Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BELGRADE797
2007-06-06 13:09:00
SECRET
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

DETAILS, IMPACT OF TOLIMIR ARREST

Tags:  ICTY PGOV PREL SR 
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VZCZCXRO7038
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHBW #0797/01 1571309
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061309Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0963
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000797 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS: ICTY PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: DETAILS, IMPACT OF TOLIMIR ARREST


Classified by Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000797

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS: ICTY PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: DETAILS, IMPACT OF TOLIMIR ARREST


Classified by Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (s) Summary: A recent meeting with Serbia's Action Plan
coordinator revealed that Tolimir was in fact arrested in Belgrade.
The circumstances of the arrest point mostly to internal political
motivations vice a sea change in ICTY policy. Nevertheless, the
result was positive, and proved the operational capacity and
political will can be found to complete ICTY cooperation, in the
right circumstances. Keeping the Mladic redline on concluding the
SAA and full euro-atlantic integration could be a key to encouraging
additional action. End Summary.


2. (s) An apologetic Rasim Ljajic, chairman of the National Council
for Cooperation with the ICTY, met with poloffs June 5 to revise
information he had provided at the time of the Tolimir arrest
operation. He admitted that Tolimir had indeed been arrested in
Belgrade and transported to the Serbia-RS border, where it was
arranged for RS police to apprehend him for further transfer to The
Hague. Somewhat agitatedly, Ljajic noted that of the five Action
Plan coordinators (including himself),only BIA chief BULATOVIC had
any knowledge of the operation in advance. In fact, Ljajic confirmed
this was an all-BIA operation, noting that police units were on the
border "essentially for show." He added that one other person in the
cabinet was aware of the operation (hinting at Kostunica Chief of
Staff Aleksander Nikitovic, who he had previously reported called
Ljajic for details of the operation).


3. (s) Ljajic noted that in his meeting with ICTY chief prosecutor
Carla del Ponte, Kostunica refused to confirm the details of the
operation, saying he "couldn't comment on that." Ljajic said she was
later informed in other meetings of the nature of the operation. She
reportedly told Kostunica that, while Tolimir's arrest was of course
good news, her take-away from the operation was a clear message that
the GoS knows where the remaining PIFWCs are and has the ability to
hand them over. A frustrated Ljajic told us the GoS "had the ball,
and could have scored a goal, but instead decided to play

kindergarten games" with Tolimir, noting the goodwill and trust that
could have been generated by an arrest in Serbia.


4. (s) Ljajic said that, in addition to strengthening the case for
restarting SAA talks on the eve of Carla del Ponte's planned visit,
the operation had three main goals: first, to strengthen the
position of BIA chief Rade BULATOVIC; second, to strengthen the RS
leadership; and third, to preserve Kostunica's "voluntary surrender"
policy.


5. (s) Ljajic said that, as a result of this all-BIA operation,
Kostunica was making a play to make BULATOVIC an indispensable
resource for del Ponte for concluding ICTY business. As such, he
expected del Ponte to lobby now for BULATOVIC to stay in his position
as BIA chief - a key point of contention between DS and DSS in
coalition negotiations that remained unresolved even after the
government was formed. Now, Ljajic said, DS's hands would be tied -
they could not legitimately fight BULATOVIC staying on if del Ponte
was pushing to keep him. This, Ljajic said, would naturally hurt the
DS internally and with its voters, "but no more than they have
already hurt themselves with all their concessions" in forming a
coalition government with DSS, he added.


6. (s) Ljajic also maintained the move was designed to bolster the
RS police and political leadership. Ljajic said the RS leadership
has come under increasing pressure to do more on police reform and
ICTY cooperation, and up to now did not have a legitimate public
PIWFC capture to their credit. Wrapping up Tolimir, he surmised,
would lessen the pressures on the RS leadership to do more on police
reforms for the time being. Finally, Ljajic noted that, by pushing
Tolimir across the border, Kostunica could maintain his policy of
pursuing only voluntary surrenders, a key touchstone for Socialists,
Radicals, and others in the "anti-Hague lobby." This would serve to
dampen somewhat the opposition to the move by SPS and SRS
politicians, who would likely question Kostunica's nationalist
credentials if he were to sanction an arrest in Serbia.


7. (s) Nevertheless, SRS SecGen Aleksander Vucic, within 24 hours
of the arrest, was already in the press alleging (correctly, as it
turned out) that Tolimir had been arrested in Serbia. Tolimir
himself proclaimed this to be true, and accused the GoS of illegally
extraditing a Serbian citizen to another country for prosecution. On
June 4, parliamentary defense and security committee chairman (and
SPS president) Ivica Dacic called for an immediate investigation into
the allegations and the details of the operation. Asked what the
government's press plan was to deal with this (given the fact that
the accusations are true),Ljajic said the government has no plan.
He said Kostunica and the government will simply remain silent, as
they have in past potential scandals, and wait for the story to peter
out. Meanwhile, Ljajic said there are solid leads on remaining PIFWC
Stojan Zupljanin, and said Goran Hadzic's family has made contact
with Serbian officials, which he said was a positive sign.


8. (s) Comment: We have heard elsewhere that some of the
supposedly key Action Plan members were left out, or kept out, of the

BELGRADE 00000797 002 OF 002


loop on this operation. While Ljajic has his own agenda (he is a
Tadic ally with a small power base eager to maintain good ties with
the international community),his information fits both with other
details we have received and with the main stream of conjecture in
the international community. We told Ljajic that, whatever the
details, it is good that Tolimir is in The Hague - and we expect
Mladic to follow, given the proven operational capacity and political
will, however selectively applied. We reiterated to him that this is
a window of opportunity to move forward on the ICTY front, but
reminded him that the window has already been framed - most recently
by Ollie Rehn - with the condition that Mladic be turned over before
the SAA can be signed.

POLT