Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE915
2007-06-26 16:53:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

MINISTRY OF KOSOVO: KOSTUNICA'S FULCRUM

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS KPAO SR MW YI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6246
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0915/01 1771653
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261653Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1076
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1367
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000915 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS KPAO SR MW YI
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF KOSOVO: KOSTUNICA'S FULCRUM

REF: BELGRADE 668

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000915

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS KPAO SR MW YI
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF KOSOVO: KOSTUNICA'S FULCRUM

REF: BELGRADE 668


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Serbia's Ministry of Kosovo and Metohija
(MOK) emerged as a new ministry during the government
coalition negotiations following Serbia's January 2007
parliamentary elections. The Ministry aims to coordinate
Serbia's Kosovo policy by combining the operational
elements of the existing Coordinating Center for Kosovo
(CCK) with a new cabinet-level organization responsible for
intra-GOS coordination as well as the GOS's bilateral and
multilateral engagement on Kosovo issues. The Ministry of
Kosovo still has work to do before it is fully online, but
it is clear that the Ministry is wholly Kostunica/DSS run
and aims to manage Kosovo policy -- a considerable portion
of the GOS' activity -- through its coordination of other
(mostly Tadic/DS-run) ministries. Interestingly, MOK
officials draw from Parliament's empowerment of the Kosovo
negotiating team rather than the Ministry's legal basis in
order to bypass other governmental institutions in ways
unavailable to ministries. The way in which the GOS has
handled their "secret plan" for the Russians to use at
Kennebunkport as well as their hands-off approach to
possible demonstrations by Serbs on Vitovdan (June 28) in
Kosovo illustrate this process. End Summary.

Personnel and Logistics
--------------


2. (SBU) Serbia's Ministry of Kosovo and Metohija was
created during the government formation discussions
following the January 2007 parliamentary elections. The
Law of Ministries passed by the new parliament officially
brought the MOK online (relevant section of Law in para
13). Slobodan Samardzic, Prime Minister Kostunica's top
Kosovo advisor and chief negotiator to the UNOSEK talks, is
the Minister (official bio in paragraph 12). In the weeks
after the new Ministry was announced, Ljubomir Kljakic and
Branislava Aleksander -- both longtime Samardzic associates
(and DSS apparatchiks) -- were named Assistant Ministers.
Dusan Prorokovic, another DSS member and formerly head of
the Kosovo Committee in parliament, has been named state
secretary. The Coordinating Center for Kosovo (CCK) has


SIPDIS
been subsumed into the MOK and will be headed by Vuko
Antonijevic, replacing Sanda Raskovic-Ivic. Antonijevic, a
member of the DSS, most recently was a deputy coordinator
of CCK, and prior to that was chairman of the Serbian
National Council (SNV).


3. (U) The MOK does not have dedicated office space and is
currently operating out of the Government Building
(Nemanjina 11) where the Prime Minister's offices are
located. CCK continues to be based in the Federal Palace
in New Belgrade.


Substantive Mandate
--------------


4. (SBU) Assistant Minister Ljubomir Kljakic told poloff on
June 5 that the Ministry's primary missions are to
coordinate Kosovo policy throughout the GOS and "manage"
relations with other countries and international
organizations regarding Kosovo. He specifically mentioned
that the MOK would coordinate the Kosovo-related policies
involving the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense,
Interior, International Economic Relations and
Telecommunications. Kljakic said that, for example, if the
Foreign Minister travels abroad and engages on the Kosovo
issue, that his statements would be done in coordination
with the MOK. When asked directly, Kljakic said the
Presidency would also be "coordinated in the same fashion."


5. (SBU) Kljakic said the MOK would also oversee the GOS
negotiating team for Kosovo for any future talks. The
substantive starting point for the Ministry is, as Kljakic
said, that fresh talks are a "reasonable assumption" now
that the EU and UNSC's "perspectives have matured" enough
to be "ready to lower rigidity and question views" on
Kosovo and be willing to approach Kosovo status "with open
eyes."


6. (SBU) According to Kljakic, the technical nature of the
CCK's existing work would remain unchanged. The creation
of the Ministry will simply add a layer on top of the CCK
which will coordinate internal and international management
of Kosovo policy, which is "intense" and "multifaceted"
enough to require a whole ministry for coordination.

