Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE952
2007-07-05 13:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

YOUR JULY 10-11 VISIT TO BELGRADE

Tags:  PBTS PGOV PREL SR 
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DE RUEHBW #0952/01 1861350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051350Z JUL 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1123
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000952 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR POLT FOR A/S FRIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: YOUR JULY 10-11 VISIT TO BELGRADE

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000952

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR POLT FOR A/S FRIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: YOUR JULY 10-11 VISIT TO BELGRADE

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (c) Dan - Your visit comes amidst a surprising, if
brief, lull in heated Kosovo rhetoric from Serbia's
leadership. The lack of a decisive statement out of
Kennebunkport has left Kostunica and other Kosovo hardliners
without a clear hook on which to hang additional Kosovo
vitriol, and the approaching summer season will leave the
government somewhat depleted as ministers and others take
their traditional vacations. This lull gives you something
of a vacuum to fill. It provides an opportunity to reiterate
our commitment to completing the status process and our
expectation for Kosovo's inevitable independence, and to
reassert a message of unity in the Quint.

BELGRADE'S TACTICS


2. (c) Kostunica still has no strategy for finding an
alternative solution for Kosovo to the Ahtisaari Plan. The
ideas given by Kosovo Minister Samardzic to Russian
Ambassador to Serbia Alexeev, even by the admission of KOSMIN
senior officials, contained nothing new. Kostunica remains
content to score tactical victories - every day without
resolution is seen as another day he has "beaten" the Quint.
Meanwhile, he has intensified in recent weeks a targeted
media campaign designed to drive a wedge between the USG and
the rest of the Quint. His messages portray the U.S. as the
sole author of the current impasse, and focus on the
deteriorating relationship between Serbia and the U.S., while
noting separately that relations with Europe are improving as
SAA talks move forward. He remains confident that he has the
Europeans cowed and that open-ended negotiations are the
likely future for Kosovo.


3. (c) Kostunica's speech marking Vitovdan was a new low in
nationalist rhetoric from the PM - recalling for many the
nationalistic hate speech of Milosevic at a similar
commemoration in 1989, Kostunica ranted about a "new battle
for Kosovo" between the U.S. and Serbia. The speech drew a
surprising amount of criticism even from local media, which
is usually hesitant to cross the government on Kosovo policy,

and was probably a miscalculation. My response to his
remarks simply reiterated our longstanding friendship,
dismissed the notion that we are somehow at war, and
highlighted all the areas where we work together. This
reaction played very well in local press and further
highlighted Kostunica's irrationality on the subject.

ADRIFT AFTER KENNEBUNKPORT


4. (c) Following that tirade, Serbia's leadership held its
breath and looked forward to a strong statement from Putin
out of the Kennebunkport meeting with the President. The GoS
was clearly poised to react, but ended up sending out a
reaction statement that fizzled when there was no clear
statement on Kosovo from either side following the meeting.
While only a few days have lapsed since then, Serbia's
leadership seems for now a bit unsure of how to proceed wit
their media campaign. It is in this atmosphere that your
visit will take place - just two days ahead of a planned
visit by Kouchner. There is little advance information about
how Kouchner plans to run his trip, other than to show us all
how to handle the Balkans, but there are local rumors that he
may come to town with a partition proposal.

YOUR MEETINGS AND MESSAGES


5. (c) Your only official meetings will be with President
Tadic and PM Kostunica; a press conference will follow at the
Embassy. With Tadic, it will be important to remind him that
we notice the difference between his private reassurances
that Serbia will engage responsibly and his almost
enthusiastic public adherence to the Kostunica rejectionist
line. In fairness, there is a subtle nuance of difference
between his and the PM's public position - Tadic has asserted
he does not want Serbia to isolate itself over Kosovo, while
Kostunica seems indifferent to such a consequence. But given
the systemic immunity of the Serbian body politic to nuance,
the effect on moving public opinion has been negligible.
Consistent opinion polling and our own analysis suggests that
Serbia can get beyond status relatively unscathed, but only
if the GoS is willing to lead it there. Tadic needs a
regular dose of reminders of this.


6. (c) With Kostunica, there is little left to say
privately. He will not move from his position, and is
relatively unmindful of the consequences, apparently willing
to throw in with the Russians if that is the price for
disrupting a status solution. The best you can probably do
is cast all subtlety aside and tell him in the starkest
possible terms our commitment to an independent Kosovo -

BELGRADE 00000952 002 OF 002


preferably through the UNSC, but outside that framework if
necessary. It is unlikely to influence the outcome, but
might move him through the grief cycle a bit, away from
denial and anger and - hopefully - in the direction of
acceptance.


7. (c) At your press event, I recommend you take a tack
similar to mine in responding to Kostunica's Vitovdan rant -
note the inevitability of Kosovo's independence as a straight
declarative, then move on to areas where we remain committed
to Serbia's future - development assistance, investment and
job creation, and military-to-military cooperation. In
addition, wherever possible you should refer to the U.S. and
our European partners, to undo some of the traction Kostunica
has achieved in portraying us as split form the rest of the
Quint on Kosovo. In the absence of a statement from
Kennebunkport, your comments will be the first firm indicator
since that meeting of where we stand and where we're going.
It will be good to have you back here.
POLT