Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERLIN1142
2007-06-07 15:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
GERMANY DISCUSSES U.S. POSITION ON RUSSIA'S SUPPLY
VZCZCXYZ0028 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1142 1581502 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 071502Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8482 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1824 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0501 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0277
UNCLAS BERLIN 001142
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR ISN AND EUG/AGS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TRGY IN GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY DISCUSSES U.S. POSITION ON RUSSIA'S SUPPLY
OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR TARAPUR AND OTHER NSG-INDIA ISSUES
REF: A. STATE 75597
B. BERLIN 1084
UNCLAS BERLIN 001142
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR ISN AND EUG/AGS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TRGY IN GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY DISCUSSES U.S. POSITION ON RUSSIA'S SUPPLY
OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR TARAPUR AND OTHER NSG-INDIA ISSUES
REF: A. STATE 75597
B. BERLIN 1084
1. (U) This message contains an action request -- please see
paragraph 5.
2. (SBU) Global Affairs officer delivered ref A response to
ref B German query to Joerg Polster, German MFA International
Energy and Nuclear Energy Policy Division desk officer, June
5. Polster said the U.S. position on Russia's supply of
nuclear fuel in April 2007 to India's Tarapur nuclear power
reactors was helpful. Polster noted that Russia followed the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines by notifying the NSG
of its decision to supply nuclear fuel to a state (India)
which lacked International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards. Nevertheless, Polster observed, notification in
this case did not mean consultation, and Russia seemed to
have decided regardless of other NSG partners' views.
3. (SBU) Polster took the opportunity to discuss the
U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative. Germany
favors bringing India closer to the NSG Guidelines, Polster
said. He observed, however, that if India fulfills its
obligations and agrees to IAEA safeguards and signs the
additional protocol, it would be eligible to receive nuclear
fuel from suppliers other than the United States. He
suggested that NSG partners must be prepared to deal with
each other should India decide to receive fuel from more than
one supplier.
4. (SBU) Polster made a request concerning India's presumed
acceptance of IAEA safeguards and the additional protocol.
Once India takes these two steps with the IAEA, the next step
would be for the NSG to approve them. In preparation for NSG
approval, Polster assumed the United States would prepare
some type of document for the NSG's consideration. Polster
requested that the German Government be consulted before the
U.S. finalizes its document and presents it to the entire
NSG.
5. (U) Post requests guidance to respond to the German
request contained in paragraph 4.
TIMKEN JR
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR ISN AND EUG/AGS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TRGY IN GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY DISCUSSES U.S. POSITION ON RUSSIA'S SUPPLY
OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR TARAPUR AND OTHER NSG-INDIA ISSUES
REF: A. STATE 75597
B. BERLIN 1084
1. (U) This message contains an action request -- please see
paragraph 5.
2. (SBU) Global Affairs officer delivered ref A response to
ref B German query to Joerg Polster, German MFA International
Energy and Nuclear Energy Policy Division desk officer, June
5. Polster said the U.S. position on Russia's supply of
nuclear fuel in April 2007 to India's Tarapur nuclear power
reactors was helpful. Polster noted that Russia followed the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines by notifying the NSG
of its decision to supply nuclear fuel to a state (India)
which lacked International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards. Nevertheless, Polster observed, notification in
this case did not mean consultation, and Russia seemed to
have decided regardless of other NSG partners' views.
3. (SBU) Polster took the opportunity to discuss the
U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative. Germany
favors bringing India closer to the NSG Guidelines, Polster
said. He observed, however, that if India fulfills its
obligations and agrees to IAEA safeguards and signs the
additional protocol, it would be eligible to receive nuclear
fuel from suppliers other than the United States. He
suggested that NSG partners must be prepared to deal with
each other should India decide to receive fuel from more than
one supplier.
4. (SBU) Polster made a request concerning India's presumed
acceptance of IAEA safeguards and the additional protocol.
Once India takes these two steps with the IAEA, the next step
would be for the NSG to approve them. In preparation for NSG
approval, Polster assumed the United States would prepare
some type of document for the NSG's consideration. Polster
requested that the German Government be consulted before the
U.S. finalizes its document and presents it to the entire
NSG.
5. (U) Post requests guidance to respond to the German
request contained in paragraph 4.
TIMKEN JR