TURKEY AND TURKISH-GERMANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BERLIN 001067

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2022
TAGS: SOCI PGOV PREL TU GM
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND TURKISH-GERMANS

REF: (A) BERLIN 955 (B) BERLIN 796

Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The Turkish state has long considered Turks
resident in Germany as potential allies and maintains
official and unofficial means of influencing the community.
For many years, Turkey had at best been ambivalent and
sometimes directly hostile to integration. Turkey's stance
has changed, but Ankara still sends mixed signals to its
citizens and former citizens in Germany. The German
government hopes for a more pro-integration policy in the
future. Pressure from younger Turkish Germans, community
leaders who seek greater distance from Ankara, and the German
government will slowly erode the Turkish role here. End
Summary.

History: Bonn and Ankara's Common Agenda
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2. (U) For several decades after Turkish migration as "guest
workers" began in the 1960s, Bonn and Ankara had, broadly
speaking, a common agenda with respect to Turks in Germany.
Because neither saw Turks as immigrants to Germany, Bonn was
happy to let the Turkish state maintain strong ties with
Turks and to let the Turks live in what are now described as
"parallel societies" where German cultural and political
norms did not apply. Key official mechanisms for maintaining
ties to Turkey have been Turkey's large diplomatic presence
(13 Consulates and Consulates General) and Ditib, an
association of Turkish mosques in Germany managed by Ankara's
Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet. Beyond the
official sector, a wide range of Turkish print and electronic
media, sometimes in Germany-based editions, are available to
the community. These media focus heavily on Turkish news and
issues specifically related to the Turkish community. Few
give any coverage to general German news, reflecting the
tastes of their readership. A recent study concluded that 90
percent of Turkish Germans follow Turkish domestic politics;
only two percent were interested in German domestic politics.
Other studies have documented Turkish German reliance on
Turkish media for news.


3. (C) These ties, plus the bonds of kinship, prolonged
Turks' sense of themselves as separate from the majority
community in important political and cultural ways. In some
cases, the efforts of Ankara-affiliated organizations to
oppose integration were blatant. As late as 2003, for
example, Ditib officially and vigorously opposed Islamic
instruction in German in public schools (Christian religion
classes are offered in all states).

Diverging Agendas
--------------


4. (U) Only toward the end of the 1990s did Germany, prompted
by growing concern about the socio-economic weaknesses of the
Turkish German community, and subsequently by the threat of
Islamism, begin seriously looking at how to bring the
community into German society. Reftels and previous report
in depth on steps the German government is now undertaking to
remedy forty years of neglect.


5. (C) Though the German government is now strongly pursuing
integration, the Turkish government's agenda has yet to find
a clear direction. At the macro-political level, many
contacts tell us, Turkey still wants to retain a hold on the
loyalties of Turkish Germans, so as to use the community to
promote its EU candidacy. Most notably, Ankara was
reportedly behind the 2004 establishment of the "Union of
European Turkish Democrats," an organization based in Cologne
which draws on successful young Turkish Germans to promote a
mildly Muslim program of integration, German-Turkish links,
and Turkish EU membership. The group has attracted
considerable German attention. Ali Aslan, an Interior
Ministry official working on integration, told us of his
positive impressions made during a visit to the group with
Interior Minister Schaeuble. However, Kenan Kolat, head of
the Association of Turkish Communities (and whom others also
say is tied closely to Turkish officialdom) czlimed that the
UETD was a Turkish Army project and actively promotes Turkish

SIPDIS
community "dependency" on Turkey. Further evidence of
Turkey's desire to maintain close relations with Turkish
Germans came during Prime Minister Erdogan's recent visit to
Hannover, during which he told local Turkish Germans to learn
Turkish first and "then see about German." Erdogan also
explicitly rejected assimilation into German society. Ankara
favors changes in German legislation that it perceives as
discriminatory and which also tend to undercut ties to
Turkey, for instance Germany's rejection of dual citizenship
and new proposals that would require intending immigrants to
learn German before their arrival and raise the age for a new

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foreign spouse to enter the country to 18 or, perhaps, even

21.


