanctions against Iran, a step
that presents a challenge to Merkel's -- and Germany's --
more cautious and measured foreign policy style. Merkel
views Iran nonetheless as a priority and has been strong,
even though her government often demonstrates a low degree of
coordination on Iran issues. Her personal engagement
therefore is essential to bringing her Government, the German
business community, and the rest of the EU around; we should
sketch our vision of diplomatic steps over the coming weeks
and months and seek to enlist her increased personal
engagement.


5. (C) Merkel is likely to raise her interest in the Middle
East and ask what Germany and the EU can do to support the
U.S. and promote a successful meeting in Annapolis. Foreign
Minister Steinmeier, who currently is traveling in the
region, recently announced an EU Middle East Action Plan,
which, in part, calls for the EU to provide more development
and rule-of-law assistance to the Palestinian Authority.
Saudi King Abdullah will pay a State Visit to Germany
November 7, and Jordanian King Abdullah will make an Official
Visit directly thereafter -- Germany wants both visits to
help connect moderate Arab leaders more closely to the
Annapolis process.


6. (C) On Afghanistan, Merkel has helped maintain German
deployments despite considerable public opposition, although
she has let others do most of the heavy lifting. The German
Parliament voted overwhelmingly October 12 to extend the
ISAF/Tornado mandate and is almost certain to approve renewal
of the OEF mandate in mid-November. The Germans have
restricted their military presence mainly to the relatively
secure north and have not been willing, for example, even to
allow German military training teams to accompany their
Afghan National Army (ANA) units on deployments to southern
Afghanistan. Merkel should get a sense in Crawford of how
important additional German commitments (or flexibility in
interpreting the German mandate) are to the United States.
She may seek to have the U.S. continue to shift more of its
activities, such as training and equipping of the ANA, from
OEF to ISAF and to improve ISAF's strategic communications.



7. (C) Merkel also hopes to capitalize on the success of the
German EU Presidency, in particular her signature initiative,
the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC),aimed at reducing
regulatory barriers to transatlantic trade and investment.
Merkel is concerned about maintaining the momentum in the TEC
and fears that the European Commission and upcoming EU
presidencies (including France) may lose enthusiasm for the
project. A six-month review meeting of the TEC will take
place in Washington on the same day as her Crawford visit.
Merkel is also concerned about the recent turbulence in the
German banking sector, partially connected to the U.S.
subprime mortgage crisis, and the continuing appreciation of
the Euro, along with rising oil prices. Together, these
economic factors are expected to cause Germany's growth to
slip from 2.6 percent in 2007 to 2.2 percent in 2008.


8. (C) The Chancellor may want to review in Crawford the
agenda for the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. She will
be keen to hear our views on the role Afghanistan and Kosovo
may play there. This is a good opportunity to encourage
stronger German support on Missile Defense, energy security,
and cyber security as key challenges facing the Alliance in
the 21st Century. While we do not expect the Chancellor to
raise it in Crawford, it is possible she might note her
continued interest in German membership on the UN Security
Council.


9. (C) A successful Crawford visit will strengthen Merkel's
hand in dealing with her EU counterparts as they address
critical decisions on Iran, Kosovo, the Middle East, the
Transatlantic Economic Council, and climate change. It will
also strengthen her domestic political standing if she can
demonstrate concrete benefits to engagement with the U.S. at
a time when the U.S. image among the German public remains
unfortunately low.
KOENIG