SOUTHERN SERBIA UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000920

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS KPAO SR MW YI
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SERBIA UPDATE


1. (SBU) Summary: During a trip to Presevo and Bujanovac on June
19-20, poloff and polspec met with political leaders and various
contacts from NGOs, the media and the Orthodox Church. In general,
the region is currently acceptably calm and secure. Our contacts
confirmed that the protest on June 15 advocating secession from
Serbia was a failure, reflecting that most of the Valley's
inhabitants do not think separating or using force are viable
strategies for achieving their vision of the futures. Politically,
the region remains adrift with both municipalities wracked with
internal divisions (often intra-party disputes) and competing
strategies on how react to the two main local pressures:
dissatisfaction with Belgrade and Kosovo final status. End Summary.

The factors
--------------


2. (SBU) Kosovo: President Bush's statements in Tirana and Sofia
still resonate throughout the Presevo Valley, with various leaders
telling us the affirmation of the USG's support for Kosovo's
independence "lowered the temperature" considerably in the region.
Media contacts told us that prior to the President's statement;
tensions had been much higher due to the talk of status delay at the
G8 as well as the Sarkozy proposal. Presevo Valley Albanians seem
content to take the President's statement as a fiat and not worry
further for now. While there are rumors that Albin Kurti's
"Self-determination" movement may have some contacts (probably
through family ties) in the Valley, there is nothing close to
grassroots support.


3. (SBU) Belgrade: In general, Presevo Valley Albanians continue to
support their MP, Riza Halimi, in his efforts to advance their
interests in Belgrade. The perception of Belgrade's interest in
engaging with the region, however, is that the capital is steadily
losing interest. Albanian leaders complain of the increasing
dysfunctionality of the GOS Coordinating Body for Southern Serbia
(CB) and rumors of a cut in budgeted funds from Belgrade for next
year. In our assessment, Belgrade has actually performed moderately
well in terms of investment over the last few years (although we
agree that a cut in funding would be a clear step in the wrong
direction). Belgrade has abjectly failed to capitalize on any of
its development assistance to the municipalities, probably another
symptom of the lack of any clear leadership atop the CB. Rasim
Ljalic is technically still in charge, and Nenad Popovic is
apparently still involved with the CB's Economic Team for Southern
Serbia. Hardly anyone in southern Serbia -- Albanian or Serb -- has
high expectations for a revitalized CB or senior-level engagement in
the region.


4. (SBU) Internal politics: In both Bujanovac and Presevo, the
parties continue to cope with the fragile majorities handed to them
in last June's municipal elections. In the case of Bujanovac, the
assembly is essentially frozen in place after the division and
walkout of one of the coalition parties (see LPD below). The stasis
in Bujanovac is actually a good thing -- the local government came
to a halt before the Serbs in civic positions could be replaced (as
was demanded by the hardline Albanian parties in the governing
coalition),so Bujanovac remains with multi-ethnic appointments
rather by accident. In Presevo, most of the internal concerns are
limited to Mustafa's intra-party struggles (see PDSh below) with
most of the party supportive of Mustafa's anti-engagement stance and
the rest considering a split for the next elections. Interestingly,
Mustafa has a very good relationship with Presevo CB representative
Branko Delibasic, both of whom seem to have struck a mutually
beneficial relationship: Mustafa keeps things relatively calm and
tries to dissuade separatists while Delibasic can claim to the
international community that all is well in Presevo. Delibasic
showed that he has not remained above the fray of local
political/personal politics by questioning the Embassy's suspension
of contact with Mustafa, while disparaging MP Halimi has "not having
too much support" in Presevo.

The players
--------------


5. (SBU) Party of Democratic Action -- PVD (Bujanovac Mayor Arifi,
MP Riza Halimi): Mayor Nagip Arifi remains understandably fixated on
the aftermath of a bomb attack on his family home on June 1. He
continues to harbor reservations about whether the local police are
doing their job, and is even suspicious that they were involved.
Without doubt, this is a serious matter, but it does not seem like
anything terribly amiss for now. Arifi was out of the country at
the time of the attack and there are questions as to why his family
waited almost a day to report the event. Still, we have reassured
Arifi that we will monitor the situation and understand from him
that he will not abandon any of the courageous stands he and his
party have taken regarding engagement with Belgrade, supporting
election participation and promoting multi-ethnic representation
from the Serb community in Bujanovac. We also met with Shaip
Kamberi, who heads a human rights NGO and is a serious contender

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within the PVD for a leadership role and/or Mayor. He has stepped
aside (twice) for Arifi, and in our analysis, has more political
savvy, expertise on issues, and ability to work effectively with
Belgrade and the international community. Nevertheless, a power
struggle between Arifi and Kamberi would result with serious crisis
within the PVD. Halimi is close to both, and it might come down to
his intervention -- and he might be inclined to give Kamberi his
shot at last.