6. (C) Many of our contacts believe that groups like UETD and
the Association of Turkish Communities are at a minimum
indirect means for Ankara to spread and promote its views
among Turkish Germans. Feminist lawyer Seyran Ates is more
critical than most. She has told us that she believes there
is a Turkish nationalist agenda that is hostile to
integration and suggests that German funding for such groups'
"integration" and social programs serves this hidden agenda.
These contacts also believe that Ankara also provides funding
for such groups, although the Turkish Embassy denies this and
Interior's Aslan doubts it. Rather, Aslan sees the groups as
legitimately reflecting the views of their members and
statements such as Erdogan's as reflecting a somewhat
exaggerated sensitivity to any measures the community sees as
discriminatory. Aslan points out that dual citizenship is
supported across the board in the Turkish German community.


7. (U) The Turkish government also has a security interest in
maintaining a strong presence in the Turkish community. Most
of the estimated 600,000 Kurds in Germany are of Turkish
origin, making up as much as a quarter of the Turkish
population. Germany's Office for the Protection of the
Constitution estimates that in 2006 the PKK (operating under
the name "People's Congress of Kurdistan - Kongra Gel") had a
"potential membership" (i.e., members plus active supporters)
of 11,500.

-- Ditib's Evolution


8. (C) Ditib's evolution is a study in the complexities of
Ankara's relationship to Turkish Germans. We have heard for
several years that Ditib is moving in a more pro-integration
direction, with different contacts advancing different
theories. Some suggest that Ankara believes that Turkish
Germans will be a more effective lobby on behalf of EU
membership and other Turkish interests if they become German
citizens. Others have said that Ditib is under pressure from
the rising generation of Turkish Germans to become more
German and thus more relevant to their lives and needs.
Michael Blume, an expert on the Turkish community working in
the Baden-Wuerttemberg State Chancellery, points to the
latter factor but adds that Turkish politics also play an
important role. In his view, the AKP (Turkey's pro-Islam
governing party) has a long-term goal of establishing a true
separation of Islam and the state in Turkey. It is pursuing
this very cautiously in Turkey, he says. In Germany, though,
the AKP sees the chance to stage something like a trial-run
by slowly separating Ditib from the Diyanet. Blume points
out that more and more of Ditib's leadership comes from the
Turkish German community, although its leader is still
essentially appointed from Ankara.


9. (C) In our conversations with non-Diyanet Turkish Embassy
officials, we have gotten little sense that they, who insist
that Ditib is already a completely German organization, see
or would support separation, and Ditib's new President, Sadi
Arslan, passes out business cards which identify him (like
his predecessor) as the Turkish Embassy's Counselor for
Religious Affairs. Necla Kelek, a prominent critic of
religious Islam, believes, in contrast to Blume, that the AKP
is seeking only to Islamicize Ditib (and the Diyanet) as part
of its pro-Islam agenda. Kenan Kolat, Chairman of the
Association of Turkish Communities, also sees an AKP agenda
and fears that Ditib, which he and Kelek both associate with
a "secular" Islam, will be dominated by the more orthodox
groups within Germany's new Muslim Coordination Council
(KRM)(Ref B). Lawyer Ates disagrees, seeing an independent
Ditib as the only way to give decisive influence to the
laicist majority of Turkish Muslims. Embassy Ankara reports
some official concern about Ditib's recent affiliation with
the KRM, based however on a possible weakening of the
distinctiveness of the Turkish identity in a German/European
Islam. In addition to the AKP's alleged agenda, we
understand that there was pressure from Turkish Germans in
Ditib to join the KRM to ensure Ditib's role in German
Muslims' religious structures.

Dilemma
--------------


10. (C) We hear from Blume, Aslan and others that the younger
generation of Turkish Germans feel, in fact, neither Turkish
nor German. Aslan, himself of Turkish ancestry, reports that
many are caught in an antiquated "Turkish" cultural milieu
while having no real connection to Turkey. Blume, whose wife
is Turkish, tells us many young Turkish Germans feel shame
that their leadership often speaks no or only bad German.
Aslan, seconded by Ates, also reports that Ankara is
increasingly concerned that Turkish cultural isolation in

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Europe is in fact hurting its prospects for EU membership.
Nor can Turkey overcome the effects of time and distance and
maintain the same kind of relationship to today's generation
as it did to their fathers or grandfathers. So, Ankara is
obliged to support integration at some level. On the other
hand, finding a balance between integration and maintaining
ties to the homeland will be very difficult. For example, if
Turkish Germans increasingly shift to German as their first
language, as Germany insists, the role of Turkish media will
likely fall considerably. So, too, will the role of Turkish
speaking imams and of Ditib officials who don't know the
language. Likewise, keeping Ditib tied to the Diyanet risks
a clash with Turkish Germans who increasingly expect the
organization to reflect their needs and concerns. Blume
believes that the latter trend will gradually oblige Turkey
to accept Ditib's conversion to a truly local organization.


