Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERLIN135
2007-01-23 16:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMANY ON AFGHANISTAN AND NATO FOREIGN MINISTERIAL

Tags:  MARR PREL MOPS NATO PINS AF PK GE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5877
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHRL #0135/01 0231624
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O 231624Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6758
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000135 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS NATO PINS AF PK GE
SUBJECT: GERMANY ON AFGHANISTAN AND NATO FOREIGN MINISTERIAL

REF: A. STATE 7434

B. STATE 4834

C. 2006 BERLIN 3452

D. KABUL 218

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs John Bauman for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000135

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS NATO PINS AF PK GE
SUBJECT: GERMANY ON AFGHANISTAN AND NATO FOREIGN MINISTERIAL

REF: A. STATE 7434

B. STATE 4834

C. 2006 BERLIN 3452

D. KABUL 218

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs John Bauman for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and comment: German officials welcomed the
U.S. comprehensive approach to Afghanistan, covered in the
Secretary's meetings January 17-18 with Chancellor Merkel and

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Foreign Minister Steinmeier, and followed up January 22 by
the Deputy Chief of Mission. Berlin expects to deploy
reconnaissance Tornados to Afghanistan, and Embassy pushed
for there to be no restrictive conditions on their use and
for FM Steinmeier to make a forward-leaning statement at the
January 26 ministerial. More broadly, the German Government
is interested in greater cooperation on civilian assistance,
including possible joint U.S.-German
reconstruction/development projects in the south, and
enhanced coordination of U.S. police training efforts with a
proposed EU police training mission. This openness presents
opportunities to leverage greater German engagement and
enlist German support in improving public understanding of
the breadth of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. German officials
were skeptical on the idea of ground-based spraying of the
poppy crop, but their objections may pale in comparison to
President Karzai's decision not to approve spraying this year
(Ref D). End summary and comment.


2. (C) During her January 17-18 visit to Berlin, the
Secretary discussed Afghanistan with Chancellor Merkel and

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Foreign Minister Steinmeier. Those conversations will be
reported septel. German officials who participated in the
meetings subsequently have told us that the Secretary's
emphasis on the USG's coordinated approach in Afghanistan was
especially welcome and effective.


3. (C) Following on those discussions, the DCM January 22
met separately with Chancellery senior-director-equivalent

Geza von Geyr and Foreign Office Deputy Political Director
Ulrich Brandenburg. They covered the possible deployment of
reconnaissance Tornados, police training, counternarcotics,
and reconstruction and development. The DCM pointed out that
the U.S. would be making significant new contributions at the
ministerial, and that we looked to Germany, as a leader
within the Alliance, to do so as well.


4. (C) TORNADO DEPLOYMENT: Deputy Political Director
Brandenburg told the DCM that the deployment of
reconnaissance Tornados remains under review; a decision
likely would be brought before the January 31 cabinet
meeting. Although a new mandate was not strictly necessary,
parliamentary and public opinion made i advisable for the
Government to seek one. Sinc Steinmeier would address the
Foreign Ministeria in advance of a cabinet decision (or any
parliaentary review),he would have to stop short of makig
a formal offer to NATO -- to do otherwise woul be
counterproductive, as it would fuel accusatins from the
Bundestag that the Government was usrping legislative
prerogatives. Von Geyr asked or any information the U.S.
had about which assets would take over the reconnaissance
function after the German Tornados -- knowing someone was
ready to take over would make parliamentary approval easier.
The DCM underscored that any Tornado deployment should take
place without restrictions that make it more difficult for
the mission to succeed, such as a restriction on sharing of
information with OEF. The DCM pressed Brandenburg and von
Geyr for the most forward-leaning possible statement of
German intentions at the January 26 ministerial, pointing out
that it is possible to be clear while underscoring the
necessary legislative procedures. (Note: Our latest
information from Bundestag sources is that the Bundestag will
not approve the supplementary mandate next week -- action
likely would wait until the Bundestag resumes its work the
week of February 26. End note.) Brandenburg thought that
the Tornados would deploy by April.


5. (C) EU POLICE TRAINING: Von Geyr and Brandenburg both
welcomed the U.S. emphasis on a comprehensive approach,
integrating civilian and military efforts. This focus during
the Secretary's recent visit had been effective, both said.
Von Geyr encouraged public statements to this effect by
senior U.S. officials, which would make the domestic German
debate more constructive. It would also create a better
climate for decisions regarding an EU police training mission
in Afghanistan. Berlin recognized the U.S. had a major
police training effort in Afghanistan. Von Geyr urged the
U.S. to consider how U.S. and EU efforts in this area could
better be coordinated. At present, France and some others
were against expanding European police training in

BERLIN 00000135 002 OF 002


Afghanistan, arguing in part that the EU police mission in
Kosovo should be a higher priority. Brandenburg expressed
hope that the February 12 GAERC meeting would decide to go
forward with an EU mission.


6. (C) COUNTERNARCOTICS: The DCM raised counternarcotics
and pushed for greater German support for the Afghan
Government's CN program, especially in Badakhshan. Von Geyr
offered no substantive comment, but noted that German NSA
Heusgen spoke with his UK counterpart Nigel Sheinwald January
19 on this topic. Brandenburg said the German PRT in Kunduz
had provided some support to Afghan CN activities (and their
U.S./UK advisors). However the individuals apprehended were
released under pressure from Kabul, an incident that for
Germany exemplified the difficulties confronting
counternarcotics policy. Germany feared an aggressive CN
campaign could worsen the security situation (which
Brandenburg alleged was already deteriorating in the north).
The low level of public knowledge about the effects of
spraying could be exploited by misinformation. (Note: Ref
D, which indicates President Karzai has decided against
ground-based spraying in 2007, may remove spraying as an
issue for the Germans, but their reluctance on eradication
likely will apply to other CN support activities as well.)


7. (C) RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: Von Geyr pressed for
joint U.S.-German funding of civilian projects, including in
southern Afghanistan. (This was an idea raised by NSA
Heusgen in his most recent visit to the U.S.) Germany wanted
it to be clear that, although the German military was focused
on the north, the German Government's engagement was
country-wide, according to von Geyr. Brandenburg emphasized
the need for better coordination among NATO Allies: NATO had
to ensure that military and civilian authorities consulted in
advance about what reconstruction projects would be needed in
areas where military operations were likely. He noted that
it had taken too long for ISAF officials, in the aftermath of
Operation Medusa, to find ways to use reconstruction funds
Germany had offered. Germany and perhaps Norway might make a
proposal to this effect at the Ministerial, which could
complement the projects list being drawn up by UNAMA.



TIMKEN JR