6. (SBU) PDSh (Presevo Mayor Mustafa): Our policy of non-engagement
with Mustafa appears to be having a clear effect. In his most
recent party elections, former Presevo assembly Speaker Naser Aziri
ran against Mustafa on the platform that Mustafa's alienation of the
international community -- the US in particular -- was too costly
and damaging for the party. Mustafa defeated Aziri 98-57, but many
local contacts agree with Aziri's assessment that Mustafa leveraged
financial resources from his backers (notably a Gnjilan-based juice
factory) to sway votes with cash. Nevertheless, Aziri told us that
he will make another push for the party to change its policy before
the next elections, and if it doesn't he will split from the party
and run. We reaffirmed our policy to work with any party that
supports Contact Group principles, but also stressed that there can
be no change in the Embassy's dealings with the PDSh while Mustafa
remains in charge and against those same principles.


7. (SBU) LPD (Bujanovac Deputy Mayor Jonuz Musliu): It is hard to
say whether it is because of our non-engagement policy, but Musliu's
LPD party is simply falling apart. Four of his nine MPs (out of 41)
have walked out of the assembly, apparently no longer supportive of
Musliu. Musliu and the LPD lack any political expertise (Musliu was
previously headed the UCPMB's political wing) and their current
collapse is likely more due to a lack of any real party management
rather than a studied reconsideration by party factions of external
factors like US Embassy policy.


8. (SBU) GOS Coordinating Body (Sima Gazikalovic in Bujanovac,
Branko Delibasic in Presevo): To most observers the CB is going
nowhere fast, but this actually seems to be largely the GOS' fault.
The CB has actually poured a considerable amount of funds into
developing the region, often in partnership with AID and the UK's
DFID, but has not bothered to translate that into any successful PR
campaign. For example, the CB (along with AID) contributed to a
school in Bujanovac which, despite aspirations to the contrary,
ended up a mono-ethnic Albanian school. The CB reacted strongly
when others, like the municipal government and AID partners, were
recognized for their contributions but not the GOS and CB. We
pressed the Albanian leaders, including Arifi, to correct this (he
regretted it too, casting blame on the school director),but at the
same time it is clear the GOS simply cannot advertise the good it is
doing. The inability is probably directly linked to the absence of
leadership at the top of the organization, and lack of interest from
top-level GOS officials to do anything about it.


9. (U) The media: Both Presevo and Bujanovac now have private TV
stations -- TV ALDI in Presevo and TV SPEKTRI in Bujanovac -- to go
with the two state run stations. The Serbian broadcasting authority
will be determining who will receive the two licenses available (one
for each municipality) and both private stations are concerned they
may lose out to their state-run rivals.


10. (SBU) UCPMB veterans: The veterans of the defunct Liberation
Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB) have tried to make
themselves political relevant again through protests and have thus
far failed. They are currently marginalized because neither the
politicians nor the citizens seem to want them involved in politics
and do not see value (for now) in their message of unilateral
separation from Serbia.

Comment
--------------


10. (SBU) The Valley is calm because there is a sense that the
international community is committed to remaining involved in
southern Serbia and that Kosovo will become independent soon (mostly
because the USG has said it will). The UCPMB insurrection in 2001
showed that things can turn bad quickly in southern Serbia. For
now, the failure of the veterans' protest shows that there is
neither a spark nor fuel for instability. However, delay and lack
of clarity on the next steps forward by the international community
on Kosovo will lead to doubts among the inhabitants of the Valley
about their own future. The moderates like Arifi, Halimi and others
have held the line thus far on countering separatism, but the
support for "eastern Kosovo" by political or militant means will
increase as clarity decreases. Moreover, we have often counted on
Kosovo leaders to calm tensions and call on Presevo Valley Albanians
to constructively engage with Belgrade. If the status uncertainty
drags on, we would expect them to be preoccupied with their own
political futures, leaving them with scant resources or attention to
bring to bear on destabilizing influences in southern Serbia. End

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comment.
POLT