Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERLIN1878
2007-10-12 11:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

IRAN DEMARCHE: GERMAN RESPONSE

Tags:  PREL PGOV IR XF EUN GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHRL #1878 2851143
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121143Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9461
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0897
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1844
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0296
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0511
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001878 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR XF EUN GM
SUBJECT: IRAN DEMARCHE: GERMAN RESPONSE

REF: STATE 141316

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001878

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR XF EUN GM
SUBJECT: IRAN DEMARCHE: GERMAN RESPONSE

REF: STATE 141316

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Charge delivered reftel points to Foreign Office
State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg October 12. (Charge also
discussed Iran with Political Director Volker Stanzel October
10, raising points similar to those in reftel.) Silberberg
said the text of the EU Council conclusions had been agreed
October 11 in Brussels -- the Germans expected these
conclusions as currently drafted to be approved by ministers
at the GAERC. (Silberberg subsequently provided the entire
text to post, which we will transmit to P staff, NEA, and EUR
by email.)

State Secretary Outlines German Support for "Additional
Measures"
--------------


2. (C) Silberberg read out what he called the key passage of
the agreed text (which differs slightly from the text in
Paragraph 6 of reftel): "The Council agreed that the EU will
consider what additional measures it might take in order to
support the UN process and the shared objectives of the
international community, and invited the relevant Council
bodies to provide timely advice." Silberberg said this would
start review by working groups "with a view to next steps in
the UNSC." The EU objective would be steps that went beyond
UNSC action, but Silberberg said Germany believed agreement
on, and implementation of, more forward-leaning steps at this
time could undermine UNSC efforts. He said that the French
position was now in line with Germany's, following on
President Sarkozy's visit to Moscow -- the French reportedly
had backed away from their proposal for "autonomous"
sanctions in advance of a UNSC decision.


3. (C) The Charge pressed on the German position with
respect to autonomous sanctions. If quick agreement were
impossible in the UNSC, would Germany be prepared to proceed
with autonomous sanctions? Silberberg said this would be the
case.


Political Director's Views on Chinese Decision-Making
--------------


4. (C) In their October 10 conversation, Charge asked PolDir
Stanzel (who was German Ambassador in Beijing until summer
2008) for his views on the dynamics within China on Iran.
Stanzel said he thought China would eventually join the EU3 1
approach, and remarked that Russia would be tougher, in his
opinion. China had a slower decision-making process, one
that was subject to different "influence patterns" than in
western democracies, and this would continue to be
frustrating. He outlined three competing visions in the
Chinese foreign policy community on China's role in the world:

-- the first was the traditional foreign policy elite, which
instinctively looked at situations as win-lose and sought
positions that allowed China to profit from disagreements
among others (e.g., between U.S. and Iran).

-- the second was the "modern" elite, the people who, as
Stanzel put it, "got China into the WTO." These saw China as
interdependent with the world. They would tend to try to
find ways to accommodate the position of the superpower,
regardless of the substance. "If it's important to the U.S.,
why not go along?"

-- the third was a younger group, which had lived/studied
abroad, and understood the substance of complicated
international issues. These were still very few.

The Chinese decision-making process was layered, and didn't
end with a Minister's decision. From there it went to the
committees of the Communist Party, all of which took time and
was cumbersome and opaque. But, once a political decision
was taken, he felt that Chinese economic interests would
unquestioningly yield.

KOENIG