CFE: GERMANY PUSHES FOR BEING FORWARD-LEANING ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001107

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL GM
SUBJECT: CFE: GERMANY PUSHES FOR BEING FORWARD-LEANING ON
A/CFE RATIFICATION AT UPCOMING EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE

REF: STATE 75293

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOHN BAUMAN. REASONS:
1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Germany believes that at the June 12-15 CFE
Extraordinary Conference, a point-by-point rebuttal of
Russian concerns about CFE could prove counterproductive and
play into the hands of hardliners in Moscow. Instead,
Germany believes that NATO should be forward-leaning and take
"an orchestrated, step-by-step approach" that demonstrates to
Moscow that all the Allies are genuinely committed to
ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty once Russia has fulfilled
the Istanbul commitments. Germany continues to take a more
restrictive view of the Istanbul commitments with regard to
Russian troops in Moldova than is accepted by the rest of the
Alliance. End Summary.

Favors an earlier HLTF meeting
--------------


2. (C) Post delivered reftel talking points June 1 to MFA
Envoy for Disarmament and Arms Control, Amb. Friedrich
Groening, who promised to study them carefully before next
week's HLTF meeting. Given an extensive discussion of these
issues with the Embassy just the day before (see below),
Groening offered no substantive comments on the U.S.
nonpaper, but did express concern about the possibility that
the HLTF meeting may slip to Friday, June 8. With informal
consultations for the Extraordinary CFE Conference beginning
Monday, June 11 in Vienna, Groening was afraid that there
would be very little opportunity for "mending fences" before
the conference if the HLTF meeting did not go well.
Therefore, he argued for holding the HLTF as previously
scheduled on Thursday, June 7 and the Quad pre-coordination
meeting the day before.

Engage Russians rather than rebut their arguments
-------------- --------------


3. (C) On May 31, prior to the arrival of reftel, Groening
called in the political minister counselor and polmil chief
to register concern about the U.S. approach at the previous
day's Deputy HLTF meeting in Brussels. Also attending on the
German side was MFA Office Director for Conventional Arms
Control Michael Biontino. Based on German reporting from the
meeting, Groening characterized the U.S. line as "the usual
tough stuff," which he thought would be counterproductive if
used with the Russians. He agreed that the six points put
forward by the Russians in their diplomatic note were
basically groundless -- the first three (concerning groups of
parties) will be automatically resolved when the A/CFE comes
into force and the other three do not make much sense.
Nonetheless, rather than rebutting the Russian arguments
point-by-point, Groening thought it would be better to
"engage the Russians" so we can "move forward."

Key is giving assurances on A/CFE ratification
-------------- -


4. (C) Groening claimed to have already discussed some ideas
for an "orchestrated, step-by-step approach" with ISN A/S
John Rood, whom he met in Washington two weeks ago, before
the Russians called for the extraordinary conference on CFE.
The key to success, according to Groening, is giving the
Russians assurances that NATO is ready and committed to
ratify the A/CFE Treaty. He claimed that the Russians are
genuinely convinced that the Allies will not ratify the
A/CFE, even if Moscow does everything we are demanding
regarding the Istanbul commitments. According to Groening,
the Russians believe the Allies are deliberately sabotaging
the A/CFE because the new agreement is, on balance, more
favorable to Russia than to the West. Groening argued that
"different streams" of Russian elite opinion have come
together to call for the extraordinary CFE conference,
including many who want to use it to avoid flank limits or to
get out of the CFE treaty altogether. A confrontational
stance by NATO would just play into the hands of the
hardliners.

Disagreement over the Istanbul commitment for Moldova
-------------- --------------


5. (C) We assured Groening that the U.S. too wanted to engage
the Russians and to try to move forward. We pointed out that
it has long been our policy to actively help the Russians
meet their Istanbul commitments, for example, by helping
financing the withdrawal of ammunition from Moldova. Along
the same lines, the U.S. has made it clear that we are ready
to work with the Russians to help internationalize the
peacekeeping force in Moldova to make it acceptable to
Chisinau. Groening argued that the Russian peacekeepers in
Transnistria are not part of the Istanbul commitments, since
their presence is covered by the 1992 cease-fire agreement
which, according to Groening, remains in force and has never
been abrogated by Chisinau. Only the ammunition and the
Russian soldiers guarding the depot (about 500) are covered,
according to Groening. Regarding the U.S. offer to help the
Russians internationalize the peacekeeping force in
Transnistria, Groening claimed that this was unlikely to get
anywhere since, in his opinion, the Russians would never
accept such a change absent a solution to the whole status
issue. He thought we would never get past the Istanbul
commitment issue in Moldova if we linked it to resolution of
the underlying conflict.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Although Groening never really spelled out his
"step-by-step approach," it seems to be based on the idea
that in return for the Russians making progress on their
Istanbul commitments, the Allies would begin the process of
A/CFE ratification, on the understanding, of course, that
ratification would not be completed until the Russians have
fully complied with their Istanbul commitments. Groening
believes the main objective of the Russians at the upcoming
extraordinary conference will be to see what the Allies are
willing to do to get the A/CFE ratification process started.
Groening fears that if the Allies are not forward-leaning on
the issue of ratification, the Moscow hardliners could use it
as an excuse to push for Russian abrogation of the CFE Treaty.
TIMKEN JR