Subtle German Pressure
--------------


11. (C) The question of Turkey's role in the Turkish-German
and German Muslim communities is of some concern to German
officials. Guenther Piening, Berlin's Commissioner for
Integration, has told us that he is particularly concerned
that a Turkish agenda could come to dominate the KRM, partly
because of the weight of the Turkish community but also
because of the special veto granted to Ditib in the Council.
However, there is also a positive role to Ditib's influence,
much appreciated by German officialdom. Ditib, as an arm of
the Turkish state, has promoted the moderate, "secular" Islam
that it seems German leaders would like to see in Germany.
Ditib has also promoted loyalty to the secular state and
respect for the law, two virtues Germany would like to
instill in its Muslims. Visiting the construction site for a
new mosque, Munich Mayor Christian Ude was explicit: Ditib
was a guarantee for secular society (laicism) and would fight
radical tendencies in Islam. The Germans also face a
dilemma: a less Turkish Ditib might be more representative of
Turkish Germans, but also less secular (especially because
secular Turks have shown no interest in joining Ditib).
Interior's Aslan summed up German uncertainty regarding
Turkey. He did not think the Turkish government was a major
force in maintaining the acknowledged distinctiveness of
Turkish Germans, but he also thought that Turkey could and
should do more to promote integration. Toward that end,
Aslan reported that the Interior Ministry is organizing, for
Istanbul in October, a seminar and exhibit on Turkish life in
Germany. Though he was unclear on the specifics, Aslan hoped
this event would help change Turkish attitudes and policy
toward Turkish Germans.

Upcoming Tests
--------------


12. (C) Education is likely to be the main arena where
potential conflicts between Germany and Turkey could be
clarified. All our German and Turkish German interlocutors
stress the importance of developing German language skills to
successful integration. However, PM Erdogan's statement, the
sharp criticism of plans in Hesse to cancel Turkish language
classes, ostensibly for budgetary reasons, and the rejection
by the Turkish Embassy of the German-only policy (agreed by
the parents and students) at a Berlin school highlight the
potential for conflict. Greater conflict could arise if a
German state moves to establish an Islamic theological
faculty at a German University (an urgent need, according to
Ates). Such a faculty would pose a challenge to the near
monopoly on religious leadership Turkey now enjoys among
Turks in Germany. Ditib is, however, open to working with
German universities on the establishment of such a faculty,
Turkish Embassy contacts tell us. The overwhelmingly
positive reaction to German-language Islam classes (by
teachers trained in Germany and using curricula developed
jointly between states and local Muslim communities) suggests
that Turkey could not win a battle over education in the
long-term. The courses, according to Blume, have proved to
be a key tool for integrating students and families into the
wider school community, giving Muslim students equal status
with their Christian counterparts and offering families a
trustworthy and well-informed link (the teacher) to school
administration. The reaction to pilot projects was so
positive it forced Ditib to reverse its historic opposition
to in-school, German-language Islam classes.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) The Turkish state's role among Turkish Germans is
nether simple nor always coherent. Moreover, rivalries and
differences among Turkish Germans ensure that views of that
role are also complex and, at times, contradictory. It is

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clear though, that to some degree, Ankara's role does hinder
the integration process. Ankara and Turkish Germans with a
nationalist bent seem to be seeking ways to define a minimal
acceptable level of integration. Many others, however, seem
to be willing to accept or even prefer greater distance from
the homeland. Though the antipathy between religious and
secular Turkish Germans hinders cooperation on integration,
their openness to change, combined with pressure from the
German state and the younger generation of Turkish Germans
appears, from our perspective, likely to cause a slow but
steady erosion of Turkish official influence here. End
Comment.


13. This cable was coordinated with Embassy Ankara.
TIMKEN JR