Influence without responsibility

BELGRADE 00000915 002 OF 003


--------------


7. (SBU) In a separate meeting on June 26, Prorokovic told
polcouns that the MOK would "influence" the other
ministries involved in Kosovo while indicating that
responsibility for implementation would stay with the
relevant ministry. For example, Prorokovic said, if a
school or hospital needed to be built in Kosovo, the
Education or Health Ministries would carry out the task.
The MOK, however, would be allocated a budget and
appropriate funds and "advise" the relevant ministry. Two
real examples of how the MOK's influence without
responsibility were immediately available (paras 8 and 9).


8. (SBU) Polcouns asked Prorokovic directly about the GOS
plan allegedly passed to the Russians in advance of
Kennebunkport. Prorokovic called it a "technical
document...written in response to Putin's request" to
Kostunica for a Serbian plan for Kosovo and that he could
not share the contents. He maintained, though, that there
was "nothing new" in the points passed to Moscow that was
not already contained in the GoS proposal delivered to the
UNSC during its recent visit to Belgrade. He further
explained that it had not been circulated to other
institutions because Minister Samardzic gave it to the
Russian Ambassador "in his capacity empowered by the
parliament," referring to the 2/14/07 reaffirmation of the
GOS negotiating team by the newly elected MPs (but well
before a government formation). Therefore, Prorokovic
said, it was not a government document and did not need to
be circulated throughout the various ministries, parliament
or the Presidency. Post nevertheless requested a copy, as
has been done with the Ministries of Defense and Foreign
Affairs and the President's office (all of which did not
have one).


9. (SBU) Polcouns also raised the publicized plans for
groups of Serbs to march into Kosovo for Vitovdan on June
28, and that the USG wanted to make clear to the GOS that
Belgrade must do everything in its power to rein in
extremist elements and any other destabilizing factor
associated with the march. Prorokovic shrugged off the
representation, essentially saying the actions of any
marchers were not his ministry's responsibility. He added
that Serbia could not be responsible for the actions of any
non-state group on a non-state trip. Polcouns reiterated
the expectation, noting that similar clear messages had
been made to the Interior Ministry.

Comment
--------------


10. (SBU) As an interagency body responsible for
coordinating several Ministries' Kosovo policy, the MOK
effectively accomplishes two things for Kostunica: it is
his tool to manage GOS Kosovo policy without competition
and a political structure which keeps the coalition parties
in line both on Kosovo and in government. The Presidency
appears to have been willingly removed from any shared
responsibility on Kosovo. Tadic currently has no permanent
Kosovo advisor and he works from the same talking points as
Kostunica in public comments.


11. (SBU) Comment con't: As demonstrated by the MOK's
handling of the "secret plan" and Vitovdan, the Ministry
can make its mandate suit its needs depending on the
circumstance. The MOK gives Kostunica the ability to
advise, comment on, and control almost all of the GOS'
policy inside Kosovo, as well as to deflect any real
accountability to other Serbian institutions or away from
Serbia entirely. End comment.


12. (U) Begin text of official bio of Serbian Minister for
Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic:

Born in Belgrade in 1953. He graduated from the Faculty of
Political Sciences in Belgrade, where he also obtained his
PhD. He was editor of scientific and political program at
Radio Belgrade from 1982 to 1984. He is a regular professor
at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. He was
advisor for political issues to former Yugoslav president
and later Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. He
headed the Serbian government's committee for
decentralization and is member of the state negotiating
team on the future status of Kosovo-Metohija. Speaks
English and German. Married, with three children.

End text.


BELGRADE 00000915 003 OF 003



13. (U) Begin excerpt of GOS Law on Ministries

Article 24

The Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija is responsible for
government administration related to: functioning of the
institutions of the Republic of Serbia on the territory of
Kosovo and Metohija; education, health care, social policy,
culture, infrastructure and telecommunications in Serbian
regions of Kosovo and Metohija; activities of the Serbian
Orthodox Church; renewal of spiritual and cultural
heritage; financial, legal, technical and human resources
assistance in all fields significant for Serbs and other
non-Albanian communities on the territory of Kosovo and
Metohija; cooperation with the Commissioner for Refugees in
the segment relating to internal displaced persons from
Kosovo and Metohija; formulating proposal of law
regulating the essential autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija;
cooperation with the civil and military mission of the UN
on Kosovo and Metohija (UNMIK and KFOR); recommending to
the Government the new negotiating team tasked with all
international activities relating to continuation of
negotiations for resolving the future status of Kosovo and
Metohija; managing activities of the State negotiating
team; maintaining constant international contacts with
participants in the international negotiating process for
defining the future status of Kosovo and Metohija, as well
as other tasks defined by law.

End text.


POLT