Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERLIN1715
2007-09-10 15:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
GEORGIA/NATO: GERMANY HOLDS FIRM AGAINST NAC TRIP
how-toVZCZCXYZ0007 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1715 2531550 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 101550Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9241 INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1841 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0191 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9707
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001715
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: NATO GG PREL RS GM
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/NATO: GERMANY HOLDS FIRM AGAINST NAC TRIP
TO GEORGIA
REF: A. STATE 1125337
B. USNATO 479
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor John K. Bauman for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001715
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: NATO GG PREL RS GM
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/NATO: GERMANY HOLDS FIRM AGAINST NAC TRIP
TO GEORGIA
REF: A. STATE 1125337
B. USNATO 479
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor John K. Bauman for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Political Counselor raised Ref (A) points with MFA
NATO Office Director Dirk Brengelmann and
NSC-director-equivalent Detlef Waechter at the Chancellery.
Their positions were essentially identical and appeared to be
coordinated: Germany does not support a North Atlantic
Council visit to Georgia in October. Brengelmann said
September 10 that this remained Germanys position after
discussions between Political Director Volker Stanzel and EUR
A/S Dan Fried.
2. (C) Waechter and Brengelmann said the German position was
firm. The reason was Russia -- it was the German interagency
assessment that a NAC visit would be interpreted by the
Russians as a "provocation" and that this would complicate
efforts with Russia in other key areas such as the Kosovo
Troika and CFE. PolCouns argued that, if possible Russian
objections were the criteria, there would always be a reason
for the NAC not to visit Tbilisi; Russia should not have veto
power over the NACs travel schedule. Waechter said Berlin
had looked at the pros and cons, and believed that a NAC trip
was not as important as the Troika talks at this stage, and
that the latter might be further complicated by a NAC visit
to Georgia.
3. (C) Brengelmann asserted that the Georgians would take a
NAC visit as a positive indication of Georgias prospects for
gaining an early Membership Action Plan. PolCouns argued
that the trip would not prejudice any Allys position on MAP.
Instead, it would offer an opportunity to support positive
trends in Georgia while also underscoring the importance of
restraint and constructive engagement by Tbilisi. It was
within the power of the NAC to ensure that the Georgians --
and the Russians -- got that message unfiltered. Brengelmann
argued that NATOs ability to control the message effectively
might be constrained.
4. (C) Comment: The German Government is demonstrating an
unusual degree of interagency coordination on this matter.
In Posts experience, the Chancellery is not normally so well
informed on the details of NATO-related instructions. End
comment.
TIMKEN JR
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: NATO GG PREL RS GM
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/NATO: GERMANY HOLDS FIRM AGAINST NAC TRIP
TO GEORGIA
REF: A. STATE 1125337
B. USNATO 479
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor John K. Bauman for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Political Counselor raised Ref (A) points with MFA
NATO Office Director Dirk Brengelmann and
NSC-director-equivalent Detlef Waechter at the Chancellery.
Their positions were essentially identical and appeared to be
coordinated: Germany does not support a North Atlantic
Council visit to Georgia in October. Brengelmann said
September 10 that this remained Germanys position after
discussions between Political Director Volker Stanzel and EUR
A/S Dan Fried.
2. (C) Waechter and Brengelmann said the German position was
firm. The reason was Russia -- it was the German interagency
assessment that a NAC visit would be interpreted by the
Russians as a "provocation" and that this would complicate
efforts with Russia in other key areas such as the Kosovo
Troika and CFE. PolCouns argued that, if possible Russian
objections were the criteria, there would always be a reason
for the NAC not to visit Tbilisi; Russia should not have veto
power over the NACs travel schedule. Waechter said Berlin
had looked at the pros and cons, and believed that a NAC trip
was not as important as the Troika talks at this stage, and
that the latter might be further complicated by a NAC visit
to Georgia.
3. (C) Brengelmann asserted that the Georgians would take a
NAC visit as a positive indication of Georgias prospects for
gaining an early Membership Action Plan. PolCouns argued
that the trip would not prejudice any Allys position on MAP.
Instead, it would offer an opportunity to support positive
trends in Georgia while also underscoring the importance of
restraint and constructive engagement by Tbilisi. It was
within the power of the NAC to ensure that the Georgians --
and the Russians -- got that message unfiltered. Brengelmann
argued that NATOs ability to control the message effectively
might be constrained.
4. (C) Comment: The German Government is demonstrating an
unusual degree of interagency coordination on this matter.
In Posts experience, the Chancellery is not normally so well
informed on the details of NATO-related instructions. End
comment.
TIMKEN JR