DS FAILS FIRST TEST OF COALITION LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000925

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/17
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR NATO SR
SUBJECT: DS FAILS FIRST TEST OF COALITION LEADERSHIP

Classified by Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (c) SUMMARY: The recent tabling of the proposed PfP
Presentation Document in a sub-Cabinet committee of the GoS may be an
early indicator of the power relationships that will guide the new
coalition government. Key DS ministers were either unwilling or
unable to push the document (which had already been cleared by all
relevant ministries) through the Cabinet in time for FONMIN Jeremic's
proposed delivery of the document to Brussels on June 28. This
episode, on the heels of other recent events surrounding the
intelligence service and Kosovo policy, may well indicate that
Kostunica will continue to call the shots without effective
opposition from DS for the foreseeable future. End summary.


2. (c) In a June 19 policy planning meeting in the foreign affairs
committee of the GoS Cabinet of Ministers, committee chair and Kosovo
Minister Slobodan Samardzic unexpectedly rejected the proposed draft
PfP Presentation Document, citing reservations about language
referring to cooperation with NATO and the terminology
"Euro-Atlantic." MoD officials up to and including DEFMIN Sutanovac
were quick to inform the Embassy and to explain that the Ministry had
done everything in its power to put the PD on the agenda for the
regularly-scheduled Cabinet meeting to be held June 21, but said they
could not overcome Samardzic's objections.


3. (c) MoD State Secretary Zoran Jeftic, a DS-allied reformist who
attended the session of the committee, said Samardzic had not offered
any coherent rationale for his opposition, and seemed to be simply
acting out instructions, presumably from Kostunica or his advisors,
to block the PD from moving forward. Jeftic noted that neither
DEFMIN Sutanovac nor FONMIN Jeremic had attended the meeting to
champion the PD, and Assistant MoD Dusan Spasojevic later told us
that MFA had sent a Milosevic-era functionary to sit in on the
meeting, who remained silent throughout the proceedings.


4. (c) Jeftic explained that the foreign policy committee (which is
a rough approximation of a DC/PC) is responsible for clearing items
to recommend to the PM to put on the agenda of the Thursday Cabinet
meetings (he said there are three other such committees, including
one for finance and one for legislation). The foreign affairs
committee is chaired by DSS Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic,
and also includes Energy Minister Popovic (DSS),Economy Minister
Dinkic (G-17 Plus),Sutanovac, Jeremic, and Justice Minister Petrovic
(all DS).


5. (c) Jeftic said that a majority in the committee can, in theory,
override the reservations of the chairman, but that the chairman's
approval is needed to move any recommendation onto the proposed
agenda. He also said that, if a minister feels an issue is in the
vital national interest, s/he can override the committee and propose
the issue directly in the Cabinet meeting - but he conceded that the
PM can table any issue he does not wish to discuss. Jeftic said he
received no support from his DS and G17 colleagues in defending the
PD, and he felt Jeremic would not force a confrontation in the
Cabinet by proposing the item himself.


6. (c) The immediate practical result of this "procedural" snafu is
that the PD will have to be internally renegotiated - apparently now
with inputs from KOSMIN Samardzic - despite all relevant ministries
having previously cleared the draft. At issue, at the very least,
will be how Serbia defines its future relationship with NATO and its
desire to engage with the "Euro-Atlantic" (vice "European")
community. Also likely to get more scrutiny will be language
referring to ICTY and direct and oblique references to Kosovo and
Serbia's territorial integrity/sovereignty. As a result, FONMIN
Jeremic will not, as promised, deliver Serbia's PD to Brussels later
this week.


7. (c) The longer-term impact of this episode is disappointing,
though hardly surprising. Passage of the PD was the first
opportunity for DS to exercise what President Tadic touted privately
and publicly as the key deliverable achieved by DS in the coalition
talks - a majority voting position in the Cabinet. This majority was
supposed to enable DS to push through any decisions it deemed
critical to Serbia's future, even in the face of DSS (and potential
G-17) opposition. Tadic, Jeremic and the DS have all made it crystal
clear to us repeatedly in the past that a Euro-Atlantic future is
their top priority. Yet this first engagement with DSS over an issue
on which they disagree went unquestionably in favor of DSS.


8. (c) The unwillingness or inability of DS ministers to overcome
Samardzic's objection (to say nothing of the inanity of giving him
the chair of the foreign policy committee in the first place) tells
us at least one, and possibly two important things: first, that DS
either does not have or is unwilling to exercise the power it claims
to have to force decisions in the Cabinet; and second, that they are
unwilling or unable at this point to fight effectively for Serbia's
Euro-Atlantic orientation. This episode comes on the heels of a
Samardzic-driven "new plan" on Kosovo to which no one in DS, its
ministries, or the Presidency was privy (septel),and follows shortly
after Tadic capitulated on retaining DSS's Rade Bulatovic as the head
of the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) - an issue DS leaders

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previously said would bring down the government. Such interactions
represent a weak showing by DS in the first months of the new
coalition government, and are an indication that Kostunica will
continue to call the shots in the new coalition until DS discovers
someone who can match his tactical political acumen.

POLT